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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to provide insights into what the concept of audit quality 
means for a number of parties who have responsibilities for delivering, 
commissioning or evaluating audit quality in practice - auditors, AC members and 
quality inspectors concerning. It explores the influence of internal and external 
factors in the auditing setting on the construction of meaning of audit quality and 
how meaning is symbolised in practice. This research is based on an interpretive 
approach employing research methods of document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and a survey questionnaire. Drawing on a symbolic interactionist 
framework, the research illustrates the process of giving meaning to audit quality in 
practice.  
The study identifies various constructs that give meaning to audit quality in practice 
– auditors‘ characteristics, firm‘s characteristics, compliance obligations, the 
content and control of audit procedures, financial statement quality and client 
service orientation. It also identifies acts such as asking challenging questions, 
professional appearance, the quality of interaction between auditor and AC, 
consultation and training, and objects such as documents and records as 
fundamental in symbolising audit quality in practice. The study also highlights the 
existence of possible conflicts between some of these constructs of audit quality 
and the potential for problems in audit quality in practice.  
The research reports that the audit practitioners predominantly framed their 
conceptions of the meaning of audit quality around four important constructs: client 
service, compliance obligations, the technical audit process or content, and 
individual auditors‘ characteristics. Client service is found to have a particular 
importance for the practitioners‘ meaning of audit quality. Their construction of the 
meaning for audit quality is influenced by interactions with other audit market 
constituents as well as by economic and societal forces in the auditing environment. 
Auditors perceptions of what quality means in practice are underpinned by factors 
such as the need to legitimise the conduct of the auditor, to restore trust and 
confidence in the public at large about the quality of audit services, to maintain 
profitability and the survival of the audit firm given the competitive and commercial 
pressures in the audit market, and to legitimise firm methodology and the resulting 
audit process to outside constituents. 
Amongst the AC members interviewed, the meaning of audit quality appears to be 
associated with the characteristics of individual auditors, in particular, auditors‘ 
interpersonal and behavioural skills, attributes of the audit firm (size and industry 
specialisation) and financial statement quality. The findings show that AC members 
perceptions of audit quality significantly depend on the ‗relational‘ rather than the 
technical attributes of individual auditors. The quality of the financial statements 
also dominates the AC members‘ perceptions of audit quality rather than a technical 
interpretation of the quality of the content of the audit process. The AC members‘ 
conception of meaning for audit quality is influenced by interaction and 
communication with the external auditors.  
For the quality inspectors, the meaning of audit quality is mainly constructed in 
relation to the conduct or content of an audit. Therefore, the level of challenge to 
the management of the audit, and the sufficiency of evidence and documentation 
are important for constructing their perceptions of audit quality. They also ascribe 
considerable importance to the internal compliance-quality control applied within 
the audit firm the notion of audit quality.  
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Overall, the study describes the multifaceted meaning of audit quality and how this 
is influenced and shaped by interactions – based on role expectations, self-image, 
economic and social factors – and illustrates the way in which various acts and 
objects are used to represent practical meaning for the abstract concept of audit 
quality in practice. These findings have relevance for auditors, other parties to audit 
engagements, policy makers and regulators concerned with the contribution of 
auditing to the financial reporting system and for academic researchers seeking to 
develop a deeper understanding of how that contribution is achieved in practice. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 Subject of the Thesis 
This thesis takes as its subject the manner in which audit partners, audit committee 
(AC) members and audit quality inspectors construct meanings for the concept of 
audit quality that could be influential in the conduct and evaluation of audit 
engagements in practice, and considers these meanings in the broader institutional 
and social context of practice. Concepts of audit quality have been examined 
extensively in research studies looking at the links between observable signals of 
auditor quality (such as the size of the audit firm or industry specialisation) and 
indicators of financial reporting quality (such as the issuance of modified audit 
reports or the quality of reported earnings) (see Francis, 2004 and Watkins, Hillison 
and Morecroft, 2004 for reviews of literature). In these studies, concepts of audit 
quality have been normatively defined and narrowed down to specific 
characteristics or decisions (Humphrey et al., 2007b) and the indicators quality of 
the audit are restricted to observable aspects of the resultant financial reports 
rather than the content of the audit process itself. In consequence, less is known 
about how auditors‘ conceptualise the meaning of audit quality or what the term 
means in the conduct of the audit, that is, the behaviours and attributes that audit 
practitioners associate with audit quality. In addition, little information is available 
about the understanding of AC members and quality inspectors of the term and 
how it features in their evaluation process of audit quality. This study attempts to 
add to research on these issues.  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: section 1.1. provides brief 
insight into the regulatory framework for auditing in the UK; section 1.2 briefly 
introduces the issue of audit quality; section 1.3 outlines the research questions 
and describes the research approach; section 1.4 discusses the justification for this 
study; and finally section 1.5 describes the layout of the thesis with a summary of 
the contents of each chapter.  
1.1 Regulatory Framework in the UK 
In recent years there have been considerable developments in the auditing, 
financial reporting and governance regimes around the world, with the events 
involving Enron-Andersen and similar cases heightening the interest of regulators 
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and the public at large concerning auditing, financial reporting and corporate 
governance practices. The cases have raised concerns in several areas relating to 
the quality of audit performance, the integrity of financial statements, and the 
effectiveness of the AC to oversee both the financial reporting process and the 
external audit function. In response to these events, various changes to the 
regulatory regime for auditing and governance practices were made in the US and 
in other jurisdictions including the UK and the EU. The impact of the cases has been 
marked by the strengthening of the legal regulations governing auditing and 
reporting, for example through the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) 
in the US and the Revised Eighth Directive for member states of the EU. These have 
introduced significant changes in various areas of auditing, reporting and 
governance practices and include independent inspections of listed companies‘ 
audits, restriction of joint provision of audit and non-audit services, greater 
independence in the setting of auditing standards and strengthening the role of the 
AC in the financial reporting and auditing process.  
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s some major changes had already been 
made in the regulatory regime for auditing, corporate reporting and governance in 
the UK. The changes were partly caused by corporate scandals (BCCI, Maxwell and 
Polly Peck) which happened at that time. In consequence, the auditing and 
reporting regime, which primarily comprised company law and self-regulation by 
the accountancy bodies, was supplemented with the establishment of the Cadbury 
Committee for corporate governance which led to the introduction of the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance, and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) with its 
various operating bodies, such as the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). 
In 2002 the UK government once again undertook several reforms in its 
accounting, auditing and governance regime in response to Enron and other 
corporate failures because of concerns with quality of financial reporting, and the 
effectiveness of the audit process and the oversight role of the AC (CGAA, 2003). 
Against the backdrop of the corporate failures, the Higgs Committee Report and the 
Smith Committee Report were released in 2003. The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance was also updated during that year (details background on corporate 
governance framework is discussed in section 2.4). The Accountancy Foundation, 
which was established by the accountancy professional bodies in 2000, was 
restructured and ceased regulating professional practice in auditing. In addition, the 
Ethics Standard Board (ESB) was dissolved. In 2004, three of its key boards – 
Auditing Practices Board (APB), Investigation and Discipline Board (IDB) and 
14 
 
Review Board – were transferred under the FRC to accommodate the new 
regulatory structure (see Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1: The Structure of Audit Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Turley (2008) 
Under the new structure, various operating boards were set up to oversee different 
aspects of regulatory responsibility. The new structure aimed to strengthen the 
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oversight and regulation of the profession within the FRC (Turley, 2008, p.210). 
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In 2006, the Revised Eighth Company Law Directive on Statutory Audit was 
adopted by the Council of the European Union thereby driving another development 
in the auditing regime in the UK. Some of the key changes include requirements for 
audit firms to publish an annual transparency report and disclose information 
concerning the legal and ownership structure, internal quality control system and 
audit fees (Humphrey and Moizer, 2008). The adoption has also put emphasis on 
the importance of communication between the external auditors and the AC. The 
members‘ states are also required to establish independent public oversight boards 
that are responsible for, among other things, monitoring the audit firm‘s compliance 
with the applicable regulatory framework and audit quality. The most significant 
change that happened during this time was the establishment of the Audit 
Inspection Unit (AIU), which is part of the Professional Oversight Board (POB) with 
responsibility for the inspection of public interest audits and publication of the 
results of the inspections (more discussion about the AIU is available in section 
2.3). The new regulatory framework has thus set new criteria for and placed new 
conditions on audit practice (Humphrey et al., 2007a). 
The UK government has also undertaken a review that has led to the revision of the 
Companies Act 1985. In consequence, the Companies Act 2006 was issued and a 
number of changes were made. For example, the Act allows audit firms to limit 
their liability and establishes a criminal offence when a misleading audit report is 
issued. The Act also enhances the transparency of the audit process by requiring 
the name of the individual audit partners signing audit reports to be identified and 
increases the quality of information available regarding auditor resignations.  
On the corporate reporting front, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) were introduced for financial statements of listed companies for the period 
beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Listed companies were required to disclose 
more information in addition to the audited financial statements (such as a 
Directors‘ Remuneration Report, Directors‘ Report and Statement of Compliance 
with the UK Corporate Governance Code), with consequent implications for the role 
of the external auditors who are now required to verify that information. Some 
accounting standards in the IFRSs require the use of fair value measurement, which 
requires a greater use of judgement (both by management and auditor) in the 
preparation and audit of financial statements (FRC, 2006b).  
In concluding this brief outline on the regulatory framework in the UK, it is 
observed that significant changes have been made to the auditing regime as a 
specific response to the corporate collapses and auditing scandals. These 
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developments offer an interesting background to the subject of the thesis. Audit 
quality as the subject of the thesis will be briefly introduced in the next section. 
1.2 Audit Quality 
To understand company audits, it is helpful first to understand its rationale and the 
role played by the external auditors. Company audits exist because of a separation 
between the ownership and the control of companies in the modern economy where 
shareholders or owners have given resources to managers with the direction of 
maximising their wealth. Nonetheless, it is argued that opportunistic managers 
have a propensity for not reporting the true state of the performance of the 
company, which could result in residual loss to the owners. Therefore, the role of 
the auditors is to reduce agency costs because of information asymmetry and 
competing interests between the two parties. For this reason, agency theory, which 
concerns the control and information asymmetry between the shareholders and 
managers, is normally used theoretically to legitimate the reason why company 
audit is important in the modern economy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Arnold and 
de Lange, 2004). 
From the economic perspective, audit services are about reducing agency costs 
through the verification of financial statements by an independent auditor. The 
verification process involves the accumulation and evaluation of evidence, which 
later becomes a basis for the auditors to form their professional opinion or 
judgement on the financial statements. The result of the process, the audit opinion 
that is stated in the audit report, is believed to enhance the credibility and quality 
of the financial statements. It can be argued that the value of the audit services 
depends on the form of opinion issued by the auditors. In consequence, the value 
of the audit opinion depends on the quality of audit work carried out by the auditors 
(Moizer, 2005). Audit quality is important because it will affect the credibility and 
reliability of the audit opinion. If the auditors perform a poor audit, the opinion 
rendered about the audited financial statements could be misleading, and this 
would definitely affect the users‘ economic decisions. In this discourse, audit quality 
is thought to protect the economic interest of the owners and other interested 
parties by enhancing the value of the financial statements prepared by the 
managers.  
Concerns about audit quality and the factors that influence quality have been 
longstanding subjects of interest in academic, practitioner and regulatory debates 
about auditing. The objective of enhancing audit quality underlies standard setting 
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activities and doubts about the quality of audit have motivated investigations and 
other actions by regulators (see for example, Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; 
FRC, 2006b and 2008). In like manner, academic research has examined the links 
between various factors and the possibility of quality differentiation between audit 
firms. Much of the research literature investigating audit quality relies on the 
definition proposed by DeAngelo (1981a), that audit quality is the market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both: (i) identify a breach in the client 
company‘s accounting system and (ii) report that breach, that is, that the auditor 
has both the technical competence to detect any material errors during the audit 
process, and the independence to ensure that material errors and omissions are 
corrected or disclosed in the auditor‘s report. Following DeAngelo, who also argued 
that because evaluating audit quality is costly, less costly surrogates or proxies 
such as firm size and reputation will be used as indicators of audit quality, research 
studies have frequently employed surrogates to test the effects of the 
independence and competence of the auditors. Although mixed results have been 
reported, prior research has showed that factors such as industry expertise, the 
amount of non-audit services, tenure and size of the audit firm may be associated 
with variations in audit quality (details about studies related to audit quality are 
presented in Chapter 2).  
Notwithstanding the important contribution of archival and other studies which, 
following a rationalist economics perspective, have looked for systematic evidence 
that audit quality is influential in audit contracts, some have argued that this 
approach neglects the wider social, political and historical contexts of auditing 
(Power, 1996; Humphrey, 2008). The dominance of a functionalist or positivist 
approach may constrain our understanding of actual auditing practices (Dirsmith et 
al., 1985). As a result, the importance of the social and institutional dimensions of 
auditing has increasingly been recognised and incorporated into research studies 
(Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Carpenter and Dirsmith, 1993; Curtis and Turley, 
2007; Hudaib and Haniffa, 2009). Despite the development of studies that place 
greater emphasis on understanding audit practice in its context, so far little 
attention has been given to exploring how the meaning of the concept of audit 
quality is constructed in practice in the context of the institutional and social 
environment of the audit setting. Specifically, little evidence is available about how 
audit practitioners translate the general concept of audit quality into behaviour that 
affects the actual conduct of the audit in practice, that is, what audit quality means 
to those who carry out audit engagements. Likewise, limited evidence is available 
about AC members and quality inspectors understanding of the term of audit 
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quality or how AC members and quality inspectors, who have oversight 
responsibilities for auditing and financial reporting, assess the quality of the work 
performed by external auditors. These issues are essentially the subject of this 
thesis, which aims, through documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews and 
a survey questionnaire to enhance understanding concerning the meaning of audit 
quality in practice.  
1.3 Research Questions and Research Approach 
The main objective of this study is to understand the meaning of audit quality in 
practice. The first research question seeks to advance the understanding of the 
concept of audit quality from the perspectives of those who deliver the audit 
services, that is the audit partners, and those who are responsible for 
commissioning and monitoring the audit services, that is the AC members and 
quality inspectors:  
Research question 1: How is the concept of audit quality understood and applied by  
key participants in the audit process? 
This study approaches auditing practice as not only a technical activity but also a 
socially constructed activity. Perceptions and beliefs about audit quality are seen as 
emerging from a complex series of interactions between various constituents in the 
auditing environment, influenced by regulatory, societal and economic factors in the 
auditing environment. The study also concerns the representations of the meaning 
of audit quality in practice, that is, to understand how various symbols (words, 
objects and acts) are used to represent the meaning of audit quality. Hence, the 
study attempts to answer the following research questions: 
Research question 2: What are the factors that influence the construction of the  
meaning of audit quality in practice? 
Research question 3: How is the meaning of audit quality represented in practice? 
The final set of questions aims to enhance knowledge about the impact of auditing 
and governance reforms on audit quality. Two further sets of more specific 
questions are developed to support investigations into this issue.  
Research question 4: What is the impact of the AIU on audit quality?  
Research question 5: What is the impact of the AC on audit quality? 
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An analytical framework, which has been developed based on symbolic 
interactionism, is used to address these research questions. The framework 
facilitates the development of an understanding of the social meaning of audit 
quality in its institutional and social context. Semi-structured interviews are 
employed as the main research method because this allows for in-depth, 
contextualised study, which is appropriate to address the research questions. A 
survey questionnaire and archive documents from the public domain including the 
FRC Discussion Paper and the AIU Annual Inspection Reports are also examined to 
provide additional evidence from which to address the research questions.  
1.4 The Justification and Importance of the Study 
As reported earlier, the objective of this thesis is to revisit the meaning of the 
concept of audit quality and to understand the representation of that meaning in 
practice. It also investigates the influence of internal and external factors in the 
audit environment on the construction of the meaning. The motivation for 
undertaking this study is because there has been no extensive in-depth research 
that simultaneously explores the practical meaning of audit quality from the 
perspectives of the audit partners, AC members and quality inspectors. There is 
also limited in-depth investigation that explores the influence of a range of 
contextual factors in the auditing setting that may influence the perceptions of audit 
quality held by audit partners, AC members and quality inspectors. The current 
auditing and governance environments also provide an interesting context in which 
to study the issue of audit quality. The importance of the study can be summarised 
as follows: 
1) It adds to and extends the existing body of knowledge on audit quality 
literature, in particular by providing evidence drawn from audit practice in the 
UK and by employing the interpretive approach rather than the mainstream or 
functionalist approach. 
2) It will furnish further insights into prevailing factors that affect audit practices 
and concept of audit quality. 
3) It will help regulators, corporate managers, society, practitioners, and 
academicians to gain a better understanding of the nature and factors that 
might affect audit quality.  
4) It will empirically inform the debate surrounding the potential benefits of 
direct regulation of audit practices to promote a high quality of audit.  
5) It will assist in comprehending the role of the AC members in promoting high 
quality auditing. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This section shows the organisation of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
and other documentary records that are relevant to the notion of audit quality. This 
then leads to a discussion and the identification of gaps in the analysis of the 
literature, that is, the lack of research examining the meaning of audit quality 
within the institutional and organisational context of audit practice.  
Chapter 3 outlines both the theoretical framework and research design employed in 
this study. Symbolic interactionism is presented, which provides a framework for 
the analysis and understanding of the empirical work in the study. This provides a 
basis to consider the complex interaction between auditors and other audit market 
constituents and environmental factors that influence the meaning of audit quality 
in practice. This chapter also describes the interpretive research approach that 
underpins the research methodology, which guides the research design for the 
study.  
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the first stage of the study, which describes 
views about audit quality expressed in responses of interested parties on the 
discussion paper, entitled ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ issued by the FRC in 2006. An 
analysis of the key issues raised by respondents is presented and becomes the 
basis for further investigation in the second stage of study, which involves semi-
structured interviews and a survey questionnaire.  
The subsequent three chapters discuss the empirical work of the second stage of 
the study. The chapters explain the findings regarding the conception of the 
meaning of audit quality, factors influencing construction of that meaning and the 
representation of audit quality in practice. Evidence collected from audit partners, 
AC members and quality inspectors is presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
respectively. The potential impact of the role of the AC members and quality 
inspectors to audit quality are also discussed.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusion of the empirical work of the study. 
Critical issues with regard to perceptions of audit quality in the organisational and 
social context in which auditing is conducted are highlighted. This chapter concludes 
the thesis by considering the contributions and limitations of the study and by 
making suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Perspectives on Audit Quality 
2.0  Introduction  
The previous chapter presented a brief overview of research relating to audit 
quality. It introduced the research area and discussed the background to the 
research problem. The purpose of this chapter is to review a number of major 
approaches to researching audit quality that have been applied or areas of research 
that are relevant to audit quality. The literature on inputs and outcomes related to 
audit quality, audit process, perceptions of audit quality and audit quality in an 
organisational and social context are evaluated. The evaluation of research 
concerning inputs and outcomes related to audit quality, audit process and 
perceptions of audit quality contribute to our current understanding regarding the 
concepts and definitions of audit quality, factors or situations that affect audit 
quality in practice, and the perceptions of various participants in the auditing 
environment concerning audit quality. Evidence shows limited evaluations of the 
concept and definition of audit quality from those involved (such as audit 
practitioners, AC members and audit quality inspectors) in the audit process. 
Evaluation of studies of auditing practice in its organisational and social context has 
contributed to our understanding concerning the relationship between the audit 
practice and notion of audit quality, which highlights the issues of legitimacy, image 
management and conflicts in practice. Evidence reveals that limited studies appear 
to have addressed wider organisational and institutional dimensions in investigating 
the concept of audit quality in practice.  
This chapter also reviews other documents and publications relevant to audit 
quality that are primarily drawn from the arena of regulatory policy on auditing. It 
examines practitioner and regulatory conception of audit quality. The purpose is to 
develop an understanding of the multiple perspectives ascribed to audit quality and 
provide a broader viewpoint of the various debates that affect this investigation. 
The literature on ACs in association with audit quality and documents relevant to AC 
are also reviewed, which contribute to our understanding about their roles, 
operations and effects. The review shows that the responsibility of ACs for 
overseeing audit quality appears to be expanding as a result of the changes in the 
corporate governance framework. Evidence concerning their effects on the external 
audit function is evaluated recognising that there is limited understanding regarding 
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the processes associated with the operation or activity of ACs and the manner in 
which they influence audit quality in practice.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 reviews research 
studies that are relevant to audit quality and a number of themes under this topic 
are considered. In particular, it draws attention to the limits of the conventional 
vision of audit quality and related research approaches and to the socially 
constructed nature of audit practices, thus highlighting the need for research in 
understanding audit quality within its organisational and social context. This part of 
the chapter will argue that this approach to auditing research may have the 
potential to illustrate some additional and different aspects of audit quality in 
practice. Section 2.2 reviews professional perspectives of audit quality and section 
2.3 reviews regulatory perspectives of audit quality, both of which perspectives 
recognise broader aspects of audit quality. Section 2.4 evaluates prior literature on 
ACs that examines the AC process and its impact on audit quality. Section 2.5 
discusses the implications of the review for the current study. This forms the basis 
for formulation of the research questions and developing the research objectives of 
the thesis. Finally, section 2.6 provides a summary of the chapter.  
2.1   Research Approaches to Audit Quality 
The concept of audit quality has proved difficult to define with certainty. It is not 
immediately or directly observable and is difficult to measure (Power, 1997). 
Moreover, audit markets‘ participants have conflicting roles and different 
expectations that lead to different interpretations of audit quality (Sutton, 1993). 
As a result, different people tend to have different definitions and ways of 
measuring it (Rasmussen and Jensen, 1998; Watkins et al., 2004), which suggests 
ambiguity and subjectivity in the term audit quality, as recognised by the FRC: 
“There is no single agreed definition of audit quality that can be used as a 
„standard‟ against which actual performance can be assessed” (FRC, 2006b, 
p. 16). 
The regulator in the UK and professional practitioners have never defined the term 
precisely although various initiatives have been built around the term and serve to 
influence contemporary understandings of such concepts (both practitioner and 
regulatory perspectives on audit quality are discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively). The professional literature is inclined to define audit quality in relation 
to meeting the requirements of the auditing standards during the course of the 
audit (Krishnan and Schauer, 2001; McConnell and Banks, 1998). In comparison, 
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various academic research approaches that are relevant to audit quality (see Figure 
2.1) have defined and measured audit quality in a number of ways, involving a 
combination of measures linked to audit outcomes, such as audit failures (Feroz et 
al., 1991) and the quality of financial reporting (Becker et al., 1998; Gul et al., 
2003), process measures that are related to auditor performance (Sutton, 1993; 
Malone and Roberts, 1996), and to capture quality attributes of relevance to users 
and preparers of financial statements (Schroeder, 1986; Carcello et al., 1992; Duff, 
2009). One research approach takes into account the influence of the organisational 
and social context of auditing practice. This line of research questions the influence 
of people, processes and the audit environment such as the role of regulation, AC 
members, audit clients and professional bodies to audit practice. This thesis 
essentially adopts this approach as a basis for the research. In the remaining part 
of the section, various approaches to audit quality are discussed.  
Figure 2.1: Aspects to Audit Quality 
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probability that a given auditor will both (i) 'identify a breach in the client 
company‘s accounting system‘ and (ii) ‗report that breach‘ – that is, the auditor has 
both the technical competence to detect any material errors during the audit 
process, and the independence to ensure material errors and omissions are 
corrected or disclosed in the auditor‘s report. Thus, audit quality is connected to 
both the actuality and the perceptions of two important determinants of audit 
quality: competence and independence. Following DeAngelo, who argued that 
assessing audit quality is costly because of the limited ability of the consumers to 
observe audit procedures used in an audit engagement and the limited information 
about incentives within the auditor-client contract, she proposed the use of auditor 
size as a surrogate for auditor quality. She also argued that the larger audit firms 
are of better quality compared to other auditors because they have less economic 
reliance on any single client. Moreover, incentives for larger audit firms to reduce 
audit quality will be lower because of the economic importance of maintaining 
reputation (larger audit firms with greater numbers of audit clients may have ‗more 
to lose‘ if they fail to detect and report material errors and omissions). 
Inputs and Outcomes Related to Audit Quality 
A number of strands of research that are largely built on DeAngelo‘s definition of 
audit quality can be recognised and these are summarised in Figure 2.2. The main 
theme of research in this area involves the consideration of the relationship 
between measures of ‗output‘ quality (such as quality of earnings and regulatory 
sanctions) and various ‗input‘ related variables (such as audit firm size, audit fees 
and audit tenure).  
Figure 2.2: Inputs and Outcomes Related to Audit Quality 
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Failure to deliver adequate output quality has been inferred from sources such as 
auditor litigation (Palmrose, 1988) and the imposition of regulatory sanctions (Feroz 
et al., 1991). Financial reporting quality has been linked to the auditor‘s ability to 
improve the credibility of earnings (Becker et al., 1998; Gul et al., 2003), the 
accuracy of the audit opinion (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004), the probability that the 
auditor will not issue an unqualified opinion for financial statements containing 
material misstatements (Lee at al., 1999), and the accuracy of the information 
reported by the auditor (Davidson and Neu, 1993). Input factors that have 
commonly been tested for evidence of an association with variation in these 
outcomes include the size of the audit firm, audit fees (as an indicator of audit 
effort), whether the firm is a specialist in the industry and whether the degree of 
auditor independence is threatened by the presence of fees from non-audit services 
and long audit tenure. Although mixed results have been reported, prior research 
has recognised audit fees, the amount of non-audit services and audit tenure as 
input factors that may be associated with variations in audit quality 
Audit firm size has been the most commonly studied surrogate for audit quality. It 
is argued that the larger audit firms are higher quality than the smaller firms for 
various reasons. First, larger firms are able to hire highly skilled employees because 
of their reputation. In addition, the larger firms are also able to provide rigorous 
training for their staff, which contributes to the development of the skills and 
knowledge of the auditors. Second, it is also argued that more developed and 
structured audit approach or methodology applied by the larger firms increases 
their ability to issue accurate audit opinions through greater detection of errors and 
omissions (Carcello et al., 1995). However, other studies provide limited evidence 
on the association between the structured audit approaches and the type of 
opinions rendered (Mutchler and William, 1990).  
One of the most common approaches that have been widely investigated in this 
area is the association between audit firm size and various attributes associated 
with the quality of financial reporting. Researchers hypothesize that the clients of 
big size audit firms report more accurate financial information and less earnings 
management. Large audit firms, such as the Big Four, are argued to be more likely 
to issue a more accurate opinion and their audit clients to experience fewer 
restatements of financial statements and be subject to fewer regulatory sanctions 
(Feroz, 1991).  
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Big size firms are said to be more conservative in reporting because they have 
more incentives to reduce litigation loss in order to maintain their professional 
reputation and independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; DeFond et al., 2002) and are less 
likely to be economically dependent on a single client (Pearson, 1980). In this 
context, it is predicted that a higher quality auditor is more likely to control 
inappropriate behaviour of the client‘s management and, thus, more likely to 
control earnings manipulation and ensure accurate financial information is issued.  
Using archival data, some results support the hypothesis that big size auditors are 
associated with a lower incidence of earnings management (Becker et al., 1998: 
Kim et al., 2003). Similarly, a few published studies show that reported earnings 
forecasts of companies audited by big size auditors are more accurate than non-big 
size auditors, implying more accurate financial information (Chen, Lin and Zhou, 
2005; Lee et al., 2006). In contrast, some studies find no significant difference in 
the reported discretionary accruals of clients audited by the differing size of firms 
(Jeong and Rho, 2004; Caneghem; 2004; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006).  
Kim et al. (2003) concluded that big size audit firms have more incentive to deter 
aggressive earnings management when: i) there is a conflict or convergence of 
reporting incentives (income-increasing accounting choices) between corporate 
managers and external auditors; and ii) there is high litigation risk for failure to 
detect income overstatement. They argued that when auditors face these two 
situations auditors of the big size audit firms exercise a high degree of professional 
scepticism to restrict the aggressive behaviour of corporate managers compared to 
the smaller firms.  
Using archival data from firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from year 1994 
to 1998, Jeong and Rho (2004) found no significant difference in the reported 
discretionary accruals of companies audited by either the then Big Six or non-Big 
Six auditors. This finding is also consistent for companies that switch from non-Big 
Six to Big Six auditors and vice versa. The results show that there is no quality 
differentiation between different sizes of audit firms in Korea. In addition, the size 
of audit firms does not influence variation in the quality of financial reporting (in 
terms of reported discretionary accruals). Similarly, Caneghem (2004) found a 
negative association between the size of audit firms and the financial reporting 
quality based on a sample of listed companies in the UK. He concluded that the 
relationship between audit quality and the financial reporting quality are rather 
inconclusive because of weak support for audit firm size ability to restrict earnings 
management. 
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Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) undertook a comparative study to investigate the 
issue of earnings management in a European context. They examined the effects of 
national audit environment, audit firm quality (using proxy of audit firm size) and 
reliance on international capital markets on earnings management activities. Using 
data from firms in France, Germany and the UK, they discovered that the 
magnitude of earnings management practices varies across the three countries. 
Their study found three important findings. First, stricter national audit 
environments play a significant role in constraining earnings management activities 
regardless of the size of the audit firms between the three countries. Second, the 
influence of big size audit firms on earnings management activities only exists in 
the UK because of a stricter investor protection environment but not in France or 
Germany. Finally, firms that rely on international capital markets are associated 
with a higher level of accruals, which implies that NYSE listing does not deter 
earnings management. Overall, they concluded that monitoring strength by big size 
auditors on discretionary accruals is not uniform across the three countries.  
A few published studies have used earnings forecasts during the initial public 
offering (IPO) to investigate the relationship between proxies of audit quality and 
the financial reporting quality. Chen, Lin and Zhou (2005) provided evidence that 
suggests that big size and specialist auditors are associated with high quality 
financial reporting. Using data of Taiwan IPO firms, analysis reveals that the clients 
of the Big Five auditors reported less unexpected accruals. The result implies that 
specialist and big size auditors are able to mitigate earnings management, and, 
thus, contribute to more accurate financial information.  
Lee et al. (2006) carried out a study to evaluate the relationship between the size 
of audit firms on both the accuracy and conservatism of audited earnings forecasts 
provided in the Australian IPO prospectuses. Using a sample of 215 firms, from 
year 1991 to 1998, they found that earnings forecasts reported and audited by the 
then Big Six firms are more accurate than smaller firms. They found that big size 
auditors are more conservative on reported earnings forecasts, which indicates a 
high quality of financial reporting. 
Prior research shows that larger audit firms receive larger audit fees compared to 
smaller firms. It is argued that larger audit fees reflect high audit quality through 
greater audit effort, which influences the ability of the auditors to detect material 
misstatements (Elitzur and Falk, 1996) and constrain earnings management 
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). In a similar manner, the additional premium 
associated with larger audit fees is believed to be related to specialised knowledge 
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of a particular audit firm that contributes to high audit quality (Palmrose, 1986; 
Balachandran and Simon, 1994). The larger audit firms with greater clientele within 
the same industry are believed to have in-depth understanding of the nature of 
business and risks in that particular industry. Nonetheless, the evidence is mixed 
and several studies have been unsuccessful in identifying an association between 
audit fees and auditor effort that are associated with higher audit quality (Dye, 
1993; Hoitash et al., 2007). Moreover, the premium on audit fees might be 
attributed to brand name value or at least the perception of higher quality audit 
rather than expertise relating to their industry specialisation. 
A study by Caramanis and Lennox (2008) examined the effects of audit effort 
(using proxy of audit hours worked) on quality of earnings. Using analysis from a 
database of hours worked by auditors on 9,738 audits in Greece between year 1994 
and 2002, their study showed that lower audit hours are associated with positive 
and larger abnormal accruals. In addition, when an audit effort is low managers are 
more aggressive in managing earnings in order to meet or beat the earnings 
benchmark. Their findings also showed a significant negative relationship between 
audit hours and income-increasing earnings management for Big Five firms, which 
means that big size auditors exert more audit effort (work longer hour) and are 
able to monitor aggressive earnings management. They concluded that lower audit 
effort gives an opportunity for managers to aggressively manage their reported 
earnings.  
Some studies have examined the impact of non-audit fees on the competence and 
independence of auditors. This area of research concerns whether the provision of 
non-audit services would impair auditors‘ independence through economic 
dependence on a client because of large fees unrelated to the audit. The research 
also concerns whether the provision of non-audit services will lead to higher audit 
quality as a result of ‗knowledge spillover‘ or whether auditors gain greater 
understanding of the client and their business processes because of additional 
services. In general, past research has documented inconsistent results concerning 
the association between high non-audit service fees and erosion of auditor 
independence that reduces audit quality (Frankel et al., 2002; Kinney et al., 2004). 
In similar manner, prior research has shown mixed results concerning the potential 
beneficial impact of non-audit services on audit quality (Simunic, 1984; Wu, 2006). 
Beyond the focus on auditor size, some studies have examined the impact of 
auditor tenure (Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Stanley and DeZoort, 2007; Manry et al., 
2008), and audit and non-audit fees (Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2006; Lim and 
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Tan, 2008) on financial reporting quality. There are two main competing opinions in 
relation to the impact of audit tenure on audit quality. First, some researchers posit 
that long audit tenure is related to high audit quality through the auditors‘ 
enhanced ability to detect misstatements and errors because of the greater 
understanding of the client‘s business and processes (Johnson et al., 2002; Manry 
et al., 2008). It is argued that longer audit tenure and the provision of non-audit 
services would increase audit quality because of the increased knowledge of specific 
audit clients that is negatively related to the likelihood of financial restatements. 
While, others assert that long tenure could reduce audit quality for the reasons of 
complacency or less rigorous audit procedures that reduce auditors‘ capacity to 
detect errors and misstatements (Shockley, 1982; Deis and Giroux, 1992). Some 
researchers argue that longer audit tenure and high provision of non-audit services 
would impair auditor independence and, consequently, reduce the propensity of the 
auditors to issue an accurate audit opinion.  
Ghosh and Moon (2005) employed a market-based approach and evaluated the 
impact of auditor tenure on perceptions of financial statement users concerning the 
quality of earnings. Specifically, they investigated the perceptions of investors, 
independent rating agencies, and financial analysts on the impact of auditor tenure 
on earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions (as a proxy for 
earnings quality). They found that the investors and financial analysts perceived 
that longer audit tenure could enhance audit quality. In contrast, the independent 
rating agencies perceived the unfavourable impact of auditor tenure on earnings 
quality.  
Using non-audit services as a proxy of audit quality, Gul et al. (2006) hypothesized 
that there is an inverse relationship between non-audit services provided by a 
firm‘s auditor and the earnings quality (measured as the earnings response 
coefficient) and this relationship is weaker for firms audited by Big Six auditors. 
Using archival data, from 840 firm-year observations of Australian companies, they 
found support for the hypothesis; earnings response coefficient is negatively 
associated with non-audit services as indicated by a negative and significant 
coefficient on the earnings. The results imply that investors perceived non-audit 
services affect the credibility of financial statements, but the adverse perception will 
be less profound if the financial statements have been audited by Big Six auditors.  
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In general, prior research has documented mixed results on the relationship 
between audit tenure and audit quality. Again, the evidence of the linkage between 
the surrogates of audit quality and financial reporting quality provides inconsistent 
results.  
Academic researchers have also investigated audit quality from the analysis of audit 
failure cases. It is expected that higher audit quality is reflected through less 
litigation as a consequence of audit failures through auditors‘ ability to detect and 
report material misstatements. For example, Palmrose (1988) examined 472 
sample of legal cases related to audit-related litigation against Big Eight and non-
Big Eight firms in the US from 1960 through 1985. She found that big size audit 
firms were associated with less incidence of litigation than other types of audit firm. 
There are also some studies that employ a case study observation to examine the 
content of an individual case of a company or audit firm in detail (Erickson et al., 
2000; Fuerman, 2004). For example, Erickson et al. (2000) examined detailed legal 
documents (audit working papers and auditor deposition testimony of auditors) of 
audit failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL) in the US. They concluded that lack 
of knowledge and understanding of auditors in LSL‘s business and operations 
contributed to a deficiency in audit procedures, and, consequently, led to audit 
failure.  
Literature on individual auditors tends to focus on the impact of auditor‘s 
professionalism on audit performance. Catanach and Walker (1999) suggest that 
audit quality is a function of auditor performance that can be classified into two 
main aspects. First, the professional ability that is related to auditors‘ ability to 
detect material misstatements and omissions of accounting matters that depends 
on auditor‘s professional attributes such as technical competence, knowledge, 
experience, industry specialisation and technological proficiency. These professional 
attributes are acquired by way of advanced education, training and experience, 
which characterise auditors as members of a profession (Burns and Haga, 1977). In 
a similar manner, the Auditors‘ Code (APB, 2004b) requires that auditors act with 
professional skill, which is derived from their qualification, training and practical 
experience. In this case, auditors are required to have in-depth understanding of 
financial reporting and business issues, together with expertise in accumulating and 
assessing the evidence necessary to form an audit opinion. Empirical research, such 
as the experimental study by Owhoso et al. (2002), suggests that auditors with 
specialist knowledge are better able to detect both mechanical and conceptual 
errors in the financial statements. Similarly, an earlier experimental study by 
Solomon et al. (1999) provides evidence that auditors‘ specialist knowledge 
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deriving from training and direct experiences influences their ability to detect errors 
in the financial statements.  
Second, audit quality is connected to professional conduct, which embraces 
attributes that may include independence, integrity, objectivity and due 
professional care (ISA 200 UK and Ireland; Catanach and Walker, 1999). The 
conceptual framework issued by the IFAC (2005) defines independence as 
comprising two main aspects. First, independence is an attitude of mind that relates 
to auditors acting with integrity and exercising objectivity and professional 
scepticism in his/her professional work. Second, independence in appearance 
concerns the public perception of potential conflicts of interest that compromise 
independence in mind. This aspect of professionalism is important for the auditor to 
report impartial audit opinions by way of resisting client management pressure and 
being aware of what is right and what is wrong in his/her professional conduct (The 
Auditors‘ Code). Independence is also important for the audit profession because it 
is related to the credibility of the audit opinion and the financial statements. 
Suddaby et al. (2009) suggest that auditor independence has long been claimed as 
a core professional value by the auditing profession, which governs their 
performance and behaviours that demonstrate audit quality.  
Overall, much of the research in the area of audit outcomes has used a market 
based data and tests the association between certain proxies of audit quality and 
the related outcome such as the quality of financial reporting (for example the 
extent of earnings management) and case analysis. In general, the research has 
been conducted under the implicit assumption that the proxies of audit quality, 
particularly audit firm size, equate to high audit quality, but has yielded mixed 
results. Nonetheless, the collapse of Arthur Andersen and the banking crisis in 
recent years suggest the need to revisit this assumption. This potentially highlights 
the limited usefulness of audit firm size as a proxy of audit quality, as indicated by 
the FRC and AICPA – that there is no quality differentiation between the sizes of the 
audit firm. Despite the contribution of this area of research in enhancing our 
understanding of audit quality from the perspective of the correlation between the 
proxies of audit quality and financial statements properties (such as abnormal 
accruals), it provides limited information about audit practices that contribute to 
high audit quality. This suggests the need for additional research beyond the 
association between the proxies of audit quality and related outcomes. The next 
section discusses other research approaches that relevant to audit quality.  
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2.1.2  The Audit Process and Audit Quality 
Prior literature on the audit process that is relevant to understanding audit quality 
can be categorised into three main fields of enquiry: first, research on audit 
procedures as a representation of what auditors do, second, studies of the nature of 
auditors‘ judgement and decision making and third, investigation of the prevalence 
of behaviours which may threaten or undermine audit quality. These are shown in 
Figure 2.3 and discussed briefly next. 
Figure 2.3: The Audit Process and Audit Quality 
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Different audit approaches are argued to have different effects on audit 
performance. Bowrin (1998) reviewed the literature concerning audit structure and 
identified the positive impacts of structured approaches on audit effectiveness, 
audit efficiency and the audit firm‘s litigation threat, improvement in consensus of 
auditor judgements and the accuracy of audit decisions. Nonetheless, prior 
literature has produced mixed findings about the relationship between audit 
structure and its potential benefit on various aspects of audit performance 
(Bamber& Snowball, 1988; Morris & Nichols, 1988; Mutchler and Williams, 1990; 
Icerman and Hillison, 1991). For example, Bamber and Snowball (1988) conducted 
a field experiment with 113 audit seniors and examined the impact of different 
audit structure (structured vs. unstructured) on the consensus of auditor 
judgements and auditors‘ use of coordination and control mechanisms in their audit 
performance. They found limited impact of a structured audit approach to 
judgement consensus but auditors from structured firms use greater coordination 
and control mechanism (such as consultations with peers or audit managers) when 
faced with greater uncertainty in the conduct of the audit compared to auditors 
from unstructured firms.  
Mutchler and Williams (1990) studied the relationship between audit technology 
and audit firms going concern opinion. They found that client risk profiles rather 
than audit technology had greater influence on auditor judgement. Morris and 
Nichols (1988) provided evidence of a positive association between a structured 
audit approach with auditor judgement consensus on materiality decisions based on 
the examination of information (interest capitalization decisions) in published 
annual reports. Chow et al. (2006) found evidence of differences in structure of the 
audit process between Big Four firms and national firms in China. They suggested 
that differences in the structure of the audit process may potentially contribute to 
variability and inconsistency in audit performance across auditors and audit 
engagements.  
In an experimental study, Bamber and Ramsay (2000) evaluated the impact of 
auditors‘ specialization on workpaper review process performance. They found that 
auditors‘ specialization did not facilitate a more efficient review process. Agoglia et 
al. (2009) investigated the impact of audit review format on the quality of 
reviewers‘ judgements. They found that the reviewer‘s judgements were affected 
by the form of review format (face-to-face review vs. electronic review) prepared 
by the preparers.  
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Auditor Judgement and Decision Making 
Auditor performance is also reflected in the extensive literature on judgement and 
decision making in auditing, which focuses on the quality of auditors‘ decisions 
(Knechel, 2000). An earlier review of the literature by Libby and Luft (1993) 
classified the effects of knowledge, ability, motivation, and environment that 
enhance our understanding on potential factors that could affect auditor 
performance. Solomon and Trotman‘s (2003) reviewed of this literature identified 
the impact of the following topics: multi-person judgement, heuristics and biases, 
knowledge and memory, probabilistic judgement, environment and motivation, and 
policy capturing on auditors‘ judgement and decision making. Recently, Nelson and 
Tang (2005) reviewed this literature and classified the impact of three broad 
categories: audit tasks, auditor attributes and the interaction between auditor and 
other stakeholders on auditors‘ judgement and task performance.  
Meixner and Welker (1988) examined the impact of auditor experience on 
judgement consensus. They found that the level of judgement consensus among 
participating staff auditors increased with situational and organization experience. 
In other words, the length of time that staff auditors had been associated with the 
same audit managers and auditor‘s office impacted on the judgement consensus. 
Kaplan (1985) investigated the impact of combining the evaluation of internal 
control and audit planning judgments on the auditors‘ consensus of the planned 
number of audit hours. They found no significant difference in the level of 
consensus on audit hours between groups that performed both tasks and groups 
that only performed audit planning judgements. An experimental study by Trotman 
and Yetton (1985) found evidence that the review process significantly reduced 
judgement variance. They did not find a significant difference in performance in the 
review process relative to the interacting group (senior and manager) or composite 
group (two seniors). 
Robertson (2010) found evidence of the influence of audit clients on auditor 
judgement. He showed that clients that used ‗ingratiation‘ (a strategic influence 
tactic) were able to influence auditors to meet their demand. Trotman et al.‘s 
(2005) experimental study, which involved forty-five managers and partners, 
examined the impact of intervention methods (role-playing, passive consideration 
of the client‘s interests and options, and practice) on the client negotiations process 
concerning inventory write-down. They provided evidence of the potential benefits 
of the methods on the auditor‘s negotiation ability.  
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In the absence of definitive measures of the quality of audit judgements, 
researchers tend to focus on the consistency and consensus of auditor decisions, 
that is, whether different auditors faced with similar situations will make the same 
decision. Most of the research involves methodology based on experimental 
settings for capturing and testing judgement of individual auditors and factors that 
may be influential to judgements.  
Quality Threatening Behaviour 
One line of research related to auditor performance has focused on identifying 
factors that would undermine audit quality by way of quality threatening behaviour 
(QTB) (see Table 2.1 for more examples of QTB). Literature defines QTB or 
dysfunctional behaviour1 as actions that could impair the ability of the auditor to 
detect material errors (Kelley and Margheim, 1990). Herrbach (2001) defines 
dysfunctional behaviour as actions taken by an auditor during an engagement that 
reduce evidence-gathering effectiveness inappropriately. While Malone and Roberts 
(1996) define it as the auditors‘ failure to properly execute audit steps.  
 
Table 2.1: List of Specific Quality Threatening Behaviour 
 
Quality Threatening Behaviour  
 
 
 Premature sign off  
 Reducing the amount of work performed below what auditor would 
consider reasonable 
 Failing to research accounting principles 
 Making superficial reviews of client documents 
 Accepting weak client explanations 
 Bias in sample selection 
 Reduction in sample size 
 Reduction in amount of documentation 
 Failing to research technical issues 
 Reliance on client work more than appropriate 
 
 
Four main categories of variables have been identified that could affect auditor 
performance – those related to the individual, those related to superiors in the 
management of the audit, control systems and contextual variables. Mixed results 
have been obtained from studies that have focused on the relationship between the 
incidence of QTB and individual variables such as personality characteristics (Kelley 
                                            
1 Quality threatening behaviour is sometimes described as dysfunctional behaviour or audit 
quality reduction acts. These terms are used interchangeably. 
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and Margheim, 1990; Malone and Roberts, 1996; Otley and Pierce, 1996a), 
professional characteristics (Malone and Roberts, 1996; Otley and Pierce, 1996a; 
Lord and DeZoort, 2001), gender (Pierce and Sweeney, 2003), moral development 
(Ponemon, 1992; Lord and DeZoort, 2001) and ethics (Lightner et al., 1982). 
Previous studies have also examined the association between superior level 
variables such as leadership style and the occurrence of QTB (Otley and Pierce, 
1995; Pierce and Sweeney, 2004). 
For example, Kelly and Margheim (1990) investigated the impact of the 
characteristics of the audit senior team (personality traits, structuring behaviour of 
audit tasks and consideration towards staff auditor) on the behaviour of the staff 
auditors. They examined whether audit senior characteristics moderates the 
dysfunctional behaviour of staff auditors caused by time budget pressure in the US. 
The findings from eighty-five matched pairs of senior/staff responses of 
questionnaires showed high occurrence of QTB (such as premature sign-off audit 
report, reduces the amount of work that would be considered appropriate, failure to 
research accounting principles and make superficial reviews of client documents) in 
practice. The evidence showed limited influence of characteristics of audit senior on 
the dysfunctional behaviour of the staff auditors.  
The impact of control systems on quality has been examined with respect to 
performance evaluation (Sweeney and Pierce, 2004), time deadline and budget 
pressure (Lightner et al.,1982; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; McNair, 1991; Otley 
and Pierce, 1996b; Willet and Page, 1996; Kelley et al., 1999; Lee, 2002) and 
firms‘ quality control and review procedures (Margheim and Pany, 1986; Malone 
and Roberts, 1996; Pierce and Sweeney, 2005). The findings suggest that time 
deadline and budget pressures are associated with a high occurrence of QTB but 
have reported mixed results for quality control and review procedures.  
Public accounting firms are relying on budgets as a form of control mechanism and 
performance measurement tool. As a result, the budget has a potential to create 
pressure within an audit firm because of its dual function. Previous research has 
highlighted ‗the cost-quality dilemma‘ in the public accounting firm because of this 
practice (McNair, 1991; Otley and Pierce, 1996). In general, increasing the quality 
of the audit may involve investing more time in the audit and may lead to further 
costs. In contrast, spending less time would likely affect the quality of auditor 
performance in detecting material errors. Previous research has highlighted 
difficulties in achieving an appropriate balance between controlling audit cost and 
maintaining a high level of audit quality performance. Past studies have shown that 
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auditors sometimes respond to the conflict between cost and quality by engaging in 
dysfunctional behaviour, such as premature sign off on audit steps, reducing the 
amount of work performed below what the auditor considers reasonable and 
accepting weak client explanations (Willet and Page, 1996; Pierce and Sweeney, 
2004).  
Willett and Page (1996) carried out a survey questionnaire to explore irregular 
auditing practices among junior staff auditors in the UK. One-hundred and twelve 
(23% response rate) junior auditors responded to the questionnaire. They found 
that because of time budget pressure irregular auditing does occur among junior 
staff auditors. In comparison, Lee (2002) conducted a case study approach to 
investigate the phenomena of irregular auditing in the context of the audit practice 
environment in the UK. He conducted in-depth interviews with nine junior auditors 
between August 1994 and November 1996. He found that quality reduction acts 
normally occur in immaterial areas of audit and when faced with intense time 
pressure junior audit staff would use their own time to complete satisfactory audit 
tasks. Otley and Pierce (1996b), in a study of audit seniors in Big Six firms in 
Ireland found budget pressure had a significant impact on the incidence of quality 
threatening behaviour. They also found that a high level of organizational 
commitment and effective audit review lead to lower incidence of dysfunctional 
behaviour.  
Other studies highlight the relationship between QTB and contextual variables such 
as audit firm structure (Malone and Roberts, 1996), size of audit firm (Margheim 
and Pany, 1986; Malone and Roberts, 1996), motivation (Lightner et al.,1982), the 
psychological contract (Herrbach, 2001) and social pressure (Lord and DeZoort, 
2001). Collectively this evidence shows there is a significant association between 
audit quality, as evidenced by QTB, and contextual variables within and around the 
audit firms.  
For example, Herrbach (2001) carried out a survey questionnaire with one-hundred 
and seventy senior auditors in France. The main objective of this study was to 
examine the effects of ‗psychological contract‘ on auditor behaviour. In other 
words, this study aimed to investigate how the relationship between the individual 
auditor and audit firm affect auditor performance. Factors such as work autonomy, 
salary and training are some of the variables that were investigated. He found 
limited occurrence of dysfunctional behaviour among the audit seniors. He also 
found a negative association between high work autonomy, professional training 
and salary and quality reduction acts.  
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Using a survey questionnaire, Malone and Roberts (1996) documented a positive 
relationship between effective review procedures and low occurrence of 
dysfunctional behaviour among junior and senior level auditors. They also found a 
negative association between structured audit approaches with the incidence of 
dysfunctional behaviour.  
Analysis of this strand of research shows the value of looking at audit quality 
beyond simple proxy indicators of auditors‘ competence and independence or 
measures of audit quality in relation to inputs and outcomes. The literature 
provides some evidence of contextual factors that can influence audit quality. 
2.1.3. Perceptions of Audit Quality 
Studies on perceptions can be generally divided into two: users‘ and preparers‘ 
perceptions of audit quality and research on the audit expectations gap. These are 
discussed briefly next. 
Users’ and Preparers’ Perceptions of Audit Quality 
Prior research has investigated users‘ and preparers‘ perceptions of audit quality 
and has suggested that preparers, users and auditors view audit quality differently 
(Schroeder et al., 1986; Knapp, 1991; Carcello et al., 1992; Behn et al., 1997; 
Chen et al., 2001; Duff, 2004). Schroeder et al. (1986) examined AC chairpersons 
and audit partners‘ perception on factors that could influence the quality of external 
audits. Eighty-one AC chairs and forty-one audit partners responded to their survey 
questionnaire. The findings show that audit committee chairs perceive audit team 
factors (such as the amount of partner and manager attention to the audit, 
planning and conduct of audit team work, and communication between audit team 
and management) to be more important than the audit firm factors (such as fees, 
peer review, size and reputation) when they assess the audit quality. Furthermore, 
the findings reveal a significant difference between audit partners and audit 
committee chairpersons‘ perceptions concerning six factors: independence, team 
rotation, quality control procedures, auditors‘ technical skills, reputation, and 
communication between the audit team and the audit committee.  
Another study by Knapp (1991) investigated the impact of auditor size, audit tenure 
and general audit strategy on AC members‘ assessment on audit quality. Using an 
experimental study of 122 AC members in the US, he found that AC members 
perceive that auditor size and auditor tenure significantly influence the quality of 
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audit. However, AC members perceive audit strategy as a less important factor 
during the assessment of audit quality.  
Carcello et al. (1992) examined financial controllers‘, institutional investors‘ and 
audit partners‘ perceptions of audit quality through a questionnaire survey. The 
results indicated that all three groups perceive audit team factors as more 
important than audit firm factors in enhancing the quality of the audit. Significant 
differences were reported between preparers/users and audit partners in relation to 
quality factors such as compliance with audit standards, the nature and extent of 
non-audit services, quality control standards and professional certification for firm 
personnel.  
Chen at al. (2001) examined the attributes of audit quality that regulators and 
auditors felt enhance or undermine audit quality in China. In general, team and 
individual factors such as competence, ethics, and communication between the 
audit team and management were rated high as factors that could enhance audit 
quality. In contrast, factors such as provision of consulting services, cost-saving 
oriented audit firms and audit rotation were perceived as least important in 
determining audit quality. 
Duff (2004) argued that in addition to the standard definition of audit quality 
(independence and competence) other aspects such as client service, empathy, 
service quality and responsiveness should be considered as providing a broader 
view of audit quality. He carried out a survey questionnaire in 2002 before the 
implementation of regulatory changes in the post Enron environment in the UK and 
examined the perceptions of audit partners, finance directors and fund managers 
concerning the important dimensions of technical quality (reputation, capability, 
independence, expertise and experience) and service quality (non-audit services, 
responsiveness, empathy and client service) on audit quality. Overall, his study 
showed the importance of both technical and service quality dimensions as part of 
the larger concept of audit quality as perceived by the three groups.  
In a follow up study, in 2005, after the implementation of regulatory changes in the 
post Enron environments, Duff (2009) found that all three groups (audit partners, 
finance directors and fund managers) rated lower technical quality dimensions as 
compared to the results of his earlier study. In comparison, scores on service 
quality dimensions remain unchanged between the two studies. Overall, he 
concluded that the three groups still perceived service quality, relationship, 
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independence and competence as an important part of the larger concept of audit 
quality.  
Recently, Beattie et al. (2011) examined the perceptions of two-hundred and 
nineteen audit partners, one-hundred and thirty AC chairs and one-hundred and 
forty-nine chief financial officers concerning the impact of economic and recent 
regulatory factors on audit quality in the UK. Overall, five factors that could 
enhance audit quality were rated high by the respondents: i) communication 
between external auditor and AC; ii) financial background of AC; iii) auditor 
independence (person in position to influence outcome of the audit does not have 
direct or indirect financial interests with the client); iv) size of audit firm; and v) 
composition of AC consists of independent non-executive directors. In comparison, 
three factors that were considered by the respondents to undermine audit quality 
include: i) management time and cost in changing auditors; ii) budget pressure 
imposed on staff; and iii) non-big four firm. In general, they found that factors 
related to recent regulatory reforms (such as disclosure of non-audit fees paid to 
auditor with detailed breakdown, requirements of audit partner rotation, risk of 
litigation, AIU independent inspection and publication of reports and risk of 
investigation by the FRRP) had minimal effect on the level of audit quality. 
A few themes are evident in this area of research. First, there is no consensus on 
what audit quality means. The preparers, users and auditors view audit quality 
differently. Second, what constitutes audit quality is subjective and varies 
depending on the perception and expectation of various parties concerning audit 
services. Finally, most research in this area used either survey questionnaires or 
experimental study that provide limited understanding about how audit 
practitioners, AC members and regulators conceptualize the idea of audit quality 
and its influence on their process and activities since structured questions are used 
to examine the issue.  
Audit Expectations Gap 
A final field of the auditing literature that is relevant to the underlying issue of audit 
quality is that related to the notion of the audit expectations gap. The long-
established expectation of the role of the external auditors is to improve the 
credibility of the financial information through independent verification of financial 
statements (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Wilcox and Smith, 1977; Wallace, 1980). The 
professional standard, ISA (UK and Ireland) 200 (APB, 2009), expects the auditors 
to express a true and fair view on the financial statements, which is in accordance 
with the financial reporting framework. The APB issued the Auditors‘ Code (APB, 
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2004b) which, among other things, expects the role of the external auditors to 
provide value by adding reliability and quality to financial reporting as well as 
providing constructive recommendations to the management that can contribute to 
the effective operation of the business and the capital market. The company‘s 
management expects the external auditors to provide value for money services and 
non-audit services (Mills and Bettner, 1992; Beattie and Fearnley, 1995) while the 
public expect the external auditors to guard companies against fraud and error 
(Percy, 2007).  
Some past research has recognised that diverse expectations on the role of the 
auditor have resulted in different perceptions and expectations concerning the 
quality of audit services (Carcello et al., 1992; Sutton, 1993). A number of authors 
have also highlighted potential conflicts (Wilcox and Smith; 1977; Mills and Bettner, 
1992) and the ‗expectations gap‘ (Porter, 1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Porter, 
1993; Sikka et al., 1998) in the auditing environment that result from the 
differences between the views of different groups of participants in the financial 
reporting process. Prior research, in most cases based on questionnaire surveys, 
has documented the existence of a gap in various areas relating to auditors‘ 
responsibilities and audit performance (for further reading please refer to: Porter, 
1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Lee, 1994; Sikka et al., 1998). Porter (1993, p.50) 
provides an analysis of the components of the expectation gap: 
1. The reasonableness gap: defined as a gap between ‗what society expects 
auditors to achieve and what auditors can reasonably be expected to 
accomplish‘. 
2. The performance gap: defined as a gap between between ‗what the public 
can reasonably expect auditors to accomplish and what they are perceived 
to achieve‘. 
The audit expectation-performance gap can be further divided into: 
1. The deficient standards gap: a gap between ‗the duties which can 
reasonably be expected of auditors and auditors‘ existing duties as defined 
by law and professional promulgations‘. 
2. The deficient performance gap: a gap between ‗the expected standard of 
performance of auditors‘ existing duties and auditors‘ perceived 
performance, as expected and perceived by society‘.  
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Mills and Bettner (1992) highlighted four themes for the expectation audit gaps that 
exist and possible conflicts in the audit profession due to miscommunication or 
misinterpretation of the external auditor‘s role. The following are the themes: 
Gap 1: The audit expectations gap that is linked to the difference between what the 
public and the auditor believe about the external auditor‘s duties and 
responsibilities. Three possible conflicts are identified as a result of the gap: 1) 
conflict between the audit firm‘s self interest and society‘s demand for objective 
and credible information, which means, the auditor faces a dilemma in providing 
high-quality audit service at a reasonable price; 2) conflict in meeting growing 
expectations of the public on social, political and environmental issues that is 
beyond the focus of the financial reporting; and 3) conflict about the extent of 
direct regulation of the audit profession to provide control on the profession‘s 
activities to protect the public interest. 
Gap 2: Scope of services gap, which is associated with the difference between the 
client‘s expectations on the range of services (for example, management advisory 
services) and the attestation responsibility of the auditor to the owner or 
shareholder. The more diverse the scope of services offered by the external auditor 
the more likely it could create a conflict of independence for the auditor.  
Gap 3: Intraprofessional competition gap, which is related to the state of the audit 
market where the big size audit firms enjoy oligopoly power over large public 
clients that hinders open competition in the audit market for the other audit firms. 
As a result, this has created a two-tier profession, which results in conflict 
associated with competitive behaviour among the audit firms.  
Gap 4: The role ambiguity gap is associated with the difference between the values 
and norms that the audit firm perceives and the audit staff‘s own perceptions of 
those values and norms. A conflict might exist if the audit firm goal is incongruent 
with the audit staff‘s own goal. For example, an internal message about the 
importance of audit quality might be contradicted by a message about cost cutting 
to maximise profits.  
The above summarises the gaps and potential conflicts that exist in the auditing 
environment. The themes that emerge relate to: the extent that commercial 
interest has an effect on activities and the role expected of the external auditor, the 
degree to which auditors are independent and to whom the auditor should be 
accountable.  
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2.1.4 The Limits of the Traditional and Other Approaches 
to Audit Quality  
The above overview of the research literature (section 2.1.1) reveals that 
traditional research approaches has focused on notions of competence and 
independence of auditors suggested by DeAngelo (1981a) as analysis frameworks 
for audit quality. One of the problematic aspects of this definition is that users of 
the audit services need to assess both the technical competence and the 
independence of the auditors. To assess technical competence will require the users 
to assess and examine the audit working papers and compare how well the work is 
done with established auditing standards and guidelines. However, it is impossible 
for the users to assess and examine the audit working papers. Therefore, the audit 
profession and regulatory body demonstrate the quality or appropriateness of the 
work conducted through a peer review process and inspection by an independent 
regulatory body such as the AIU or the Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB). 
To assess independence of auditors is more difficult because independence in mind 
is rather abstract and related to the ethical and moral beliefs of the individual 
auditors. Nevertheless, independence in appearance of the auditors is more 
observable and can be related to various aspects of the auditor-client management 
relationship such as auditor tenure, which is the length of time that auditors have 
been associated with the company, and the percentage of the non-audit services 
fees (these aspects of audit quality have been extensively investigated in the 
traditional view of auditing).  
The above discussion highlights the problematic nature of the definition of audit 
quality in respect of the users gathering the necessary information to evaluate the 
quality of a particular audit. In addition, this standard definition of audit quality, 
which serves as a framework of analysis in most audit quality studies, might not be 
sufficient to represent audit quality because of its narrow focus, which is only on 
the aspects of the competence and independence of the auditors (Duff, 2004). 
Furthermore, most of the studies employ agency theory and are undertaken from a 
North American perspective, often show conflicting results and neglect the social 
and organisational context of the audit which might influence quality (FRC, 2006b; 
Humphrey, 2008). From the methodological standpoint, the economic rational does 
not provide a precise definition or theoretical status for audit quality, and the 
surrogates or proxies of audit quality that have been examined in the prior research 
are still inconclusive. Operationalising the concepts of audit quality, therefore, is 
open for further investigation. Indeed, publications such as ‗Audit Quality‘ by the 
ICAEW in 2002 and ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ by the FRC in 2006 have highlighted 
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the importance of other aspects of auditing that recognise a broader view of the 
concept of audit quality.  
Although existing archival studies (such as studies on inputs and outcomes related 
to audit quality), surveys (such as, research on users‘ and preparers‘ perceptions of 
audit quality) and laboratory experiments (such as, research on judgement and 
decision making) have revealed a considerable amount about the importance of 
audit quality in the audit contract, threats to achieving appropriate quality and the 
nature of auditor judgement (see Francis, 2004 and Watkins et al., 2004 for 
reviews of the literature), these studies are unlikely to provide meaningful insights 
into the actual audit practices of auditors. Even if the researcher introduces more 
variables or complexity into surveys or experiments or archival data, it is still 
debatable whether a researcher can capture or understand the pressure and 
influence of the audit environment on the quality of audit performance (Humphrey, 
2008).  
Power (2003, p.379) points out that limited research has addressed auditing 
practice ‗in context‘ and as a result, much less is known about auditing in its social 
and organisational context, as compared to experimental settings. For example, 
there is still a great deal that is not known about the nature of actual audit 
practices and the meaning those who conduct audits and those who oversee auditor 
appointments and work performance associate with the concept of audit quality. 
Little attention has been given to questioning how the meanings of the concept of 
audit quality are constructed, promoted and operationalised by individual auditors, 
that is, how ‗real audit practice‘ relates to audit quality. Furthermore, little is known 
about how individual auditors construct or negotiate terms of audit quality with 
different outside constituents. In a similar manner, there is limited understanding 
about how auditors‘ interactions between other audit market constituents, such as 
the regulator and AC members, influence their conception of audit quality or vice 
versa. There has been little attention given to questioning how the meanings of the 
concept of audit quality are constructed, promoted and reacted to by individual 
auditors, the regulator and AC members. This study attempts to add to research 
findings and knowledge on these issues.  
Most prior research has concentrated on issues surrounding audit quality without 
really examining how it is operationalised and given meaning and the potential 
influence of internal and external factors in the auditing environment on the 
meaning of audit quality. It can be argued that much of the prior literature does not 
address the societal context of audit practice or how audit quality is understood 
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within its organisational and institutional setting. In line with calls for more research 
that understands accounting and other phenomena within their social and 
institutional context (Burchell et al., 1980; Dirsmith et al., 1985), there is a need to 
approach the study of auditing practice with reference to its practical context. The 
next section will further discuss some research on auditing in its organisational and 
social context that is relevant to audit quality and contributes to the development of 
the underlying concerns of this thesis.  
2.1.5 Auditing Practice in its Organisational and Social 
Context  
This section reviews existing auditing literature the purpose of which is to develop 
an understanding of audit practice in its social and organisational context. The call 
to consider auditing in context has resulted in a stream of research that considers 
the way in which auditing practices both shape and are shaped by the environment 
in which they operate (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Pentland, 1993; Hudaib and 
Haniffa, 2009). The position implicit from this approach to auditing is to go beyond 
the traditional view of auditing as a neutral, objective and scientific phenomenon. 
Accordingly, this approach concerns the understanding of the auditing phenomenon 
as a socially constructed activity that defines and constitutes certain aspects of 
reality, which are influenced by its organisational and social context. Research with 
this focus has, whether explicitly or implicitly, acknowledged and sought to address 
limitations in more rational-economic or functionalist approaches to auditing 
research. A range of critical and sociological approaches has been brought into the 
auditing arena in this process. This section will argue that this ‗alternative‘ set of 
approaches have enhanced our understanding of auditing practice in various ways.  
Audit Practice and Production of Audit Quality  
A number of field studies in auditing provide significant evidence of the ‗messy 
realities of practice‘ that draw attention to auditing as a socially created activity 
(Pentland, 1993; Power, 1995; Fischer, 1996). The studies show auditing practice is 
context dependent and can serve different roles and functions (Burchell et al., 
1980; Nahapiet, 1988). Humphrey and Moizer (1990), support this view of auditing 
as a socially created activity, where from a series of interviews with 18 audit 
managers in the UK, they found that commercialisation of the audit firms and 
company managers influence the audit planning. They argued that planning serves 
not only as a techno-rational function designed to enhance the quality of the audit 
(in terms of efficiency and effectiveness), but also as a tool to legitimise the 
auditors‘ decisions about the extent and the nature of audit work, and as a 
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marketing device to enhance the revenue generation of the audit firms. Different 
roles of audit practice are also supported by Carpenter and Dirsmith (1993) who 
viewed statistical sampling as more than a technical function that aims to serve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of gathering audit evidence for better audit judgments 
and saw it as also playing a significant role in legitimating and controlling abstract 
knowledge of the audit profession. A similar view is also forwarded by Fischer 
(1996) who from a study of implementation of audit technologies within several Big 
Six firms showed that change or innovation in audit process was not because of 
better audit but also drives by business side of auditing that legitimised sample size 
reduction or ‗over-auditing‘.  
Pentland (1993) conducted a fieldwork study that examined the formation of audit 
judgement by auditors. In particular, he examined how auditors become 
comfortable with figures in the financial statements and the representations 
presented by the corporate management. Based on case studies of two audit 
teams, he concluded that auditors relied on ‗gut feeling‘ or audit ritual to produce 
such comfort rather than ‗structure‘ or the technical function of audit. The 
production of comfort from a rituals perspective highlights how comfort is treated 
as an article of trade within the participants involved with audit services such as 
audit teams, the audit firms and the capital community at large. Pentland showed, 
for example, how the production of working papers that support the audit opinion 
produce order and comfort within the audit teams, and become a foundation of the 
community‘s trust in auditing from the external viewpoint. The notion of patriarchal 
settings (the priests) and acts of ceremonial character (the signature is sacred) 
signify the social and contextual aspects of auditing activity.  
Mills and Bettner (1992, p. 192) suggested the auditing profession uses the ‗rituals‘ 
of the audit process involving planning, evidence gathering and audit reporting to 
represent, among other things, objectivity, integrity, professional scepticism, 
technical competence or, in general, the quality of the audit services. This ritual is 
also perceived as important for the legitimacy of the auditors‘ actions, to build trust 
and confidence in the profession, and in maintaining the ‗social order‘ of financial 
markets and economic systems.  
From the social perspective, auditing is not seen as an economic rational response 
to the business demand but rather it is either seen as social construction through 
negotiation of audit knowledge and creation of auditable environments (Power, 
1996, p. 294) or as a social function that changes according to social change and 
needs (Flint, 1971, p. 287). Power (ibid) argued that audit activity is derived from 
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the active process of ‗making things auditable‘, which, contrary to official images, is 
not derived from a neutral activity. He stated that auditors needed to construct and 
count what can be regarded as audit evidence within the audit knowledge. Hence, 
audit activity creates environments in which its knowledge base is legitimate and 
successful. In this respect, auditing is treated beyond a technical exercise of 
verifying financial statements. Therefore, auditing is a product of interaction and 
negotiation between auditors and other parties within the auditing ‗system‘.  
A number of field studies in auditing provide some evidence of the influence of 
regulatory, political and economic conditions and other audit market constituents 
(audit client, professional associations and regulatory bodies) in the audit setting on 
audit practices, how the audit practitioners come to see themselves and the 
construction and presentation of legitimate and useful knowledge of auditing. In 
other words, role, practices or performance of auditors may partly be shaped and 
influenced by their interactions with various societal institutions including 
professional bodies, audit clients, regulatory bodies and the public in general.  
More recently, Khalifa et al.‘s (2007) study of the discourse of audit methodology 
provides an example of the influence of competitive pressure in the audit market on 
the development of audit methodology that promotes business risk auditing for 
‗clients‘ rather than enhancing the quality of audit in practice through enhancing 
audit effectiveness. A study by Curtis and Turley (2007) highlighted conflicting roles 
of audit methodology in the organisational context of audit practice to legitimate 
the production of audit and production of profits that result in tensions between 
administrators in a large audit firm and audit practitioners.  
The literature on regulation and its impact on audit practices and, in consequence, 
audit quality is relatively scant. Nonetheless a few studies provide some evidence 
about the potential impact of regulation on audit quality. Nagy and Cenker (2007) 
conducted interviews with auditors in the US and show that increased regulation 
through implementation of SOX (2002) has impacted auditors‘ professional 
judgement and overall audit quality through creating a compliance approach to 
audit that hinders auditors‘ reasoning capabilities. An earlier study by Francis 
(1994) indicated that new regulations as response to accounting scandals normally 
lead to highly standardised and structured audit approaches that potentially reduce 
audit quality by limiting dependence upon professional judgement. In like manner, 
Hatherly (1999) suggested that increased regulation and economic pressures in the 
auditing setting might displace some level of professional judgement from auditing 
to achieve cost effectiveness.  
48 
 
Richard (2006) considered how the role and the relationship of the financial director 
and auditor influence the quality of the audit process. Using an interpretive 
approach, sixty interviews were conducted among sixteen listed firms and eight 
audit firms in France. The results suggest that relationship dualism 
(professional/personal relationship) and hybrid trust provide the foundation for the 
affiliation of the financial director and auditor. Richard argued that 
professional/personal relationship and trust is a relevant dimension in the audit 
process. She further explained that trust and personal relationship influence the 
audit process such as the speed and performance of audit services and the 
exchange of information. Richard recognises the existence of a peers‘ relationship 
that emerges from the hybrid trust and the dualism of the financial directors and 
auditors‘ relationship. The peer relationship is shaped by its social structure, 
professional and cultural norms (normative isomorphism), frequency of the 
relationship and the multiplexity of the relationship. The author proposes the 
concept of parity from this interpretative conception, which influences the 
independence and competence of the auditor (audit quality).  
Hudaib and Haniffa (2009) studied the meaning of auditor independence in Saudi 
Arabia and applied concepts of social interaction, joint action and differential degree 
of power in symbolic interactionism. Based on interviews, observations and 
document analysis they found that construction of the meaning of independence 
was influenced by auditors‘ reflective perspective concerning their reputation and 
ethical reasoning. It was also found that commercial activities and image 
management of the audit firm as well as political and social-economic structures of 
the country influence the meaning of independence. Similarly, earlier work by 
Sucher and Kosmala-MacLullich (2004) showed the construction of audit 
independence in Czech Republic was influenced by socio-economic and cultural 
pressures in the country. Both studies showed the influence of interaction between 
auditors and others in a ‗social system‘ to form the concept or representation of 
independence. Therefore this suggests a social construction aspect to the reality of 
auditors‘ independence.  
Overall this literature has identified a range of issues in auditors‘ social and 
organisational context which influence audit practices. These studies recognise the 
complex and ambiguous nature of the audit environment and highlight that in the 
auditing context, where the quality of output in terms of assurance cannot be 
measured, audit practices (e.g. audit planning and methodology) serve symbolic as 
well as technical functions and have much to do with creating a sense of legitimacy 
for audit practice and abstract audit knowledge.  
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Auditing has been recognised as a ‗profession‘ that influences the ideology and 
practices of its members. According to Burns and Haga (1977) public accountants 
are considered to be a profession because they meet these two conditions: first, the 
function or role of the public accountants is crucial to others (such as investors, 
lending institutions, and regulator) and, second, public accountants possess 
‗mystique‘ or expertise, technical knowledge and specialised training that is not 
available or cannot be performed by ordinary people. Flint (1988) outlined five 
attributes that qualify auditing as a profession:  
(i) Auditing provides a service to the public, and its members have specialist 
knowledge and skills or competence that is acquired from advanced level 
education, training and experience that are based on systematic theory and 
intellectual knowledge; 
(ii) Due to the nature and complexity of the audit service, non-members are 
unable to critically judge its quality; 
(iii) The nature and complexity of the service require the profession to have a 
procedure that is designated to its members; 
(iv) The members of the profession are required to be objective, impartial, 
honest and not-self interested; 
(v) The profession has a procedure to monitor its members for maintaining 
standards of competence and behaviour and also has a right to take 
disciplinary action for breach of the standards. 
From the above, several important features of auditing as a profession can be 
identified, which influence its social significance and perceptions about its work 
practices. First, the formation of ‗serving the public interest‘ as an ideology in 
pursuit of social acceptability and the credibility of the profession, which establishes 
the importance of the work to society. The ideology also creates a self-image that 
gives social value to the role and function of the auditing profession. Baker (2008) 
argued that the profession has used the ideology of ‗public interest‘ as a rhetorical 
claim to gain legitimacy from a wider public about the role of the auditors and the 
quality of their work performance. He suggests the importance of the idea of public 
interest in providing a socially integrative function for the profession to legitimate 
and justify its authority, practices, activities and function.  
Second, the establishment of ‗specialist knowledge‘ or expertise through 
professional qualifications, training and experience, which underlie audit practices, 
are important symbols of professionalism for acceptable representation of the work 
practice of the auditors and, to some extent, of its quality (Power, 1996). Hines 
(1997, p.89) suggested that the profession had used the symbols of 
professionalism to claim and maintain an abstract and incoherent body of 
knowledge for the profession. She also suggested that the conceptual framework of 
the accounting profession concerning the importance of image or the appearance of 
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the body of knowledge to maintain status quo restricts competition as well as the 
intervention of regulation on the profession. Third, in addition to the assessment by 
the accountancy profession (such as peer review), the existence of standards and 
guidelines (e.g. codes of conduct) were seen to be important in signalling that a 
certain standard of quality had been achieved and maintained in members‘ work 
performance and the autonomy of their work.  
Some researchers have argued that the deterioration or de-professionalization of 
the status of auditing as a profession has led to a crisis about the role of the auditor 
and quality of audit work (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Sikka et al., 2009). In 
particular, the crisis is strongly connected to the shift in ideology of the profession, 
which shows that the role of auditors and audit practice is more to accommodate 
the commercial interests of the audit firms rather than the public interest (Hanlon, 
1994). Baker (2008) highlighted the distortive aspects of the ideology that are 
caused by the economic interest of the profession rather than public interest, which 
leads to a conflict in values and practices within the profession. Wyatt (2004) 
highlighted a change in culture in firms that focuses on revenues and profits that 
drive commercial actions and behaviour.  
Sikka at al. (2009) suggested that auditors are members of a commercial 
professional service firm that seeks to increase its profit and market share. As a 
result, the personal aspect and conduct of its members, and representation of audit 
knowledge and practice should be consistent with economic pressure and client 
legitimacy rather than in favour of public interests. Some researchers have argued 
about the impact of the commercial interest of the profession on the auditor‘s 
independence and audit performance. For example, time budget pressure, which is 
caused by the emphasis on revenue, can have a negative impact on audit quality 
through auditor‘s engaging in dysfunctional behaviour, such as reducing sample 
size or prematurely signing-off the audit report (Kelley et al., 1999; Otley and 
Pierce, 1996a). The commercial interest of the audit firm may also have a negative 
impact on the appearance of audit quality by reducing the ability of the auditors to 
maintain their independence because of a significant amount of non-audit fees 
received from the audit client (Pany and Reckers, 1984) 
Some researchers have suggested that the notion of professional appearance is 
important for the auditors in managing the impression of their client as an 
indication of audit quality rather than their professional attributes or values. The 
qualitative case study by Grey (1998) reveals that auditors regard the notion of 
professionalism to be closely related to forms of behaviour or self-presentation 
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rather than professional accreditation and technical skills. Grey noted that this 
aspect of professionalism espouses a whole range of self-presentation including:  
“Communication; self-confidence; initiative; ability to win confidence and 
respect from clients and colleagues; performance under pressure; 
cooperativeness; reliability; self-motivation; business sense; appearance; 
presentations skills; contributions in meetings; rapport with client; 
managing client expectations; logical organisation of written work; neatness 
of written work; meeting deadlines” (Grey, p. 575).  
Similar to Grey, the interview study by Anderson-Gough et al. (2002) showed that 
the auditors‘ understanding of the meaning of professional is primarily connected to 
issues pertaining to personal conduct and appearance, which are important for 
managing the impression about the quality of audit activity rather than determining 
the content. Furthermore, both studies suggest that the idea of professionalism as 
appearance is largely constructed around the ‗client‘ of the audit firms. The recent 
study carried out by Carrington (2010) suggests that professional appearance is 
important to indicate that sufficient quality is performed in the conduct of the audit, 
although there is no necessary connection between appearance and performance of 
work tasks. He indicates the importance of appearance for the legitimating role of 
the auditor as the result of a weak knowledge base of the audit.  
Power (2003, p.385) mentioned that external auditing emphasises appearances and 
processes (such as, expertise, competence, working papers and audit planning) to 
signify audit quality when the quality of the output is unobservable within the 
practice as well as to the outside people. Since auditors are unable to demonstrate 
an objective measure of their output, focus on appearances and processes are 
important to symbolise quality in their claim to the knowledge base of auditing and 
work practices. In fact, auditors themselves face problems in determining what 
good quality is: 
“Even where audit effort can be made transparent, audit quality is obscure 
to auditors themselves. It is not analytically clear what „good auditing‟ really 
is, since outputs are sufficiently ambiguous for auditors themselves to be 
unsure. Auditors do not know if they are good auditors or not, however 
much effort they put in signal to outsiders” (Power, 2003, p. 389).  
Power (1996) provided an analytical framework for understanding the knowledge 
base and production of the audit and suggests four elements that are involved in 
the process (see Figure 2.4). The first element is referred to as the knowledge 
structure of audit practice. At this level, audit knowledge is established and 
legitimised through the construction of codified rules, auditing standards and audit 
regulations, which are issued by various professional institutes and regulatory 
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bodies. In addition, auditors also use audit working papers to convey audit 
knowledge to the public (especially legal and regulatory audiences). Second, the 
elements of the auditing knowledge system explain the use of education, licensing 
requirements, professional examinations, training and continuing education by the 
auditing profession to legitimate their abstract knowledge. The third level addresses 
the level of audit practice such as audit judgements and audit procedures (sampling 
and risk analysis). Power argued that the audit process and procedures shape the 
representations of audit knowledge. Finally, the fourth level involves quality control, 
such as peer review and various other feedback mechanisms that are created to 
mediate the practice and official knowledge structures.  
Figure 2.4: The System of Auditing Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Power (1996) 
Auditors also undertake various legitimating strategies and acts such as espousing 
norms and values as an independent expert auditors acting in the public interest 
and emphasising procedural aspects of audit, not only to represent and 
communicate audit quality but more importantly to secure their professional status, 
claims to expertise and to maintain legal monopoly power granted to them. Neu 
(1991) suggested that the audit profession engages in ‗impression management 
techniques‘ through four sets of techniques (entry requirements, standards and 
guidelines, disciplinary activities and charity activities) that are used to create and 
maintain a schema of trust that helps to maintain legitimacy and professional 
privilege as well as other functional aspects of audit practices.  
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The above discussion highlights the importance of auditors‘ personal conduct and 
appearance as well as various ‗impression techniques‘ and processes as 
representations of quality in the absence of observable features in quality of work 
performance. The analysis also highlights the issues of role conflicts and the 
commercialisation of audit firms which may influence the nature and practice of 
audit. 
2.2 Professional Perspectives on Audit Quality 
From a more practitioner perspective, audit quality has been examined with 
reference to the degree to which the audit conforms to applicable auditing 
standards (Cook, 1987; Aldhizer et al., 1995; McConnell and Banks, 1998; Tie, 
1999; Krishnan and Schauer, 2001). For example, Krishnan and Schauer (2001) 
documented a positive association between audit firm size and compliance with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) disclosure requirements (after 
controlling for other factors such as client size, financial health and participation in 
peer review). McConnell and Bank (1998) discuss audit quality in relation to the 
confirmation of accounts receivable according to SAS no. 67. They argue that audit 
quality will be enhanced if auditors have a thorough understanding of the accounts 
receivable confirmation process as it will likely detect material misstatements. 
Practitioner approaches to audit quality also tend to place more emphasis on the 
process around the audit and within which professional judgement is exercised. For 
example in the UK, the ICAEW identifies five factors that could drive audit quality in 
practice: (1) leadership, (2) people, (3) working practices, (4) monitoring quality 
practices, and (5) client relationships (ICAEW, 2002). They argued that these are 
the major factors underpinning audit quality in practice; activities or practical things 
that a firm could or should pursue to build, promote and maintain audit quality.  
“Audit quality depends on a number of critical factors: people and their 
training, audit firms and their processes, clients and corporate governance” 
(ICAEW, 2002, p. 2). 
“Audit quality has many contributing factors including good leadership, 
experienced judgement, technical competence, ethical values and 
appropriate client relationships, proper working practices and effective 
quality control and monitoring review processes” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 9). 
This construction of audit quality suggests that quality is about the auditors‘ 
professional judgement, which is supported by people who carry out the audit 
processes, people who command and oversee it, systems of quality control that 
monitor it, and individuals and the firm‘s values that uphold it. It is clear that rather 
than defining what audit quality is, much of the effort now concentrates on 
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identifying activities or factors that could have an impact on the audit processes 
and audit quality.  
“The quality of audit opinion lies in that of the judgements the auditor 
makes. These in turn dependent on the quality of the evidence that has 
been gathered and the quality of the people gathering it” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 
7). 
 
“Ultimately, auditors provide a quality service to shareholders if they provide 
audit reports that are independent, reliable and supported by adequate audit 
evidence” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 8). 
Obviously, the quality of the audit judgements cannot be directly assessed or 
measured. As a result, the central feature of audit quality highlighted by the 
profession is about the quality of the audit process that supports their professional 
judgement. The focal point of discussion in the paper is about the importance of 
activities, events, or conditions, or ‗inputs‘ to the audit processes and the effect on 
the quality of the output (judgement): 
“Inputs can be judged by the quality of the output. If errors are often made 
or poor judgement is exhibited, then the inputs need to be considered. 
These include the quality of staff training” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 48).  
 
Further analysis shows that the practical construct of audit quality proposed by the 
ICAEW can be categorised into three main elements (Figure 2.5). The first element 
is governance and the control of the firm, which comprises working practices, 
monitoring quality processes and client relationship. Good working practices are 
argued to influence the quality of audits. For this reason, it is important for audit 
firms to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of their members. Good working 
practices are also supported by adequate audit planning, the characteristics of the 
people that are executing the plan and the people that are reviewing the practices. 
Good working practices are also recognised as part of the control in the audit 
process: 
“Good working practices need to be embedded in the audit process; they are 
an intrinsic part of the firm‟s quality control procedures” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 
11). 
Another important aspect of the governance and control of the audit firm concerns 
its monitoring quality processes. Formal and informal quality monitoring procedures 
are set up or implemented to assess the quality of audits. These include control 
reviews, audit reviews, compliance reviews, training and learning and office 
memos.  
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Figure 2.5: Practitioners’ Construction of Audit Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of control in managing audit clients is also highlighted in the 
ICAEW‘s paper. For instance, control is necessary to monitor client acceptance or 
continuance, which could reduce the risk of audit failure. The impact of non-audit 
services should also be safeguarded to ensure that independence will not be 
impaired or influence audit quality. Finally, effective communication and an open 
relationship between the auditors and audit committees are important to the 
performance of the audit. 
The second element of audit quality is the individual or people in the firm. The 
practitioners stress the importance of individual expertise, experience, skills and 
values to the quality of audits.  
“Audits are performed by people, so audit quality depends on their 
quality...The quality of a firm‟s people and their performance depends on 
their competence and motivation” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 18). 
The third element of audit quality is the culture of the audit firm. Effective leaders 
are responsible to set the overall tone in the audit firm. They are responsible to 
establish firm wide policies and procedures that embed quality culture to promote 
audit quality. For instance, the firm‘s policies and procedures such as recruitment, 
reward and training should reflect quality as important features. Leaders are also 
responsible to promote quality by communicating it at all levels in the firm.  
“Whatever the size of firm and however it defines audit quality, this will only 
be achieved if its importance is central to the strategy and objectives of the 
firm‟s leadership and it is translated into practical actions. Audit quality is a 
collective responsibility but the tone has to be set up from the top and 
people have to be accountable” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 13). 
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“...quality audits are the results of people working together and being 
prepared to take on the responsibility of ensuring that right result is 
achieved. Senior people within an audit firm have to take on a leadership 
role...the desire to perform the quality audit will results from the sense of 
professional obligation and the character of those in charge of the 
firm...audit quality is achieved only if it is the keystone of the firm‟s overall 
strategy” (ICAEW, 2002, p. 9). 
In brief, the construction of audit quality as proposed by the ICAEW emphasises a 
wider view of audit quality that recognizes the influence of interaction within and 
between the firm and various internal and external factors in the auditing 
environment to audit quality.  
2.3 Regulatory Perspectives on Audit Quality 
The auditing profession and its members are governed by laws and regulations. In 
the UK, the members or professional auditors are required to comply with 
standards and requirements such as the Auditors‘ Code (APB, 2004b), the 
International Standard on Quality Control 1 (ISQC1) (APB, 2009), the International 
Standard of Auditing (UK and Ireland) (APB, 2009), APB Ethical Standards (APB, 
2004a), and the UK Audit Regulation and Guidance. These standards and 
regulations highlight four fundamental elements that could influence audit practice 
and performance: (1) individual characteristics, (2) firm characteristics, (3) the 
audit report or the output of audit services, and (4) the value of the audit report. 
First, the standards, requirements and guidelines emphasise the importance of 
individual characteristics to the quality of audit performance. For example, the 
Auditors‘ Code (APB, 2004b) stresses the imperative of individual characteristics 
such as accountability, integrity, objectivity and independence, competence, rigour 
and judgement of the auditor in the conduct of the audit. The APB Ethical Standards 
(APB, 2004a) further point out the imperative of auditors‘ independence as a 
fundamental characteristic of professional auditors.  
Second, standards such as the ISQC1 (APB, 2009) specifically discuss the elements 
of quality at the firm level. The standard frames requirements about policies and 
procedures that should be established within the audit firm to achieve quality 
services. These include leadership responsibility for quality, ethical requirements for 
auditors, acceptance and continuance procedures for the audit client, human 
resources, engagement performance and quality monitoring.  
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Third, regulators identify that another important element of quality is the output of 
the audit services – the audit report. The report should be able to provide some 
indication about the quality of the audit performance. The Auditors‘ Code (APB, 
2004b) indicates that the report should contain accurate, clear, complete and true 
information. 
Finally, the quality of audit is also associated with additional value created by the 
services. The Auditors‘ Code (APB, 2004b) considers the importance of audits to 
enhance the quality and reliability of the financial reporting. In addition, the 
auditors should also be able to give constructive recommendations and suggestions 
to the management of the company during the course of the audit in the areas 
where weaknesses are identified. Here, the ‗value‘ of the audit services involves 
producing and enhancing the trust and confidence of the users of the financial 
reports to the individual company and the capital market as a whole. Next, the 
audit services could assist in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
company‘s performance. 
Overall, the UK regulatory framework put forward four main elements of audit 
quality in its standards and guidelines (Figure 2.6). These elements propose the 
importance of inputs (individual and firm characteristics) and outputs (audit report) 
of the audit processes and value (trust and confidence) resulting from the 
processes. The issue is how the elements of audit quality can be monitored or 
measured or verified by the regulator. In the absence of visible criteria in the 
quality assessment of the output of audit services, the regulator is more concerned 
with the quality of processes involved in producing the audit report.  
Figure 2.6: Regulators’ Construction of Audit Quality 
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The audit report is a vehicle where professional auditors express their professional 
opinion about the true and fair view of the financial statements. The opinion of the 
auditor involves a considerable amount of professional judgement. Because of the 
limitations in evaluating the quality of judgement, the regulators are more 
concerned with the quality of processes that are involved when auditors form these 
judgements. The importance of the verification of the audit processes brings a focus 
on the importance of the ‗quality of documentation‘ of those processes as ‗evidence‘ 
to support the auditors‘ judgement. This effort is reflected in the work of the Audit 
Inspection Unit (AIU), which is the body responsible for monitoring the quality of 
audit services offered by the public accounting firms.  
2.3.1  The AIU Perspective on Audit Quality 
The AIU was set up in 2003 after the reforms in the corporate governance and 
audit regulation regime following the Enron-Andersen collapse in the US. The AIU is 
an independent unit, reporting to the POB, which is within the independent 
regulator of the FRC. The AIU is responsible for monitoring the quality of audits of 
listed companies and other major public interest entities. The AIU is also 
responsible for monitoring public accounting firms‘ compliance with the regulatory 
framework for auditors in the UK. The arrangement for independent monitoring 
provided by the AIU is set out in paragraphs 13 and 23 of Schedule 10 of the 
Companies Act 2006. The work of the AIU is intended to enhance confidence in the 
audit process by enhancing the transparency of the work of the auditors and the 
judgements made by them.  
Scope and Monitoring Approach  
The scope of the AIU work covers audits of all companies incorporated in the UK - 
listed companies and other entities whose financial condition is considered to be of 
major public interest (AIU, 2011). The POB is responsible for approving the scope 
and work programme of the AIU and determining which audited companies are 
classified within the ‗major public interest‘ category. The responsibilities of the AIU 
cover an independent inspection of major public accounting firms – the Big Four 
and five other major firms. The AIU also reviews other firms or ‗smaller firms‘ that 
also fall under the scope of the work. The cycle of inspection is annual for the Big 
Four firms and two years for other major firms.  
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The AIU‘s independent inspection is intended to ‗challenge‘ the audit firms and 
auditors, and to focus on audit judgements and audit processes. The AIU‘s 
monitoring framework focuses on these attributes (http://frc.org.uk/pob/audit/): 
1. Quality of auditing 
2. Thorough, robust and challenging approach to inspection visits; 
3. Wide-ranging reviews of firm-wide procedures, including an assessment of 
how the culture within the firms impacts on audit quality; 
4. Risk-based selection of individual audits for review, utilising a risk model 
covering listed and AIM listed entities;  
5. In-depth reviews of individual audits, addressing identified areas of risk and 
including critical assessment of the key audit judgments made in reaching 
the audit opinion; and 
6. An assessment of the quality of communication with the Audit Committee. 
The monitoring framework can be classified into three major areas: quality control, 
independence and ethics, and audit performance (AIU, 2009). The AIU assess and 
review firm wide policies and procedures, key input elements to the audit process 
and a firm‘s individual audit engagements based on the following characteristics: 
Table 2.2: The AIU Monitoring Framework 
 
Key areas Principal themes and issues 
 
1. Quality control 
 
 
1. Leadership, strategy and communications 
- Tone at the top, which supports audit quality 
through the firm's strategy, objectives and targets, 
internal communications and reward mechanisms 
2. Performance evaluation, promotions and remuneration 
3. Other human resource matters 
- Audit training and communications 
- Credit crunch communications 
- Client risk assessment and acceptance/continuance 
4. Consultation and review 
- Engagement quality control review 
- Pre-issuance technical reviews 
5. Audit quality monitoring 
- Effective internal audit quality review and other 
monitoring procedures by the firm; appropriate 
and timely actions in relation to weaknesses 
identified by the audit quality review or through 
the external monitoring process 
 
2. Independence 
and ethics 
 
 
1. Ethical policies and consultation 
- Direct assistance by staff from clients‟ internal 
audit departments 
2. Compliance monitoring procedures 
- Annual compliance confirmation 
- Scope of services 
- Non-audit services 
3. Rotation policies and monitoring 
- Rotation monitoring 
- Long association and key audit partners 
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Table 2.2: The AIU Monitoring Framework (continued) 
 
Key areas Principal themes and issues 
 
3. Audit 
performance 
 
 
1. Audit methodology 
2. Assessing and responding to risk 
- Identification of significant risks 
- Fraud risks 
- Preliminary analytical review 
3. Audit evidence and related judgments 
- Impairment reviews 
- Provisions and accruals 
- Post-employment benefits 
- External confirmations 
- Using the work of an expert 
4. Communicating with Audit Committees 
5. Audit finalisation 
 
Source: 2008/2009 Audit Quality Inspections: An Overview (AIU, 2009) 
The first public report on independent inspection was published in June 2005. The 
report published findings from inspections of the four largest UK audit firms 
(Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG Audit LLP and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP). In the following year, the AIU reported findings from 
inspections of the four largest audit firms and five other major firms (Baker Tilly, 
BDO Stoy Hayward LLP, Grant Thornton UK LLP, PKF (UK), LLP and RSM Robson 
Rhodes LLP). In 2008, the AIU publicly reported findings from the inspection of 
individual audit firms to enhance its transparency following heightened interest in 
the form and content of public reporting (POB, 2007).  
Since the first publication of the public report by the AIU in 2005, audit quality has 
been constructed around the ‗verification‘ of the audit process and related activities, 
events or conditions that contribute to the formation of the audit opinion or 
judgements (Figure 2.7).  
Figure 2.7: AIU Verification of Audit Quality 
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For this reason, the assessment of audit quality is centred on the ‗quality of 
documentation‘ that is supposed to reflect the evidence of a high audit quality. As a 
result, adequacy and sufficiency of audit documentation of an audit firm‘s wide 
audit policies and procedures, and individual audit engagement are subject to 
examination. The assessment of quality of documentation is reflected in the various 
procedures and processes of the audit firms. As indicated in the reports issued by 
the AIU: 
“The AIU continues to believe that the thought processes underlying 
significant audit judgments need to be properly evidenced at the time and 
that failure to do so increases the risk of them being incomplete or 
misguided and of inappropriate audit judgments being made as a result” 
(ICAEW, 2008, p. 4). 
 
“We identified a need to improve the quality of audit documentation across 
all firms, in respect of many of the audit engagements we reviewed. This 
was also an issue that the firms themselves had recognised as needing to be 
addressed following previous internal and external reviews. In many cases 
we found that audit work undertaken could not be fully understood without 
obtaining oral explanations from the audit team and that the rationale for 
key audit judgments was not adequately recorded on the audit files. It was 
apparent that actions previously taken to improve the position (such as 
issuing reminders to audit staff of the need to document properly all work 
undertaken) had not been effective” (AIU, 2005, p. 20). 
The external monitoring of audit firms, which has been implemented over the 
years, often spoke of enhancing the quality of audits. This effort is intended to 
make audit quality more visible to outside parties. Audit quality and its related 
activities, which were previously unknown to the world outside of the profession, 
can now be seen, observed and evaluated. It is an attempt to enhance the 
transparency of the audit firm‘s governance and control in relation to audit quality. 
A key aspect of the monitoring and assessment of the inspection unit is the review 
of the professional judgements undertaken by the auditors. The inspection unit 
emphasises the importance of adequate and proper documentation of the process 
in the audit judgements as part of the evidence concerning audit quality.  
2.3.2  The FRC Perspective on Audit Quality 
In February 2008, the FRC issued a framework of audit quality with the intention 
that the publication would provide clear guidelines to companies, audit committees, 
regulators and other stakeholders in their assessment of audit quality. The 
framework followed consultation on the Discussion Paper on Promoting Audit 
Quality in 2006. The framework outlines five major drivers that can promote high 
quality audits (FRC, 2007): 
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1. The culture within an audit firm 
2. The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff 
3. The effectiveness of the audit process 
4. The reliability and usefulness of audit reporting 
5. Factors outside the control of auditors 
The framework proposed by the FRC recognised a wider view of the factors that 
could influence audit quality (Figure 2.8). The framework identified audit reports as 
the key output of the audit process. Consequently, the effectiveness of the audit 
process is dependent on the internal and external factors within the audit firms. It 
identified three levels – individual, firm and institutional – that contribute to the 
attainment of high audit quality. 
Figure 2.8: The FRC Audit Quality Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, at the individual level, the skills and personal qualities of the partners 
and staff of the audit firms are important to the effectiveness of the audit process. 
At the firm level, quality culture plays a significant role in the conduct of the 
individual. Lastly, the framework indicates that interactions and communication 
between the audit firms, audit clients, and the audit committees could influence the 
overall audit performance. In general, the interaction and relationship between 
these three levels could influence the quality of audits in practice. The framework 
explicitly recognises the wider aspects of audit quality and the performance of the 
auditors is influenced by various internal and external factors in the auditing 
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environment. More detailed discussions about the FRC audit quality framework and 
comments letters to the discussion paper are available in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
2.4 The Corporate Governance Framework  
In response to the corporate failures (e.g. Polly Peck, Maxwell and BCCI) in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the FRC, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession formed the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
in May 1991. This committee was later to be known as the Cadbury Committee and 
issued its report in 1992. The report made a number of recommendations 
concerning the relationship between the chairman and chief executive, the role of 
the audit committee, the role of external auditors and reporting on internal control 
and the company‘s position (FRC, October, 2010b). Subsequent to the Cadbury 
report, various reports were issued and revised: the Greenbury Report (1995), the 
Hampel Report (1998), the Higgs Report (2003), the Smith Report (2003, FRC, 
2005, and 2010c) and the Combined Code (FRC, 1998; FRC, 2003; FRC, 2006a and 
FRC, 2010a). Once again these were in response to corporate failures and scandals 
either internally (banking crisis) or as a reaction to corporate events in other parts 
of the world. These reports have become a formal framework for the UK corporate 
governance regime. In May 2010, the FRC issued the UK Corporate Governance 
Code to replace the Combined Code. The new code applies to all companies with a 
UK premium equity listing, regardless of whether incorporated in the UK or not, for 
accounting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2010 (FRC, 2010). The code 
carries through the corporate governance framework that operates on a ‗comply or 
explain‘ basis. The code‘s main principles are in five sections, concerning: 
leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, and relations with 
shareholders. The Code C.3.1 states: 
“The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the 
case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors. In 
smaller companies the company chairman may be a member, but not chair, 
of the committee in addition to the independent non-executive directors, 
provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as chairman. 
The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit 
committee has recent and relevant financial experience”. 
It can be seen that the discussion of corporate governance has gained popularity 
due to the incidents of corporate collapse that have contributed to the development 
of the role of the AC in the arena of corporate governance (Zaman, 2002).  
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2.4.1  The Audit Committee 
Despite the widespread use of the term of corporate governance, there is limited 
consensus on what it is (Razaee, 2009). According to Cadbury (1992), corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. The 
definition focuses on the systems of control, financial or otherwise, so as to achieve 
a company‘s main objectives. It is also suggested that corporate governance is 
related to the effectiveness of regulatory initiatives to penetrate the organization 
and ensure compliance with rules via specifically designated officers, audit 
committees, and other internal structures (Power, 1997, p. 41). In the corporate 
governance arrangements, the AC is considered one of its key mechanisms, and is 
responsible for oversight of matters related to financial reporting, auditing and 
overall corporate governance (DeZoort, 1997).  
There has been a significant increase in the adoption of ACs by companies since the 
issuance of the Cadbury and other reports (Collier, 1996; Adelopo, 2010). The 
adoption further increased in 1998 when the London Stock Exchange required listed 
companies to disclose compliance with the Combined Code as part of its listing 
requirements. There are other reasons that contribute to the adoption of an AC in 
the UK. Collier (1996) argued that the adoption of the AC by UK companies is a 
result of the direct influence of corporate governance practices in the US. However, 
the corporate governance practices adopted for UK companies are flexible because 
of the principle-based approach of the UK corporate governance framework. This is 
in contrast with the corporate governance regime in the US, which adopts a rule-
based approach where compliance is compulsory. On a similar note, both the UK 
and the US place great emphasis on the role of the AC as one of the key players in 
the corporate governance framework. 
Legislative pressure has also been identified as a factor that influences the rise in 
the adoption of the AC in UK companies (Zaman, 2002). Although efforts to 
legislate for the adoption of the AC have failed and adoption remains voluntary, the 
persistence of the attempt, such as the 1976 and 1988 Companies Bill (Audit 
Committees) to secure legislation may have influenced the rise in adoption 
(Adelopo, 2010). Pressure from the accountancy profession has also been identified 
as a factor that contributes to the adoption of the AC in the UK. For example, the 
ICAEW (1987), in response to the Eighth Company Law Directive, stated their 
strong support for a statutory requirement for an audit committee in all public 
companies. Another noticeable factor that has influenced the adoption of the AC is 
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related to the incidents of corporate collapse that resulted in greater expectations 
concerning the role of the AC in improving corporate governance (Adelopo, 2010).  
The Cadbury Committee (1992) defined AC as a sub-committee of the main board 
that comprises mostly independent directors or non-executive directors with the 
responsibility for the oversight of auditing activities. The SOX (2002) section 205 
(a) defines AC as: 
“a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of 
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and 
financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial 
statements of the issuer”. 
Razaee (2009, p. 120) provides a broader definition of AC, which includes its 
expected roles and responsibilities to all other stakeholders:  
“The AC is a committee composed of independent, non-executive directors 
charged with oversight functions of ensuring responsible corporate 
governance, a reliable financial reporting process, an effective internal 
control structure, a credible audit function, an informed whistleblower 
complaint process and an appropriate code of business ethics with the 
purpose of creating long-term shareholder value while protecting the 
interests of other stakeholders”. 
The terms of reference of the expected role and responsibilities of the AC is outlined 
in Section C.3.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010a) as follows: 
1. To monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and any 
formal announcements relating to the company‘s financial performance, 
reviewing significant financial reporting judgements contained in them; 
2. To review the company‘s internal financial controls and, unless expressly 
addressed by a separate board risk committee composed of independent 
directors, or by the board itself, to review the company‘s internal control and 
risk management systems; 
3. To monitor and review the effectiveness of the company‘s internal audit 
function; 
4. To make recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for 
their approval in general meeting, in relation to the appointment, re-
appointment and removal of the external auditor and to approve the 
remuneration and terms of engagement of the external auditor; 
5. To review and monitor the external auditor‘s independence and objectivity 
and the effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant 
UK professional and regulatory requirements; 
6. To develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor 
to supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance 
regarding the provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm, and 
to report to the board, identifying any matters in respect of which it 
considers that action or improvement is needed and making 
recommendations as to the steps to be taken. 
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Section C.3.6 of the UK Corporate Governance Code further emphasises the 
principal responsibility of the AC regarding the appointment, reappointment and 
removal of the external auditor. In situations where the AC‘s recommendation is 
not accepted by the board, the Code requires full disclosure on the matter in the 
annual report. In December 2010, the FRC Guidance on Audit Committees 
(formerly known as the Smith Guidance) (FRC, 2010c) was updated to assist 
members of the committee in carrying out their roles according to the relevant 
provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
The Guidance outlines four major areas of best practice for the AC:  
1. Establishment and role of AC, which includes membership, procedures and 
resources. It also covers issues of appointment, meetings, remuneration, 
and skills, experience and training of committee members (Paragraphs 2.1-
2.19). 
2. Relationship with the board (Paragraphs 3.1-3.5). 
3. Roles and responsibilities. It provides guidance on the role and 
responsibilities of the AC concerning financial reporting, internal controls and 
risk management, whistle blowing, internal audit process and external audit 
process (Paragraphs 4.1-4.44). 
4. Communication with shareholders (Paragraphs 5.1-5.3).  
Paragraphs 4.17-4.44 of the Guidance specify the role and responsibilities of the AC 
concerning the external audit process. The guidelines can be summarised under 
four major areas: 
1. Appointment of external auditor. The responsibility of the AC to review the 
external auditor‘s selection and appointment process as well as investigate 
the reason for the auditor‘s resignation. The AC should assess annually the 
qualification, expertise and resources, and independence of the external 
auditors and the effectiveness of the audit process. 
2. Terms and remuneration of external auditors. The AC should approve audit 
fees and review terms of engagement. In particular, the AC should review 
the scope of the audit with the external auditors and can ask for additional 
work to be performed by the external auditors if the scope is inadequate.  
3. Independence of external auditors. The AC should assess the independence 
and objectivity of the external auditors by taking into consideration the 
relevant UK laws, regulations and professional requirements (e.g. APB 
Ethical Standards for Auditors). The AC should review and approve non-audit 
services provided by the external auditors. 
4. Annual audit cycle. The AC should review and discuss with the external 
auditors the findings of their work and discuss the effectiveness of the audit 
process. During the review and assessment the AC should among others: 
 Review the appropriateness of the audit plan, which includes planned 
levels of materiality and proposed resources to execute the audit 
plan; 
 Review key accounting and audit judgements; 
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 Discuss with the external auditor major issues that arose during the 
course of the audit and have subsequently been resolved and those 
issues that have been left unresolved; 
 Review whether the auditor has met the agreed audit plan and 
understand the reasons for any changes, including changes in 
perceived audit risks and the work undertaken by the external 
auditors to address those risks; 
 Consider the robustness and perceptiveness of the auditors in their 
handling of the key accounting and audit judgements identified and in 
responding to questions from the audit committees, and in their 
commentary where appropriate on the systems of internal control; 
 Obtain feedback about the conduct of the audit from the key people 
involved, e.g. the finance director and the head of internal audit; and 
 Review and monitor the content of the external auditor‘s 
management letter, in order to assess whether it is based on a good 
understanding of the company‘s business and establish whether 
recommendations have been acted upon and, if not, the reasons why 
they have not been acted upon. 
From the above, it can be seen that the degree of codification of best practices and 
the attention given to the activities of the AC have greatly increased (Zaman, 2002; 
FRC, 2010c), particularly the role of the AC in relation to the external audit 
function. The AC now has greater roles and explicit responsibility for overseeing 
audit quality as commissioned by the UK Corporate Governance Code and the FRC 
Guidance on Audit Committees. The issue of communication between AC and 
external auditors has also been prevalent in the auditing standards. Nevertheless, 
the level of expectation concerning the role should be realistic given that its 
effectiveness and activity may depend on various factors that influence its effects 
and outcomes (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Turley and Zaman, 2007).  
2.4.2  Audit Committee Effects on the Audit Function 
AC members are among the parties who are responsible for overseeing the external 
audit function. The UK Corporate Governance Code and the FRC Guidance on Audit 
Committee have emphasised the need for the AC to evaluate various aspects of the 
external auditor‘s work, which includes monitoring auditor‘s independence, 
appointment and remuneration, and effectiveness of the audit process. Thus, this 
section directs particular attention on the influence of AC on audit quality and its 
effects on external audit function.  
The Link between Inputs and Outcomes Related to Audit Quality and the 
Audit Committee 
Prior research lends mixed support for the association between the characteristics 
or effectiveness (composition, independence, financial literate member and 
frequency of meeting) of the AC, and inputs and outcomes related to audit quality. 
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Overall, past studies have documented inconclusive evidence on the association 
between the existence and the characteristics of the AC with financial reporting 
quality. Prior research tends to focus on the impact of the presence or 
characteristics of the AC on earnings management, financial restatements and 
regulatory sanction. It is expected that the presence of an AC will be likely to inhibit 
companies from engaging in earnings manipulation (Dechow et al., 1996) and 
result in less adjusting errors in prior reports (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991).  
Felo et al. (2003) found a positive association between financial expertise and high 
quality of financial reporting but were unable to identify any association between 
independence and financial reporting quality. Xie et al. (2003) found similar 
evidence that showed financial expert members are associated with high financial 
reporting quality. Multiple regression analysis used in the study revealed a 
significant relationship between active (more frequent meetings) and expert 
members, and lower discretionary accruals. Qin (2007) also found a significant 
relationship between accounting expertise and earnings quality. He suggested that 
AC members with previous accounting positions such as public accountant, auditor, 
principal/chief financial officer, controller, or principal/chief accounting officer 
relates to high quality of reported earnings. 
Bedard et al. (2004) evaluated the impact of AC characteristics: financial literacy, 
independence and meetings frequency on earnings management. Using the level of 
income increasing/decreasing abnormal accruals, results are consistent with 
expectation and show that aggressive earnings management relates to less 
financial expertise, independence and meetings frequency.  
Piot and Janin (2007) documented mixed associations between the proxies of audit 
quality, AC characteristics and financial reporting quality in France. Specifically, 
they examined whether auditor size (reputation) and audit tenure, and the 
existence of an AC and its independence influence the level of earnings 
management. Archival evidence reveals some interesting findings. First, they 
reported no significant association between the Big 5 auditors and the level of 
abnormal accruals. Similarly, they did not find any evidence that supports the 
suggestion that an increase in audit tenure leads to a decrease in audit quality 
(increase in abnormal accruals). Second, although the presence of an AC relates to 
lower earnings management, other AC characteristics such as independence 
appeared to be insignificant. In contrast, Klein (2002) found that an independent 
AC is associated with lower earnings management. Using data from 692 
observations from year 1992 to 1993 of S&P 500 companies in the US, analysis 
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showed a negative association between AC independence and abnormal accruals. 
Furthermore, Klein found that the less independent the AC composition, the larger 
the abnormal accruals become. This may infer that independence of AC members is 
important to oversee the quality of financial reporting process by ensuring lower 
earnings management.  
Abbott et al. (2003a) examined the effects of expertise and AC meeting frequency 
on financial restatements. Results showed a significant negative relationship of both 
variables with financial restatements. Carcello and Neal (2000) examined the issue 
of whether independence of AC members influences the type of audit opinion issued 
by the external auditor. Using data from 223 financially distressed companies in the 
US, they examined the association between AC composition and the likelihood that 
the auditor will issue going concern modified reports. The findings indicate that the 
greater the percentage of affiliated directors in the AC, the lower the probability 
that the auditor will issue a going concern opinion.  
For example, Abbott and Parker (2000) highlighted the link between AC 
characteristics and the appointment of an industry specialist auditor. Using archival 
data of 500 US companies, the results showed that independent and active AC 
members (that meet at least twice per year) are more likely to select auditors that 
specialise in the company‘s industry. The results imply that an independent and 
effective AC will demand a high quality of audit and therefore will appoint an 
industry specialist auditor on the assumption that they are better in detecting 
material errors in financial statements. Chen, Moroney and Houghton. (2005) 
replicated and extended the study by Abbott and Parker (2000) by looking at other 
variables (director qualifications, number of directorships and provision of non-audit 
services) in their model. Using data from 510 listed companies in Australia, the 
analysis of the results indicated that AC independence influences the use of an 
industry specialist auditor, which was consistent with Abbott and Parker‘s (2000) 
study. In contrast, the proportion of directors with financial qualifications and the 
frequency of AC meetings were not associated with the selection of an industry 
specialist audit firm. The contradictory results might have been due to different 
regulatory settings or different variable specifications and measurements. A key 
limitation of the above-mentioned studies was that AC effectiveness and industry 
specialist auditor causality cannot be directly examined.  
The existence of the AC has also been argued to have an effect on either increasing 
or decreasing the audit fee. A number of rationales can be offered for this 
possibility. First, it is expected that the audit fee will be higher if the AC aims for 
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higher audit quality through demanding a high level of audit coverage. Second, 
strong internal control associated with AC could reduce audit fees because of less 
audit coverage. Collier and Gregory (1996) examined both these propositions in 
their analysis of 315 companies of the FTSE 500 in the UK. They found that the 
presence of an AC is associated with higher audit fees but found no significant 
relationship for the second. In contrast, O‘Sullivan (2000) found no evidence that 
the characteristics of the AC influence auditors‘ pricing decisions. Prior research has 
also examined the association between the characteristics and effectiveness of the 
AC, such as independence, expertise and meeting frequency with non-audit fees 
(Abbott et al., 2003b; Stewart and Kent, 2006). Researchers have theorized that 
effective AC members have an incentive to limit the provision of non-audit services 
as it could compromise auditor‘s independence. Abbott et al. (2003b) suggested 
that AC members perceive that a high level of non-audit services could impair 
auditor independence, hence, the ACs use their span of control to limit the 
provision of non-audit services. The findings from archival data were consistent 
with expectations and show that independence and meeting frequency were 
negatively associated with the ratio of non-audit to audit fees, suggesting that an 
effective AC is able to influence the scope of audit coverage and limit the provision 
of non-audit services. However, Lee and Mande (2005) found no significant 
relationship between AC effectiveness and non-audit fees. The inconsistent results 
highlight the limited effect of the AC on the scope of external audit and auditor‘s 
remuneration. 
In addition to focusing on the non-audit fees ratio, Gaynor et al. (2006) 
investigated three research questions in relation to non-audit services. First, 
whether ACs consider the effect of non-audit services on quality of audit before any 
approval of the purchase of non-audit services from the auditor. Next, the extent 
that mandated fee disclosures affect the AC‘s pre-approval decision. Lastly, the 
extent to which the audit committee‘s decision in relation to the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services is consistent with investors‘ preferences. The 
experimental study revealed three important results. First, ACs are willing to 
appoint an auditor for non-audit services if it improves the quality of audit. Second, 
the AC‘s pre-approval decision is affected by fee disclosure requirements. Third, 
relative to the AC members, investors believe that the joint provision of non-audit 
services will improve audit quality. Thus, this study lends support to investigating 
the importance of ACs in improving audit quality (specifically on auditor 
independence in fact and in appearance). An important limitation of the study is 
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that experimental work might not provide similar results to those in an actual 
setting.  
In the UK, the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) is responsible for taking 
action against companies for flawed financial statements. The study carried out by 
Peasnell (1999) showed an insignificant relationship between the presence of the 
AC with a sample of 47 UK companies that were subject to FRRP action. Windram 
and Song (2000) showed a significant negative relationship between FRRP action 
and the characteristics of the AC (financial literacy, the number of outside 
directorship and number of meetings). Beasley (1996) found the presence of the AC 
has no significant effect on the likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
Prior research has also investigated the perception of AC members on factors that 
influence audit quality in practice. Using data collected from a survey questionnaire 
of AC chairpersons in the US, Schroder et al. (1986) found that factors related to 
audit team (e.g. attentiveness of manager and partner, and planning and conduct 
of audit team) are perceived to be more important than audit firm factors (e.g. 
relative audit fees size, the results of peer review and litigation). A subsequent 
study on AC members‘ perceptions of audit quality was carried out by Knapp in 
1991. He employed an experimental study that specifically examined the perception 
of ACs on the impact of audit firm size, audit tenure and type of audit approach 
(structured vs. unstructured) on audit quality (auditors‘ ability to detect and report 
material error). He found that ACs that had experience of working with differing 
sizes of audit firm did not perceive big size audit firms as better quality than the 
smaller firms. The auditor‘s tenure was perceived to be positively related to audit 
quality in the early years of the audit engagements, but negatively related to audit 
quality in subsequent years. Interestingly, the study suggests that the AC 
members‘ lack of in-depth understanding and knowledge about different types of 
audit approach, which would enable them to substantiate its impact on audit quality 
that draws attention to the limited skills and knowledge of the AC. Several studies 
have also highlighted the sufficiency of knowledge and expertise of AC members, 
which may inhibit their capacity to discharge effective oversight function (DeZoort, 
1997; Lee and Stone, 1997). 
Beattie et al. (2011) examined the perceptions of the AC chairpersons concerning 
factors that enhance audit quality in the post Enron environment in the UK. Among 
factors that were rated highly by the chairs of the AC that could enhance audit 
quality were auditors‘ communication on various issues relating to the audit, audit 
fees relative to audit scope, and audit firm‘s internal quality monitoring procedures. 
72 
 
They also perceived that AC members‘ independence and financial literacy were 
important factors that could enhance audit quality.  
Operation of Audit Committee and its Effect on External Audit 
There are a small number of studies that attempt to understand the impact of the 
AC on the audit process as well as to understand the operation of the AC in relation 
to the external audit. Cohen and Hanno (2000) can be regarded as one of the first 
studies that examined the issue of corporate governance and the audit process. 
Using experimental methods they investigated the impact of the oversight activities 
of directors and the AC (independence and frequency of meetings), and 
management control philosophy to preplanning (client acceptance process) and 
audit-planning. The findings indicate that corporate governance activities (strong or 
weak) and management control activities (strong or weak) influence the audit 
process. In particular, strong corporate governance and control activities influence 
auditor consideration concerning the client acceptance process, as well as the 
auditor assessment of client business risk. Likewise, both corporate governance 
factors and management control philosophy have a significant effect on auditor 
planning judgement and subsequent substantive testing, and subsequent control 
risk assessments. From a financial reporting viewpoint, the results suggest the 
importance of having strong corporate governance mechanisms that can influence 
audit quality and financial reporting quality. Strong control environments are 
associated with less financial restatements and fraudulent financial reporting, which 
might inhibit the attainment of high quality financial reporting.  
In an extension of their earlier study, Cohen et al. (2002) carried out a semi-
structured interview with 36 audit practitioners (seniors, managers and partners), 
to investigate the impact of corporate governance factors on the audit process. 
Specifically, the study attempted to examine three main research questions: first, 
the auditors‘ perception on the structure, importance and the effectiveness of 
corporate governance factors; second, how auditors consider the impact of the 
corporate governance factors in audit planning and the conduct of the audit; third, 
auditors‘ views concerning the importance and role of corporate governance in the 
audit process, in audit engagement, client acceptance and in the future. The study 
revealed that auditors perceived company management as an important structure 
in corporate governance. Surprisingly, the auditors perceived the AC as 
unimportant and ineffective in the governance process. Next, all of the respondents 
indicated that they gather and use corporate governance information in audit 
planning and audit performance. Furthermore, the respondents perceive that 
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corporate governance is important in the client acceptance stage and for 
multinational clients. Finally, the majority of the auditors indicated the greater 
importance of corporate governance factors in the audit process now and in the 
future. In general, this study provides weak support concerning the impact of the 
AC on the audit process. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this study was 
conducted to demonstrate AC effectiveness in overseeing the external audit process 
before the Enron environment when the AC was less scrutinised. 
There is some research concerning process issues in the operation of the AC and its 
relation to external audit. Analysis of the fieldwork case study carried out by 
Gendron et al. (2004) suggests that the existence of the AC is for more than 
ceremonial purposes and the AC meetings are more than formal ritual. The case 
study evidence showed the important aspects of asking challenging questions, and 
assessing the written and verbal information provided by auditors in the operation 
of the AC that contribute to AC effectiveness. This finding is in contrast to an earlier 
study by Spira (1999) who argued that audit committee activities, such as meeting 
documentation and the process of questioning lack substance and mainly serve as 
ceremonial performance to gain the external symbol of legitimacy. Comparatively, 
Turley and Zaman (2007, p. 775), using a case study of UK public companies, 
showed minimal impact of the AC on external auditor activity. The study provides 
limited evidence on: i) impact of the AC on audit design, ii) authority of the AC to 
appoint and remunerate auditors, and iii) the ability of the AC to challenge and 
question the audit findings in the AC meeting. These results suggest limited effects 
of the AC on external audit, and, in consequence, audit quality.  
To synthesize, although mixed results have been documented, prior research 
generally suggests that there is an association between the existence and 
characteristics of the AC and various proxies of audit quality. Nonetheless, most of 
the research in this area has employed archival or experiment methods, which 
provide limited understanding concerning how the AC contributes to high audit 
quality. Similarly, surveys do not provide much information about AC activities or 
how the AC evaluates the effectiveness of the audit and audit quality. DeZoort et al. 
(2002, p. 69) identified the dominant focus of archival and survey methods in AC 
research and suggested that other methodological approaches might be better in 
understanding additional aspects of AC activity. Their analysis and synthesis of the 
AC literature suggested that there is a need for more research on relationships and 
interfaces between the AC and external auditors.  
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Turley and Zaman (2004) provided an analytical review of the effects of AC on 
three main aspects: audit function, financial reporting quality and corporate 
performance. Overall, they suggest more work: i) to understand the operations and 
processes of the AC, and, in consequence, its effects; and ii) to understand the role 
of the AC within its institutional and organisational contexts; and iii) more 
qualitative research methods (case studies and interviews) to complement existing 
research beyond documenting the association between the AC characteristics and 
its expected outcomes.  
2.5  Implications of Review and Research Questions  
This chapter has evaluated different strands of research that are relevant to audit 
quality. The description of the research aspects related to audit quality set out in 
this chapter has drawn attention to the limitations of this work in several areas. 
First, notwithstanding its wide-ranging nature and extensiveness, it is apparent that 
there has been rather limited progress in our understanding concerning the 
meaning of the concept of audit quality beyond the technical competence and 
independence of auditors. Essentially, there is a gap in relation to how those 
involved in the audit process conceptualise audit quality in practice. Thus, this 
thesis sets out the objective of examining the practical conception of the meaning 
of audit quality from the perspective of key participants in the audit process – 
auditors, AC members and quality inspectors, using semi-structured interviews, 
archive documents and a questionnaire survey. This is important because even if 
we identify a relationship, such as the size of firm being linked to higher quality 
signal, we do not know how the practitioners in a particular class of firm are 
viewing the task and what they are doing which gives rise to this link. In like 
manner, there is limited understanding concerning how AC members commission 
audits in order to satisfy their expectations for high audit quality in practice or how 
the operation and activity of the AC has an effect on audit quality. Similarly, 
evidence on how audit inspectors evaluate quality and contribute to the 
achievement of high quality auditing in practice is rather limited. Therefore, the 
current research, which focuses on how audit quality is given meaning by those 
involved in conducting, commissioning and evaluating auditing in practice, is 
worthwhile and will contribute to the extant literature. The three groups and 
specific research design are chosen for two reasons. First, they are directly 
responsible for delivering or ensuring the quality of auditing and thereby the 
integrity of financial reporting and therefore could provide rich information on the 
research topic. Second, the research aims to gain an in-depth and detailed 
knowledge of the topic based on the groups‘ opinions, feelings, actions and 
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thoughts. As such, qualitative enquiry through archive documents, semi-structured 
interviews and a questionnaire survey are best matched with the research 
objective. The first research question is formulated to reflect the objective of 
providing additional evidence about how the concept of audit quality is given 
meaning by those involved in auditing, as follows: 
Research question 1:  How is the concept of audit quality understood and applied by  
key participants in the audit process? 
Second, the analysis presented in this chapter suggests that only a relatively small 
number of studies consider wider social, organisational and institutional dimensions 
in the investigation of audit quality. This has illustrated that quality of audit 
performance is influenced by various internal and external factors in the auditing 
setting. Nevertheless, relatively little is known about how the factors in the auditing 
environment influence and shape the construction of meaning of the concept of 
audit quality by key participants in the auditing process. There has been little effort 
to understand the possible influence of organisational and social factors on the 
construction of meaning for audit quality in practice. Despite the development of 
studies which place greater emphasis on understanding audit practice in its context, 
so far little attention has been given to exploring how the meaning of the concept 
of audit quality is constructed in practice in the context of the social, regulatory and 
economic environment of the audit firm. Thus, this thesis aims to examine the 
impact on the meaning of audit quality of interactions between the key participants 
in the auditing setting and their environment, such as the social, economic, 
regulatory and institutional arrangements in which they operate. This investigation 
is important because auditing activity is conducted in a social and organisational 
setting that may potentially influence what is been regarded as audit quality in 
practice. The second research question is formulated to achieve the research 
objective as follows: 
Research question 2:  What are the factors that influence the construction of the  
meaning of audit quality in practice? 
Third, the description of auditing practice in its organisational and social context 
(section 2.1.4) has shown that quality of audit services cannot easily be measured 
and, as a result, audit practices can be linked both to technical functions, and 
efforts to preserve and strengthen the legitimacy of the auditing profession. 
Relatively little is known about the relationship between the meaning of audit 
quality and audit practices and how that meaning is represented in practice. There 
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are a limited number of studies that examine how the meaning of audit quality is 
perceived by the auditors, AC members and quality inspectors and how it is 
symbolised in practice and to what purpose. Thus, this thesis aims to examine how 
the meaning of audit quality is represented in practice by the key participants in the 
audit process. The following question is formulated: 
Research question 3:  How is the meaning of audit quality represented in practice? 
Finally, the review presented in this chapter has highlighted considerable changes 
in the auditing and governance framework in the UK as a specific response to the 
corporate and auditing failures. As a result, the AC has now greater and more 
explicit responsibility for overseeing audit quality as commissioned by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. In addition, there is now greater emphasis on the 
importance of communication between the external auditors and the AC towards 
achievement of audit quality in practice. In like manner, the changes in the auditing 
framework have introduced the AIU as a prominent party to monitor the level of 
quality of audit services delivered by the audit firms. The interactions between 
auditors with the AC members and quality inspectors may potentially influence 
delivery and achievement of audit quality in practice. Despite significant 
developments on the regulatory framework in the UK in recent years, there is 
rather limited understanding concerning the impact of the changes in the auditing 
and governance framework to the delivery and achievement of audit quality in 
practice. Thus, this thesis sets out the objective of investigating the impact of the 
AIU and the AC members on the achievement of audit quality. The following 
questions are formulated: 
Research question 4:  What is the impact of the AIU on audit quality?  
Research question 5:  What is the impact of the AC on audit quality? 
2.6 Summary 
The main premise of the thesis is that auditing is a socially constructed activity, 
thus, the meaning of audit quality is socially constructed and is influenced by 
societal and organisational contexts: interactions between various parties, and 
regulatory and economic factors in the auditing environment. This study seeks to 
investigate how the concept of audit quality is given practical meaning by audit 
practitioners, AC members and quality inspectors. Rather than viewing audit quality 
as an attribute of the individual audit that can be identified and ‗measured‘, it 
explores the way in which auditors, AC members and quality inspectors interpret 
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and apply the concept and construct meanings that can influence the manner in 
which the actual audit process and oversight evaluation of that process are 
conducted. Therefore, an interpretive approach and qualitative methodology were 
selected to provide better insights into various factors that shape and influence the 
perceptions of audit quality within its social and organisational contexts. These will 
be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework and Research Design 
3.0  Introduction 
Chapter 2 identified that in the extant auditing research, and more specifically, in 
that pertaining to audit quality, there is very limited consideration of what audit 
practitioners, AC members and quality inspectors understanding to be the meaning 
of audit quality and the possible influence of institutional, organisational and social 
factors on the construction of that meaning in practice. In other words, there is 
limited understanding about how interactions between auditors and other audit 
market constituents, such as AC members and quality inspectors influence their 
conceptions of audit quality or how the meaning of the concept of audit quality is 
constructed, promoted and reacted to by those groups. The purpose of this chapter 
is to develop a framework, drawing on symbolic interactionism, to understand the 
process of giving meaning to audit quality in its organisational and social context. 
This chapter also explains the research approach, research design and research 
methods adopted in addressing the research questions outlined in chapter 1 
(section 1.3). 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 3.1 briefly explains three main 
research perspectives in accounting research. It specifies in detail an interpretive or 
social constructionist perspective that determines the methodological approach 
used in this study. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical framework informing the 
analysis. Section 3.3 describes the research methods used, including data collection 
and data analysis. Finally, section 3.4 provides a summary of the chapter. 
3.1 Research Methodology 
Chua (1986) identified three methodological assumptions of accounting research 
that delineate a researcher‘s way of viewing and researching the world. First, the 
positivist/functionalist (mainstream) research approach, which believes that society 
or reality is objective and external to the subject, theory is separated from 
observations and human beings are passive and rational in pursuing their goal. This 
approach favours the use of quantitative methods of data analysis (hypothetical-
deductive accounts) and collection of data by experiments, surveys and archival 
methods to understand social reality or objects that allow for generalisation of 
findings. The second research approach mentioned by Chua is the critical approach 
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that views human beings as having inner potentialities that are alienated through a 
restrictive mechanism. The critical approach believes theories are temporal and 
context bound. As such, historical, ethnographic and case studies are commonly 
used to understand social reality (for details of both approaches, refer to Chua, 
1986). 
The third research approach, and the one applied in this thesis, is called 
interpretive research. This approach assumes the nature of social reality to be fluid 
and subjective; it does not exist in a concrete sense. In contrast to the positivist 
approach, the interpretive focuses on individual meaning and people‘s perceptions 
of ‗reality‘ rather than any independent ‗reality‘ that might exist external to them 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985). The interpretive approach focuses on understanding the 
subjective nature of the social world from the frame of reference of the subject 
being studied. In other words, social phenomena that happen in society are 
understood from the point of view of the participant or actor rather than the 
observer (Morgan, 1980). In addition, the interpretive approach views social reality 
as socially constructed where reality is emergent, subjectively created and 
objectified through human interactions that are given an ‗objective‘ form through 
performances, rituals, symbols and artefacts (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Chua, 
1986; Richardson, 1987, p. 346). The interpretive approach also considers that 
actors‘ definition and understanding of social reality is influenced by the interaction 
between the actor and their environment, such as the social, economic and 
institutional arrangements in which they operate.  
Berger and Luckman (1967, p. 78-80) proposed that social reality is constructed 
during three dialectical moments. First, externalization - conceptions of social 
reality are given objective form through performances, rituals, symbols and 
artefacts. Second, objectification - conceptions of social reality are accepted as part 
of social reality then achieve objective reality in life. Third, internalization - 
objectivity of social reality is internalized through socialisation processes (e.g. 
education and training) that reflect meaning. 
In the case of audit quality, auditing services involve undefined activity and the 
quality of its output is unobservable. Normally, the process and procedure of the 
audit begin with a series of planning decisions that are tailored to a specific audit 
client. It involves various assessments such as reviewing clients‘ risks and internal 
control systems that later influence the scope of the audit in terms of the type and 
extent of the audit tests. Here, auditors need to exercise their ‗professional 
judgement‘ to get comfort that the scope of the audit is appropriate and sufficient 
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to allow them to be reasonably satisfied that a high audit quality is achieved and 
the financial statements are free from material misstatements and presented in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Nonetheless, 
determinations of ‗sufficient‘ ‗appropriate‘ and ‗reasonable‘ are somewhat subjective 
and are always supported by the phrase of ‗professional judgement‘ (Humphrey et 
al., 1992, p. 148). In this case, auditors must make a decision about the extent and 
nature of audit evidence and the level of audit quality that he/she is aiming to 
achieve. As a result, different views may be formed as to what audit quality is. 
Thus, this highlights the subjective dimension about the reality of audit quality in 
practice.  
As indicated in Chapter 2, auditing is more than a neutral technical practice and the 
activity of auditing can be seen as being socially constructed. For example, 
although auditing may involve certain procedural elements the role of judgement or 
choice of methods is conducted in a social and organisational setting, which means 
it cannot be treated as a standard set of tasks. This is to say that auditing involves 
interaction in the process; individual auditors interact with other members within 
the audit firm and with various constituents in auditing settings. For example, 
auditors interact with peers, superiors or subordinates within the audit firm. The 
auditors also interact with the audit client, AC members and regulators who are 
among key participants in the auditing and financial reporting system. These 
interactions reflect particular interests and expectations that may, in turn, affect 
the auditing practices and, consequently, the performance of individual auditors. In 
addition, auditing activity involves interaction with the environment where it 
operates, such as economic and regulatory conditions in the audit market. All of 
these factors may potentially influence what is been regarded as audit quality in 
practice.  
It has been noted that much of the auditing literature is dominated by so called 
‗mainstream auditing research‘ or positivist research that fails to investigate and 
acknowledge the social construction of audit practice (Humphrey, 2008). Prior 
research provides little information about how audit firms carry out or produce their 
audits and the consequences for audit practice (Hopwood, 1996; Sikka et al., 
2009). Consistent with this, many have called for research evidence about audit 
practice from the institutional, organisational and societal context of auditing 
(Kirkham, 1992; Hopwood, 1998; Humphrey, 2001; Power, 2003). According to 
Humphrey: 
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“What are certainly needed are studies and approaches that seek to 
understand what is, or has been done, in the name and development of 
audit practice. The problem with so much audit research is that it does not 
explore audit practice per se, but rather fabricates such practice, studying 
around the edges of the “black box” of auditor decision-making or 
constructing experiments that cannot ever really be expected to replicate 
either the real pressures and career challenging or threatening scenarios 
that some auditors can encounter in their actual working environment” 
(Humphrey, 2008, p. 193). 
Previous studies of auditing, which adopt such approaches have been described in 
section 2.1.5. These illustrate that research that considers auditing in its 
institutional and organisational context is helpful in understanding the phenomena 
of auditing. In spite of the contribution of this body of research, there have been 
many calls for more contextually based studies of auditing (Lee and Humphrey, 
2006; Sikka et al., 2009). Humphrey, in calling for research on audit practice, 
commented: 
“There is also a great need for more work exploring audit firms as 
institutions – on explaining the forces driving working priorities and practice 
changes, on understanding the organisational cultures within firms, the 
reward and remuneration structures and the impact these have on the 
construction and behaviour of auditors, audit teams and audit clients” 
(Humphrey, 2008, p. 194). 
This current study responds to such calls by providing a rich descriptive account 
about the conception of meaning attributed to audit quality in practice within its 
social, organisational and institutional context. This thesis uses a symbolic 
interactionism perspective as a framework to understand the perceptions of 
auditors, AC members and quality inspectors concerning the meaning of audit 
quality in practice, factors that influence the construction of the meaning and 
related symbols that signify the meaning. The next section will further discuss the 
symbolic interactionsim perspective that underpins the analysis of the study.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework for the Research 
This section explains the principles of symbolic interactionism and their application 
to the study. The framework presented in Figure 3.1 builds on relevant aspects of 
symbolic interactionism, which considers the dynamic interactions between various 
constituents in the auditing setting and the environment that influence the 
construction and representation of the meanings of audit quality in practice, 
appropriately grounded in its social and institutional context. 
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The central ideas of symbolic interactionism were developed from the work of 
American scholars, such as George H. Mead, Herbert Blumer and Norman Denzin, 
who endeavoured to understand the process of making meaning of a social reality 
(Charon, 2007). This perspective pays particular attention to understand how 
meanings are constructed based on interactions between people and their 
environment. Blumer (1969) asserted that symbolic interactionism is based upon 
three principles: 
1. Human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the 
things have for them. 
2. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with others and one‘s self. 
3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he/she encounters.  
Thus, human meaning is seen as a social object, which is formed in the context of 
social interaction with others and the thinking of the actor and is used by people in 
their actions. Charon (2007, p. 47) explains that a social object is any object in a 
situation that an actor uses in that situation. That use has arisen socially. That use 
is understood and can be applied to a variety of situations. The perspective regards 
human meaning as symbolic and behavioural, which means that meaning entails 
signification and intention that can be seen in the symbolic realm and related 
meaningful action (Prasad, 1993; Hewitt, 2003). Accordingly, meaning as a social 
object is signified, created and communicated through the use of symbols (words, 
objects and acts) not only to others but also to our self (Charon, 2007). To quote 
Charon: 
“Social objects and therefore symbols are socially established and 
understood. This means that symbols are defined in interaction, not 
established in nature. People make them, people discuss them, people agree 
on what they shall stand for. Symbols are conventional, a socially 
established use for the purpose of representations. Conventional means that 
the symbol is arbitrarily and purposely developed to refer to something” 
(Charon, 2007, p.48-49). 
According to this perspective, symbols are important for the individual to operate or 
define meaning of the social object for the person and others that they interact 
with. Symbols are also important to manage other people‘s impressions that later 
influence other people‘s definitions of situations and their conduct (Dolch, 2003, p. 
394).  
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Following on from symbolic interactionism, the reality of audit quality is not just 
‗out there‘ but must be constructed in the activities of external auditors, AC 
members and quality inspectors. Accordingly, the ‗reality‘ of audit quality has to be 
signified and communicated using various symbols internally and externally by the 
individual actors (for example, professional qualification, audit review, auditing 
standards, consultation, audit documentation or audit committee meetings). In this 
case, audit quality becomes a symbolic representation of reality that those 
individual‘s use to arrive at a certain (satisfying or unsatisfying) degree of comfort 
and confidence in the performance of audit delivered by or presented to them in the 
situations in which they find themselves. 
Symbolic interactionism states that the meaning of a social object can be 
understood by focusing on how people interact in a particular situation, and how 
the environment may influence their perceptions and actions (Puxty, 1993). As 
people are self-reflective, their perceptions and acts are not only caused by forces 
within themselves (instincts, drives, needs, etc.), or by external factors (political, 
social or economic systems, etc.) but also what lies in between, a reflective and 
socially derived interpretation of the internal and external stimuli (Meltzer et al., 
1975). In the case of the audit firm, the influence of commercial activities and 
image management of the audit firm as well as the legal, political and social-
economic structures may influence the auditor‘s work performance (Sucher and 
Kosmala-MacLullich, 2004; Hudaib and Haniffa; 2009).  
The perceptions of people concerning social meaning are also influenced by the role 
or expectations of behaviour that are expected by others in their social interaction 
(Dolch, 2003, p. 393). It is argued that people perform a wide variety of roles in 
different domains of their everyday lives that cause multiple and frequently 
conflicting interpretations and meanings of social objects (Gopal and Prasad, 2000, 
p. 514). Consider the audit firm: the expected roles of external auditors from other 
significant parties such as the regulator, client management and audit committee 
during interaction may influence the construction of meaning of audit quality and 
related behaviours. It is important to acknowledge that auditors need 
simultaneously to satisfy various role expectations from these groups who may hold 
competing interests and have different authority. As a result, when there are 
differing role expectations, it may create role conflicts for the auditors and have the 
potential to affect their performance and the quality that is achieved (Koo and Sim, 
1999). The inevitable consequence of this is that any given meaning of audit quality 
has the potential to create conflict depending on what others consider to be audit 
quality. 
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The symbolic interactionist perspective also suggests that the meaning of a social 
object can be understood by looking at the process of ‗self-interaction‘, which 
focuses on how an individual‘s perceptions, conceptions and communications 
about/with themselves influences meaning and action:  
“First, the actor indicates to himself the things toward which he is acting; he 
has to point out to himself the things that have meaning. The making of 
such indications is an internalized social process in that the actor is 
interacting with himself. This interaction with himself is something other 
than an interplay of psychological elements; it is an instance of the person 
engaging in a process of communication with himself. Second, by virtue of 
this process of communicating with himself, interpretation becomes a matter 
of handling meanings. The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and 
transforms the meanings in this light of situation in which he is placed and 
the direction of his action” (Blumer, 1969, p. 5-6). 
In this case, the self-conception of external auditors as a professional occupational 
group and their perceptions of a public service oriented audit function that 
facilitates the public interest may influence and shape the meaning of audit quality. 
Furthermore, the increasing commercialisation of audit practice for profit making 
and economic efficiency may influence external auditors meaning of audit quality. 
Correspondingly, how the quality inspectors and the AC members view and define 
themselves may influence and shape the meaning of audit quality. 
In brief, symbolic interactionism emphasises that the perceptions of people 
concerning the meaning of a social object can be understood through three 
important concepts. First, ‗self interaction‘, in particular self-conception, influences 
the construction of the meaning of a social object. Second, the meaning of social 
object is influenced by social interaction with others in a particular situation and 
other environmental factors, and thus social meaning is influenced by various 
internal and external stimuli. Third, acts and objects are used as symbols to 
communicate and represent meaning of the social object to self and others. In 
applying these concepts for the purpose of this thesis, this study uses interviews, a 
survey questionnaire and public documents to understand the range of meanings 
and symbols that are shared, communicated and manipulated via the interactions 
between the participants in the auditing setting.  
This study regards auditing practice as a socially constructed activity and audit 
quality is regarded as a social object. Hence, the perceptions and beliefs of 
individuals about audit quality are seen as emerging from a complex series of 
interactions between various constituents in the auditing environment, and 
influenced by various environmental factors such as coercive pressure imposed by 
laws or regulation and commercialisation of audit practice that affects the work of 
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the external auditors (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990; Nagy and Cenker, 2007). It is 
important to note that external auditors do not work in isolation. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how the people, processes, and environment that auditors 
interact with influence their understanding of the audit task and, therefore, their 
performance and, consequently, their perceptions about the quality achieved 
(Nelson and Tan, 2005, p. 59). In like manner, changes in the legislation on ACs as 
a response to corporate collapses, particularly in relation to external audits may 
influence the perceptions of AC members concerning audit quality, and, in 
consequence, auditors‘ working practices. In addition, recent changes in audit 
regulation have introduced the AIU as a prominent actor in the auditing 
environment, which may have a different conception about audit quality, as such, 
interaction of external auditors with the AIU may influence their meaning for audit 
quality and associated action. 
Symbolic interactionism has been applied in auditing and accounting research. 
Hudaib and Haniffa (2009) studied meaning of auditor independence in Saudi 
Arabia and applied concepts of social interaction, joint action and differential degree 
of power in symbolic interactionism. Based on interviews, observations and 
document analysis they found that construction of the meaning of independence 
was influenced by auditors‘ reflective perspective concerning their reputation and 
ethical reasoning. It was also found that commercial activities and image 
management of the audit firm as well as political and social-economic structures of 
the country influence meaning of independence. Willmott (1986) incorporated 
interactionist approach to study the development of the accountancy profession in 
the UK. In his historical analysis, he found that the major accountancy bodies play 
a significant role and become an important instrument for constructing and 
projecting meaning of ‗profession‘ through defining and securing status, value, and 
social identity of accountancy profession. Further, the approach identified the 
presence of competing interests and tensions between and within the major 
accountancy bodies causes by problems of organizational identity and internal 
governance as well as disproportional financial and political strength. Preston 
(1986) employed participant observation in a single case study of plastic containers 
division of large organisational to examine managers understanding of meaning of 
production information system. He paid particular attention to symbols - mechanics 
and media used in the process of informing (for managers to inform each other and 
themselves) and found that media of interactions, observation, personal record 
keeping and attending meeting were important in constructing and maintaining 
aspects of information processes within an organisation. 
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It should be noted that the symbolic interactionist perspective suffers criticism as 
interactionist researchers do not rely on the use of strict scientific methods in their 
investigation (Athens, 1984). Blumer (1969) stressed that the perspective focuses 
on understanding social reality from the perspective of the individual. He argued 
that the value and validity of this perspective lies in the direct examination of 
people being studied and their own interpretation rather than the ‗objective‘ view of 
the empirical social world. The central principle of symbolic interactionism is that it 
concerns the understanding of what the actors themselves believe about the world 
(Charon, 2007). Therefore, testing hypotheses and defining two or more variables 
and testing the causal relationship between them would not capture the perspective 
of the individual actors. 
The theoretical framework based on symbolic interactionism has been outlined and 
is used to help achieve the objective of understanding the focus of this research. 
The following section continues to explore the research design and includes a 
description data collection and data analysis, which complements the theoretical 
framework of this study.  
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework 
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3.3 Research Method 
This study uses an interpretive approach that requires the use of the qualitative 
methods to provide insight into the topic under study. This approach gives an 
opportunity to the researcher to investigate the issue of audit quality within its 
social, organisational and institutional context in an open and flexible way. 
Qualitative methods are thought to be most appropriate, as the issue needs to be 
explored in detail from the participants‘ own perceptions and beliefs. Furthermore, 
the concepts and variables of the study are difficult to measure and an 
understanding of the subject might not be achieved through more structured 
research. Patton (2002) mentions that qualitative methods allow examination of a 
social issue in an open and comprehensive manner without some predetermined 
categories. It also permits the researcher to gather rich information and enhances 
the understanding of social phenomena with a small number of people or cases.  
Patton (2002, p.4) states that qualitative methods are recognised from three types 
of data collection: (1) in-depth, open ended interviews (which yield direct 
quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge); 
(2) direct observation (which involves detailed descriptions of people‘s activities, 
behaviours, actions, and a full range of interpersonal interactions and 
organisational processes as part of the observable human experience); and (3) 
analysis of written documents (comprising studying excerpts, quotations, or entire 
passages from organisational, clinical, or programme records; official publications 
and reports; personal diaries; and questionnaires and surveys). Consistent with this 
view, the data for this study were gathered from written documents, semi-
structured interviews and survey questionnaires. The next section further explains 
the data collection and data analysis used in this research.  
3.3.1  Research Design 
Research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). In this thesis, the study of official publications and 
reports, semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaires were used to answer 
the research questions established in Chapter One. These questions were addressed 
using two separate stages of related studies. In the first stage, documentary study 
was employed to identify relevant issues in audit quality from the comments 
submitted by a wide group of interested parties who responded to the discussion 
paper ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘, which was issued by the FRC in 2006. The issues 
identified were used in developing an interview guide so that relevant themes were 
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covered in the second stage of the study, which involved semi-structured interviews 
with audit partners, AC members and quality inspectors. In this way the interview 
could be structured around the matters for which there was already some evidence 
of their relevance to the understanding of audit quality. An on-line survey 
questionnaire was used to complement interview data collected from quality 
inspectors as it was not possible to negotiate access to interview a large number of 
inspectors directly, due to the sensitivity and confidentiality of their work. The 
research design for all of the studies is explained in the following sub-sections.  
3.3.1.1 Collection of Data and Analysis of Comment Letters 
In 2006 the FRC issued a discussion paper Promoting Audit Quality (FRC, 2006b) 
and invited comments from various stakeholders, audit market participants and 
commentators by a deadline of 31 March 2007. A summary of the discussion paper 
is described in Appendix 1.  
The FRC received thirty-nine sets of comments concerning the discussion paper, 
which are available as part of the public record and published on the FRC website 
(www.frc.org.org/about/promotingauditqualityresponses.cfm). The views expressed 
in all the comment letters submitted to the FRC were examined to identify potential 
and significant issues that ought to be explored during the interview stage. Detailed 
findings from the examination are reported in Chapter 4. 
This study is based on a qualitative content analysis of the comments received by 
the FRC. Qualitative content analysis is defined as: 
“any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume 
of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and 
meanings” (Patton, 2002, p. 453). 
Qualitative content analysis is an accepted approach of textual investigation to 
identify the occurrence, patterns or themes within its specific contexts (Babbie, 
2001; Berg, 2006). Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) identify several key differences 
between qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Quantitative content analysis 
is developed in the research area of mass communication with the purpose of 
counting manifest textual elements. Its analysis is deductive in nature with the 
purpose of testing hypotheses against an existing framework or theory. 
Quantitative content analysis prefers the selection of random sampling or other 
probabilistic approaches to ensure the validity of statistical inference. It concerns 
producing numerical data that can be manipulated with various statistical methods. 
In comparison, qualitative content analysis is developed in the research area of 
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anthropology and sociology and aims to understand the underlying meaning of 
texts. Its analysis is inductive in nature and involves discovering patterns, topics or 
themes in one‘s data. In terms of sample, qualitative content analysis involves 
purposively selected texts that relate to the research questions. This approach 
produces descriptions or typologies together with expressions from subjects of the 
research that reflect how they view the social world.  
Quantitative content analysis pays particular attention to the reliability of its 
measures but suffers in terms of the validity of the findings. The approach is argued 
to be more objective and reliable but fails to understand the deeper meaning of the 
text‘s context. In contrast, the main advantage of the qualitative content analysis is 
that it increases the likelihood of genuine understanding of the deeper meaning of 
the texts. However, the method cannot be easily replicated, is influenced by the 
researcher‘s own experience, opinions and background, and suffers from a lack of 
detailed numerical information.  
As for this study, the objective of this textual investigation is to collect views from 
the respondents about various issues related to audit quality. Therefore, qualitative 
content analysis is employed to understand the meaning of the data from the 
variety of forms of response to the discussion paper. 
This analysis is included in Appendix 2 and summarised in Table 4.2. Several steps 
were taken in the analysis of the comments: 
1) First, the comments were read through twice, converted into rich text 
format and imported to NVivo software.  
2) Next, a set of themes or categories was developed from the data, which 
were then reviewed to ensure all of the issues had been identified.  
3) Lastly, each of the responses were reviewed again to identify which 
respondents had commented on each of the issues identified and a detailed 
analysis of the comments on significant issues by respondents was 
prepared.  
The FRC report summary of significant issues highlighted by the commentators and 
Audit Quality Framework publication following the consultation were also read to 
ensure completeness of the issues identified. NVivo was used to code and 
categorise the large amount of narrative information, which allows flexible and 
efficient coding of the data under themes determined by the researcher. Thus, a 
large volume of information is reduced into certain patterns, categories and 
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themes, which could be done through the use of diagrams or charts to link the 
themes and categories, and link emerging case explanations with available theories 
(Ryan et al., 2002). The software also facilitates storage, coding, retrieval, 
comparing and linking of data (Patton, 2002, p. 442). 
3.3.1.2 Collection of Data and Analysis of Semi-structured 
Interviews 
The first step in designing the interview study was to contact potential respondents 
for the study. The first group of respondents was the audit practitioners. Individual 
audit partners were identified from the directory of the ICAEW members. The 
BoardEx database was used to identify members of the audit committee as the 
second group of respondents in the study. The third group of respondents was the 
quality inspectors who were contacted personally.  
All of the groups of respondents could be regarded as a credible source in relation 
to the topic under investigation. These groups are in one way or another involved in 
the assessment and achievement of audit quality in practice. For the audit partners, 
they are responsible for delivering audits that they consider to be of suitable 
quality. Therefore, the issue as to whether they are fulfilling their responsibility in 
doing a good job or delivering the quality of audit that is expected by users of the 
audit services is relevant. For the AC members, they are part of the important 
governance mechanism that is responsible for commissioning, monitoring and 
reviewing the effectiveness of external audit function, which protects the interests 
of the shareholders through improving audit quality and financial reporting quality. 
Thus, the issues as to whether they are fulfilling these anticipated roles are 
important. In addition, the issue as to whether the quality that has been delivered 
to them is meeting the standards that have been established on behalf of the 
shareholders is pertinent. For the quality inspectors they are responsible for 
evaluating and monitoring audit quality by way of ensuring audit firm‘s compliance 
with the regulatory framework and extent of ‗quality of challenge‘ of the auditors to 
the management. Subsequently, the issue as to whether the quality that has been 
delivered to them is meeting the standards that have been established on behalf of 
the society is relevant. 
Thus, the inclusion of these groups in the study is important. It is also worth noting 
that a lot of prior research has been done in comparing auditors with other groups 
such as management of the audit client and investors. Therefore, simultaneously 
comparing audit partners, AC members and quality inspectors is an important 
contribution to research on audit quality.  
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A total of two hundred potential interviewees (AC members and audit partners) 
were contacted by letter on July 2009 (Appendix 3). After the initial contact, ten 
individuals agreed and fifteen declined to participate in the study. After three weeks 
from the initial contact, follow up letters were sent to encourage participation and 
twelve more individuals were willing to participate in the study. Two individual 
involved in quality inspection agreed to participate in this study through personal 
contacts. The number of individuals who participated in the study is shown in Table 
4.1. Patton (2002, p. 244) when explaining about sample size suggests: 
“There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size 
depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what‟s at 
stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done 
with available time and resources”. 
Pertaining to this, the aim of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding or 
‗information richness‘ rather than generalisation of the issues. It is also worth 
mentioning that time and resources also play a significant factor in determining the 
sample size. 
Table 3.1: Categorisation of Interviewees 
 
Respondent Number of respondents 
Audit partners 11 
Audit committee members 11 
Quality inspectors 2 
 
The study involved twenty-four semi-structured interviews with audit engagement 
partners, quality inspectors and AC members of the FTSE 100 in the UK. Eleven 
partners were interviewed within a period of three months (from October to 
December 2009). Eight of the interviewees were from Big Four firms and the 
remaining three from mid-tier firms. Similarly, eleven AC members, nine of whom 
were chairs of the AC, were interviewed during the same period. The two 
representatives from quality inspection were interviewed in November 2009. The 
interviews took place in several places: London, Manchester, Birmingham and 
Leeds. The interviews took place either at the offices of the interviewee or other 
places that were convenient to both the researcher and the interviewee. The 
majority of the interviews lasted between one hour and one and a half hours. 
Several steps were taken to improve the reliability of the data collected in the 
interview process. An interview guide was used to provide a consistent framework 
and coverage of topics in each interview. All of the interviewees were given 
assurances of anonymity in advance of the meeting to encourage open and honest 
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responses. All of the interviews were digitally recorded and a few notes were taken 
in order to promote an open dialogue on the matters being discussed.  
The interview guide, comprising a schedule of open-ended questions, was 
developed to ensure that relevant themes were covered consistently with all 
interviewees and to ensure appropriate questions to tackle the complex issues in 
depth. The interview guide is reproduced in Appendix 4. These themes were: 
definition and concept of audit quality, the role of firm culture, regulation, 
governance and control, quality of personnel, auditor-audit committee interactions, 
independence, and judgement and audit methods. In general, the interview guide 
served as a basic checklist to ensure all relevant themes were covered during the 
interview. The guide was developed from a review of the professional and academic 
literature on audit quality, and also from an analysis of the issues referred to in the 
comment letters submitted in response to the discussion paper Promoting Audit 
Quality, published in the UK in 2006 (FRC, 2006b). In this way the interviews could 
be structured around the matters for which there was already some evidence of 
their relevance to the understanding of audit quality held in the professional and 
practitioner community. 
Patton (2002, p. 343) proposed that the use of an interview guide has the 
advantage of allowing the interviewer to decide how best to use the available time 
and it improves the consistency of coverage of relevant topics, while leaving the 
interviewer free to explore and probe interesting comments and issues that arise in 
the course of the interview. Open-ended questions encourage interviewees to 
provide a full account of their experiences. This format facilitates the development 
of a good flow to the conversation, and a good rapport between the interviewer and 
the interviewee.  
All of the interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber, and the 
transcripts were then rechecked against the audio files. The transcripts were reread 
to improve familiarity with the data. In this particular study, the analysis of data 
involved searching and identifying for recurring themes and patterns together with 
consistencies and meanings in the information. The initial themes were established 
based on the issues covered by the interview guide but were later refined as the 
analysis of data progressed and patterns emerged. Three main activities were 
performed for the analysis of qualitative interviews data: data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994): 
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1) Data reduction encompasses the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting and transforming the data contained in the transcriptions.  
2) Data display involves organization, compression and assembly of the 
information to support analysis, verification and conclusion drawing.  
3) Finally, noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations 
and causal flows are some of the activities that are involved in arriving at 
conclusions from the data.  
In this way, the qualitative data was subject to careful exploration and rigorous 
analysis of themes in order to create a ‗thick description‘ and understanding of the 
issues. Again, the computer assisted package, NVivo, was used to assist in coding 
and categorising large narrative information collected from the semi-structured 
interviews. The detailed findings from the interviews of each group are reported in 
Chapters 5 (audit partners), 6 (AC members) and 7 (quality inspectors). 
Commonality and differences between groups regarding audit quality issues are 
discussed in chapter 8.  
3.3.1.3 Collection of Data and Analysis of Survey 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was pilot-tested by reference to a senior member of the 
inspection unit in order to identify and rectify any weaknesses with an aim to 
increase the response rate. The questionnaire was administered through a web 
survey between December 2010 and January 2011. The total population for the 
quality inspectors was identified as twenty individuals, all of whom were surveyed. 
Table 8.1 below provides a summary of the response rates.  
Table 3.2: Response Rates for the Questionnaires 
 
Group Total Returned Useable response 
rate (percentage) 
Quality inspectors  20 12 60% 
The questionnaire included 85 statements in five sections in addition to a personal 
background section. A full copy of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix 5, and 
detailed findings from the various issues investigated are reported in Chapter 7. 
The form of questions used in the questionnaire incorporated a five-point Likert 
scale for responses. A Likert scale has the advantages of being relatively easy to 
construct and administer and is easily understood by respondents, making it 
especially useful in surveys (Tull and Hawkins, 1993). The questionnaire consisted 
of closed-ended questions. Care was taken in keeping the length of the 
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questionnaire reasonable whilst ensuring that it covered all of the important issues. 
In the wording of the questions asked, care was also taken in order to ensure that 
they were clear and understandable. In addition, statements concerning potentially 
sensitive areas were formed with care. The confidentiality of information given to 
the respondents was guaranteed in the introduction of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire used in the study was developed after reviewing both prior 
literature and the findings from the interviews. The questionnaire consists of six 
main sections. The first section includes several personal background questions 
related to the respondents. The second section covers the perceptions of quality 
inspectors about the attributes of audit quality in practice. In other words, it aims 
to understand the quality inspectors‘ conceptualisation of the notion of audit quality 
in practice. The third section asks the views of the quality inspectors about the 
impact of business, accounting and the auditing environment on audit quality. The 
fourth section covers their views on how actual audit quality is achieved, that is, to 
understand their perceptions of how audit quality is operationalised and presented 
in practice. The fifth section aims to collect information about potential problems in 
audit quality in practice as perceived by the quality inspectors based on their 
assessment of work of the external auditors. The final section collects views of the 
quality inspectors about the actual level of audit quality in practice.  
Descriptive statistics analysis such as central tendency and dispersion of the data 
(median and mean) are used to present the results of the data collected from the 
survey questionnaire. Although good proportionate coverage of the quality 
inspector group is achieved in the study, it is still a relatively small number of 
responses. As a result, more detailed statistical analysis or testing (such as 
differences within the sample) is restricted.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined and described the methodological and theoretical 
approach undertaken to examine the perceptions of auditors, AC members and 
quality inspectors concerning the meaning of audit quality in practice. It has 
attempted to explain how and why the research was carried out in a particular way.  
This study has applied an interpretive approach that is concerned with 
understanding the social meaning of audit quality. The study used symbolic 
interactionism as an analytical tool to understand the meanings of audit quality as a 
social object that are formed by the interactions of people in the auditing 
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environment, and which subsequently influence their action. This chapter describes 
two stages of qualitative studies to answer the concerns of the research. The 
qualitative research approach provides a new insight about issues concerning audit 
quality. The approach also offers rich description and flexibility to understand the 
societal, organisational and institutional factors that might affect audit quality. 
In the remaining parts of the thesis, chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical 
results of the study. The next chapter begins by describing the results of the 
analysis of the textual study, as a backdrop to ensure that issues relevant to the 
study were covered in the interviews. 
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Chapter 4 
Audit Quality in Practice - The FRC Discussion Paper 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of responses to the discussion paper Promoting 
Audit Quality published in the UK in 2006 (FRC, 2006b). Reporting upon the 
analysis of responses, the objective of this study is to analyse views from the 
respondents about various issues related to audit quality. This study constitutes of 
how subject of audit quality is seen in practice and as influence in work carried out 
in second stage of the research that reported in subsequent chapters. The chapter 
is set out as follows: section 4.1 briefly describes the FRC discussion paper exercise 
and the justification for its inclusion in this study; section 4.2 presents an analysis 
of the comments on the discussion paper; section 4.3 presents key issues from the 
analysis of the comments and draws out areas for further investigation in the 
subsequent study, which will be presented in the following three chapters. Finally, 
section 4.4 provides a summary of the chapter.  
4.1 Introduction and Justification for the Documentary Study 
In November 2006, the FRC published a discussion paper on promoting audit 
quality (FRC, 2006b) and invited comments from interested parties by the 31 March 
2007. While responses were invited on any aspect of the subject, the FRC sought 
answers to seventeen specific questions that relate to five main drivers of audit 
quality:  
i) culture within an audit firm,  
ii) skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff,  
iii) effectiveness of audit process,  
iv) reliability and usefulness of audit reporting, and  
v) outside factors beyond the control of auditors that affect audit quality 
such as the approach taken by management and the contribution made 
by the audit committee.  
The text of these questions is reproduced in Appendix 1 and analyses of the 
responses to the specific questions are included in Appendix 2 to the thesis. Thirty 
nine sets of responses were received in response to the discussion paper: eight 
from audit firms, ten from professional bodies, nine from institutional investors, two 
from the corporate sector and ten from other interested parties (Table 4.1). Of the 
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eight sets of responses received from the audit firms, four were received from the 
Big Four and four from middle tier firms. Of the ten responses received from the 
professional bodies, eight were from bodies in the UK or Ireland and two from 
South America.  
Table 4.1: Respondents to the Discussion Paper 
Respondents Number of responses 
Audit firms 
Professional bodies 
Investors 
Corporate 
Others 
8 
10 
9 
2 
10 
The FRC subsequently published all of the responses on its website 
(http://www.frc.org.uk/about/promotingauditqualityresponses.cfm). The text of all 
thirty nine responses was analysed as the basis for this study. Appendix 2 includes 
a list of respondents, together with an analysis of their responses to the specific 
questions posed by the FRC and other significant issues identified in the comments. 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the significant aspects of the detailed analysis in 
Appendix 2. A report published by the FRC in October 2007 that summarises 
significant issues of the responses and Audit Quality Framework publication 
following the consultation was also read to ensure completeness of the issue 
identified. 
The responses to the discussion paper were generally structured around the specific 
questions posed by the FRC. The structured nature of the discussion paper with its 
seventeen questions, determined in most cases the structure and content of the 
responses received. It could be argued that more meaningful responses could have 
been elicited using a more open-ended approach. However, respondents are not 
obliged to structure their answers in a particular way, and any very strong feelings 
about the issues under review would have been likely to emerge regardless of the 
structure. As such, the respondents made a significant number of additional 
comments in their covering letters or response pages.  
A number of limitations need to be noted regarding the nature of the documentary 
evidence. These include the fact that public statements may not capture full picture 
on privately held views, subjectivity in responses and self selection in population of 
those who responded. Nonetheless, comment letters submitted to the discussion 
paper still represents a significant available source of evidence on audit quality as 
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the collection of view expressed by a wide group of interested parties and therefore 
worth analysing.  
In order to understand how subject of audit quality is seen in practice the approach 
to the analysis is to go beyond counting comments or score points as a means of 
drawing conclusions but also to identify certain key themes that consequently 
influence on work reported in subsequent chapters. 
The issues referred to in comment letters, together with a review of the 
professional and academic literature on audit quality, also served an important role 
in this study as a basis for developing the interview guide so that relevant themes 
were covered during the interviews. In this way the interviews could be structured 
around the matters for which there was already some evidence of their relevance to 
the understanding of audit quality held in the professional and practitioner 
community. 
Table 4.2: Analysis of Significant Responses Received by the FRC on the 
Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality 
 AF PB II C O 
Total number of respondents  8 10 9 2 10 
Key Issues of the Comments 
The Culture of the Audit Firms 
Concern about tick box mentality culture  5 4 0 1 1 
Concern about focus on documentation 4 2 0 0 0 
Concern about commercialisation of the audit firm 0 0 3 0 1 
Suggest professionalism as part of culture of the 
audit firm 
0 0 4 0 0 
Sought greater information about governance and 
control of the audit firm 
0 2 7 0 1 
The Quality of people      
Diverse and up to date skills and knowledge 8 5 7 1 5 
Concern about attractiveness of the profession 7 1 2 0 1 
Concern about availability of audit staff 7 5 0 0 0 
No fundamental review of the qualification and 
training requirements 
4 5 3 0 0 
Concern about requirement of partner rotation 3 1 0 0 0 
The Effectiveness of the Audit Process      
Concern about excessive and/or overly complex 
audit standards and regulations 
7 6 1 1 3 
Concern about move to compliance/prescriptive 
audit approach 
7 5 3 2 2 
Regulators should promote and enhance principles 
based audit approach 
5 6 2 2 0 
Important role of audit client to audit process 7 6 5 1 2 
Important role of audit committees to audit process 7 6 4 1 1 
 
AF – Audit firms   PB – Professional bodies 
II – Institutional investors  C – Corporate   O - Others 
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Table 4.2: Analysis of Significant Responses Received by the FRC on the 
Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality (continued) 
 AF PB II C O 
Total number of respondents  8 10 9 2 10 
Key Issues of the Comments 
The Reliability and Usefulness of Audit Report 
Reputation of audit firm and audit profession 2 3 1 1 1 
Greater information from audit firm 2 1 5 0 1 
Understand ability of audit report 1 2 5 0 1 
Other Factors Affecting Audit Quality      
Important role and support of the management 7 2 0 0 0 
Important role and responsibilities of audit 
committee 
7 6 7 1 1 
Audit committee discharging adequate 
responsibilities 
4 1 3 1 1 
Sought detailed guidance for audit committees to 
evaluate effectiveness of audit 
3 3 2 1 4 
Sought summary of work of audit committees in 
annual report 
7 4 1 0 5 
Other Issues       
Welcomes references to discussion paper 8 10 8 2 6 
Concerned about lack of empirical evidence to 
support some of the assertions 
3 3 5 0 0 
Insufficient attention to other critical dimensions of 
audit quality 
6 4 1 1 0 
Resource concern 5 5 1 1 1 
Concept or definition of audit quality requires 
clarification 
0 1 0 1 0 
 
AF – Audit firms   PB – Professional bodies 
II – Institutional investors  C – Corporate  O – Others 
 
4.2 Comments on the Discussion Paper 
This section outlines findings from the analysis of comments letter to the discussion 
paper. As noted earlier, the discussion paper is structured around five major drivers 
of audit quality. This section is organised according to that structure together with 
other issues that emerged from the analysis. The detailed discussion will be 
presented in subsequent sections.  
4.2.1  Audit Firm Culture 
In general, respondents agreed that the culture of the audit firm was an important 
driver for audit quality. Auditors, investors, professional bodies and companies all 
made similar comments on this point. They viewed the indicators identified by the 
FRC such as leadership, auditing and ethical standards, promotion of consultation, 
partner and staff development systems, and information infrastructure as essential 
to achieve high quality audits. For example, RSM Robson Rhodes observed that: 
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“We consider that these are important indicators of a strong quality culture. 
In particular, in our view, it is the effectiveness of partner leadership on 
quality matters (the “tone at the top”) combined with the cascade of this 
through the business, which underpins a quality culture within the firm”. 
Similarly, an institutional investor, Electricity Pensions Services Limited, recognised 
that technical competence, risk management and staff training were an essential 
part of the quality culture in the audit firm. A professional body, the ICAEW, 
emphasised the significance of good technical support and that the culture of 
leadership throughout the audit firm that drives audit quality.  
While accepting the importance of culture to audit quality, most of the audit firm 
respondents were keen to describe concerns and problems about the changing 
culture in the audit firm created by the current regulatory framework. Eleven 
respondents claimed that the changes have diverted audit firms‘ attention from the 
principles to rule based procedures that could create a culture of a ‗tick-box‘ or 
compliance approach in audit. The compliance approach has also created an 
excessive focus on documentation that could reduce the use of knowledge and 
professional judgement in the conduct of the audit. The respondents argued that 
the prescriptive approach was restricting the auditor‘s ability to exercise 
professional judgement, shifting the nature of the audit to compliance work, 
thereby affecting the quality culture of the audit firms and impacting the 
effectiveness of the audit process. These eventually would undermine the quality of 
the audit.  
“The approach of the regulator has a direct effect on the culture of an audit 
firm and a relentless focus on documentation will drive a culture in the audit 
firms that detracts from evidence gathering and making judgements” (PWC).  
 
“Rules based, rather than principle based, auditing standards could result in 
a tick box mentality to auditing” (KPMG). 
“We consider that having an overly complex financial reporting regime can 
have a detrimental impact on audit quality as it can mean that partners and 
senior staff spend too much time on accounting issues or in preparing 
documentation for the benefit of regulators. We understand that this has 
been an increasing problem for firms” (ICAEW). 
In consequence of the culture, it was frequently claimed by a number of the 
investor respondents that commercial interests have become a major aspect of the 
culture of the audit firms and could compromise the audit quality. For example, the 
Association of British Insurers voiced concern about the commercial objectives of 
the audit firms that could create a threat to audit quality. Similarly, its counterpart, 
the Investment Management Association opined: 
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“We consider that one contributory factor in recent years to a decline in 
audit quality is the way firms have tended to shift to a more aggressive, 
commercial business model”. 
Further, four investors suggested that the audit firms should promote and 
encourage culture of professionalism - an audit that serves the public interest for 
the benefits of shareholders and other users of the accounts as part of the 
indicators of their quality culture. Eight respondents advocated that greater 
information about quality initiatives and the governance and control of the audit 
firms could enhance their confidence in the quality culture of the audit firm. In 
general, the respondents highlighted the lack of information about audit firm‘s 
policies and actions that they take to embed a culture of quality within the firm.  
“Fostering of reputation is a prerequisite for long-term success in a properly 
competitive business environment. In the case of accountancy firms the 
quality and professionalism of what should be seen as the core discipline, 
that of audit, is key. It is disappointing how little prominence some of the 
largest accountancy firms give to their audit business in the way they 
present themselves to the outside world” (ABI). 
 
“...way of demonstrating to their ultimate paymasters, the shareholders, 
that they are providing a valuable service” (Hermes Investment 
Management).  
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that within the context of the audit 
firms, culture is imperative and will influence the quality of audit practice. The user 
group representative, that is the investors mentioned great concern on culture of 
commercialisation of audit firm that could undermine audit quality. The audit firms 
and professional associations draw attention on negative effect of the audit 
regulation to the culture of the audit firms.  
4.2.2 The Quality of People  
Almost all of the respondents fully agreed with the importance of the auditor‘s 
knowledge, skills and personal qualities of the audit personnel for attainment of 
high audit quality. Investors, auditors, companies and professional bodies all made 
similar observations on this point. Similarly, investors such as the Investment 
Management Association and the National Association of Pension Funds pointed out 
the necessity for auditors to keep their technical skills up to date with to the 
changes in the business environment. Likewise, a professional body respondent, 
ICAI, believes that technical skills, personal qualities, professional scepticism and 
practical experience are key drivers of audit quality.  
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The audit firm respondents asserted it is important for the auditors to have diverse 
and up to date skills, and sufficient experience. These attributes are important in 
supporting professional judgement and an effective audit process during the 
conduct of the audit. As such, the audit firm respondents emphasised the 
importance of academic qualification, entry and selection requirements, and 
training procedures in the audit firm to advance the knowledge and skills of 
auditors to achieve high audit quality; quality audit judgement.  
“...this gained from the ability to work on a wide variety of companies; gain 
experience from a wide range of disciplines (from audit to tax to transaction 
services); and the undertaking of a rigorous set of exams for the audit 
qualification. To undertake high quality audits in the context of current and 
evolving business practices and accounting standards, it is particularly 
important that audit firms have available (and under their control and 
subject to their quality control processes) a sufficiently broad range of 
technical skills including information technology, taxation, valuation and 
actuarial skills” (KPMG). 
In relation to the skills, the audit firms and the professional bodies frequently 
stressed points concerning the potential adverse impact of the current regulatory 
environment on the quality of people in the audit firm. They argued that complex 
accounting rules and auditing standards, and the check-list audit approach resulted 
in changing the nature of audit work to a more compliance based activity that had 
an unfavourable impact on the attractiveness of the profession to hire and retain 
quality audit staff. In addition, intrusive audit regulations, imbalanced reviews by 
the regulators and the threat of litigation reduce the attractiveness of the 
profession to attract and retain quality audit staff.  
“Whilst the profession continues to attract high quality graduates, the 
attractiveness of the profession appears to be declining as evidenced by 
decreasing job satisfaction, brought about at least in part by increased 
regulation. Remaining in the profession post-qualification is becoming a less 
attractive option partly as a result of the amount of compliance-type work 
carried out during the training contract. Unless the best people see audit as 
an interesting, profitable and safe environment they will not join it and no 
amount of “tone from the top”, training and information infrastructure will 
overcome that fundamental weakness” (ICAEW). 
“There are concerns that the attractiveness is being impacted by: the overall 
reputation of the audit profession, complex accounting rules that involve a 
check list approach to review, an increase in accounting rules rather than 
principles, and regulators that place too much emphasis on the application 
of the rule rather than principles” (KPMG). 
Another issue that was voiced by some of the respondents was related to the 
requirements for partner rotation. Some of them believed that the requirement for 
partner rotation of every five years might not contribute to audit quality because 
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longer tenure will help build greater expertise and experience required for complex 
and high risk audit clients. These views were supported by the major professional 
bodies and audit firms.  
“We support audit partner rotation, although we question the need for the 
five year rotation period that applies in the UK. ....the impact of the audit 
partner‟s ability to build sufficient trust with management, such that the 
audit team is passed the information that they need, or that the audit 
partner does not develop detailed knowledge of the business and its risks for 
the audit to be effective” (Grant Thornton). 
“Audit quality could be enhanced for large, complex multinational clients if 
the period of rotation was 7 years rather than 5 years since it can take a 
considerable period of time for a partner to fully understand the client‟s 
business and complexities” (KPMG). 
However, while accepting that skills and experience are fundamental drivers of 
audit quality, the majority of the respondents objected to a fundamental review of 
the qualifications and training requirements for auditors. The respondents 
expressed the view that the current qualifications and training requirements are 
sufficient and appropriate.  
Overall, the majority of the respondents in this area support on the important of 
quality of people on audit quality. Analysis of the responses shows respondents 
were inclined to highlight concern with unfavourable impact of current regulatory 
environment to expertise and judgement of the auditors.  
4.2.3  The Effectiveness of the Audit Process 
The FRC asserts that factors such as characteristics of the audit team, technical 
support, audit methodology, auditing standards and quality control procedures 
contribute to the effectiveness of the audit process. Analysis of the responses 
shows that the respondents were fully in accord with the assertions. The majority of 
the respondents also emphasised the important role of the audit client and audit 
committees for an effective audit process. Other factors that influence the 
effectiveness audit process include application of business risk audit approach in an 
audit and experience of the audit partners.  
“We think that the paper identifies most of the factors that contribute to an 
effective audit process. However, we would add to these the relationship 
that an auditor has with the board of directors, the audit committee, the 
financial management and elements of the operational management. A 
close, robust and challenging relationship with these parties will improve the 
effectiveness of the audit. A distant, difficult and uncooperative relationship 
will create significant barriers to audit quality” (PWC). 
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“We are concerned that too much regulation risks auditors becoming overly 
mindful of compliance with process, which may detract from the 
thoughtfulness of audit work that is required” (PWC). 
Eighteen respondents expressed deep concern about the effect of excessive and 
overly complex standards and regulation that shift auditing from principles to rules 
based approaches. As a result, some respondents believed that as the audit 
approach becomes more prescriptive that promotes compliance exercises rather 
than the use of professional judgement, and that this would significantly affect the 
effectiveness of the audit process and the overall assessment of the financial 
statements, thus delivery of high audit quality. In response to that issue, fifteen 
respondents took the view that, regulators should promote and support the 
principles based audit approach in their initiatives and projects in the audit arena to 
ensure high audit quality. 
 
“Audit effectiveness and quality will inevitably suffer if auditors are faced 
with an increased administrative burden in order to demonstrate compliance 
in a regime that is in danger of becoming essentially rules-based with little 
or no tolerance for the exercise of professional judgment” (ICAI). 
 
“The FRC and its operating bodies have a crucial role to play in shaping 
these developments, for example in liaising with the European Commission 
and other regulators, and in making the case for the importance of 
principles-based standards and the use of professional judgement. More 
work might be needed on the nature of professional judgement which is 
distrusted by some non-UK regulators but which we believe is crucial to high 
quality audit work, and therefore needs to be better understood 
internationally” (ICAEW). 
Overall, one pertinent issue that emerged from the analysis concerning the 
effectiveness of the audit process is in relation to impact of various factors such as 
regulation, audit client, audit committee, individual auditors and firm‘s policies and 
procedures on the effectiveness of the audit process to achieve audit quality.  
4.2.4  The Reliability and Usefulness of the Audit Report 
The FRC identified reliability and usefulness of audit reporting that command 
confidence as one of the key drivers of audit quality attracted many comments from 
the institutional investors. Analysis shows that the respondents generally viewed 
concept of audit quality is closely linked to the accuracy and credibility of the audit 
opinion that enhances quality of financial statements. As such, they suggested that 
the audit report should be accurate and the auditors should be seen as an 
independent professional entity. For example:  
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“The judgment of the auditor in confirming truth and fairness of financial 
statements may, in turn, make important demands on both his professional 
faculties and integrity. This process is key to ensuring audit quality” 
(Association of British Insurers). 
“The value of the audit opinion is strongly linked to the usefulness of the 
accounts” (Coal Pension Trustee). 
Some other comments that put forward by the commentators concerning factors 
that affecting confidence on audit opinions include greater information from audit 
firms regarding their process and policies, and reputation of audit firm and audit 
profession. In comparison, some of factors that identified could reduce confidence 
in audit opinion are related to format of the audit report (length and legalistic 
wording) and prescriptive audit approach in audit.  
4.2.5  Other Factors Affecting Audit Quality  
On the whole, the respondents supported the significant contributions made by the 
management of the audit client and audit committees to audit quality. The London 
Society of Chartered Accountants, for instance, pointed out the important role of 
the audit client for audit performance. Similarly, audit firms identified that the 
culture of the audited company and the skills and personal qualities of its board and 
executive management could enhance the effectiveness of the audit process.  
 
“The culture of the audited company and the skills and personal qualities of 
its board and executive management are very important drivers of audit 
quality” (EY). 
 
“...to these the relationship that an auditor has with the Board of Directors, 
the audit committee, the financial management and elements of the 
operational management. A close, robust and challenging relationship with 
these parties will improve the effectiveness of the audit” (PWC). 
In a similar manner, other respondents such as Deloitte, the ICAEW, Investment 
Management Association and Confederation of Business Industry recognised the 
important role and responsibilities of the members of audit committees for audit 
quality. There was a consensus among the audit firms that the important role of 
audit committee in the auditing and financial reporting process. PWC noted that 
based on their experience the audit committees had become stronger and more 
questioning of what auditors do. Deloitte observed that the recent regulatory 
changes have resulted in increased communication between the auditors and audit 
committees. The audit firms also acknowledged the influence of the audit 
committees on the culture and conduct of their audit. Several audit firms also 
stressed the important role of the audit committees in enhancing the confidence of 
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the users of financial statements. These were illustrated by the following 
quotations: 
“The responsibilities audit committees have undertaken in relation to the 
audit process can give confidence to shareholders that the auditor/client 
relationship is sufficiently independent and that sufficient attention is being 
paid to audit quality” (Deloitte). 
 
“Enhancing the direct disclosure between audit committee and shareholders 
and/or making the formal communication between auditors and the audit 
committee more readily available, would go some way to improving 
confidence in the audit opinion” (BDO). 
 
“...we also recognise the very important role of the audit committee in being 
involved and overseeing relationships between companies and their auditor, 
and in monitoring the company‟s financial reporting and internal control 
systems and the audit process” (Confederation of Business Industry). 
As a result of the function of the audit committee, the majority of the respondents 
agreed that the committees discharge adequate roles and responsibilities in relation 
to the audit. The audit firm respondents acknowledged the increasing quality of 
communication between them and audit committees. Further, they recognised the 
critical role performed by audit committees in the auditing and financial reporting 
process. The audit firms, in general, suggest that additional dialogue between the 
audit committee and shareholders would enhance confidence about the audit 
profession. They also believe that detailed evaluation of audit guidelines would 
assist audit committees to function more effectively. On the other hand, investors 
requested more disclosure about the work performed by audit committees that 
enhances users‘ confidence on audit quality. 
4.2.6  Other Issues  
In general, the respondents expressed a high degree of support for the initiative 
and the audit quality framework proposed by the FRC. In particular, almost all 
respondents were in favour of the attempt of the FRC to recognise a broad set of 
significant issues relating to audit quality through identification of drivers and 
threats that could enhance and undermine the audit quality. It is clear that the 
discussion paper succeeded in recognising wider factors that may influence audit 
quality in practice. Opinions often emerged as part of the covering letters attached 
by the respondents. A number of respondents commented on the positive effects of 
discussion paper in promoting and ensuring confidence in the value and quality of 
audit opinions. Some of the respondents commented on the positive contribution 
the discussion paper made, which enhanced their understanding of the complex 
topic in a systematic way. Others indicated that the discussion paper provided 
107 
 
constructive input to understand better what constitutes audit quality in practice. 
For example: 
“We support the contribution of the paper to achieving greater and more 
consistent understanding of audit quality, and we consider the paper has 
successfully identified the principal drivers of quality” (PWC).  
 
“We believe the discussion paper generally draws together the relevant 
issues surrounding audit quality” (CBI). 
 
While acknowledging the positive contribution of the discussion paper, some 
respondents expressed adverse comments. For example, a few respondents 
referred to the lack of relevant and empirical evidence to support the assertions 
stated in the discussion paper. For instance, the comments of the CBI and KPMG 
included the following: 
“There is also a need to underpin and inform any future review with 
appropriate supporting evidence or research, which is lacking in the current 
discussion paper...an assessment of the relative importance and 
completeness of the indicators identified would benefit from some relevant 
empirical data” (CBI). 
 
“In some places the FRC discussion paper implies that there are significant 
concerns with audit quality. We do not consider that these are supported 
with sufficient research or evidence” (KPMG). 
Three of the audit firm respondents had significant criticisms of some of the threats 
to audit quality identified in the discussion paper. For example, one of the audit 
firms pointed out that some of the factors that were identified as threats to audit 
quality were unsubstantiated because of a lack of concrete evidence that it would 
have an adverse effect on quality: 
“A number of issues have been identified that could be threats but the paper 
seems to imply that they are threats. We do not see that there is any 
evidence to suggest that there is a flaw in the „pyramid structure‟ or in the 
training provided. Partners and managers are heavily involved in the key 
risk areas of an audit and staff members are adequately briefed, trained and 
supervised on the roles that they are assigned to” (KPMG).  
The audit firm respondents also argued that the discussion paper failed to recognise 
the commitment of the audit firms to the quality of audit. For example, PWC noted 
that the discussion paper fails to appreciate the very real interest that audit firms 
themselves have in obtaining the highest quality. The respondents also expressed 
deep concern about further proposed regulations that might result from the 
discussion paper. Twelve respondents took the view that although the framework 
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had identified the main drivers of audit quality, it failed to recognise other critical 
drivers such as auditor independence and audit regulation.  
“Our overall view is that it is a well timed and considered discussion paper in 
the light of the continuing need to ensure confidence in the value and quality 
of audit opinions. What is less clear is how the feedback you get will be 
used; however, from this firm‟s perspective we would wish any approach 
derived from this to be measured, and not to result in the further creation of 
more prescriptive standards; there needs to be some time given to bedding 
down the large number of new auditing and financial reporting standards 
implemented over the years” (BDO). 
“However, we believe that you have missed one key driver, the impact of 
regulation. Whilst this is highlighted in a number of areas (especially in 
chapter 7) it has not been highlighted as one of the main drivers” (KPMG). 
 
“Qualities of independence in the audit and the auditor are crucial but this is 
a dimension that receives insufficient attention in the paper” (ABI). 
Overall, most of the respondents welcomed the initiative and project in the audit 
arena in the name of understanding and enhancing audit quality. However, there 
are limited comments from the respondents that provided any detailed analytical 
assessment of the concept and definition of audit quality. Only two of the 
respondents to the discussion paper sought clarity about the definition of audit 
quality. For example, the corporate respondent, The Hundred Group of Finance 
Directors suggested that audit market constituents such as auditors and audit 
committees should define more clearly the meaning of audit quality by providing 
qualitative and quantitative measures that could be used to assess the quality of 
the audit.  
Another respondent, the ICAEW, raised concern about the imbalance in the 
definition of audit quality and its drivers as proposed by the FRC. The professional 
body claimed that current work in the audit arena focuses too much on the 
regulators rather than the broader view of the definition of audit quality. They 
proposed four broad perspectives on the definition of audit quality. These were i) 
market quality – quality in the eyes of principal stakeholders; in the case of 
shareholders as a class this arises from the stewardship role, but there are also 
other external stakeholders who might use information for decisions and this 
element of quality should aim to satisfy the public interest in the audit; ii) service 
quality – quality in the eyes of client management and those charged with 
governance; iii) operational quality – from the firms‘ perspective in order that the 
provision of audit services is sustainable; and iv) compliance quality – quality in the 
eyes of regulators, notwithstanding the regulators‘ clear interest in market quality 
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and the interest that they should arguably also have in service and operational 
quality.  
Issues relating to the effect of changes in audit regulation were significant features 
of almost all responses to the discussion paper. Although the changes are aimed at 
enhancing audit quality, several of the respondents expressed adverse opinions. 
Thirteen respondents mentioned resource concerns arising from the current audit 
regulations. For instance, five of the audit firms referred to the increased time and 
cost needed to fulfil various regulatory requirements. Increased oversight activities 
have caused additional workload for the audit firms because more staff are needed 
to spend time in meeting the regulatory requirements. For example: 
“...many ISAs are unnecessarily detailed, prescriptive and inflexible. Thus 
there is a significant risk that they could result in additional costs to firms 
and their clients (particularly smaller entities) without any corresponding 
improvement in audit quality” (IMA). 
 
“Rapid change in auditing and reporting standards with the corresponding 
oversight requires internal departments of audit firms, who [are] responsible 
[for] training, quality and risk management, to make, on occasions, 
significant demands of audit teams. These teams then have to spend more 
time completing documentation and compliance forms. This can create an 
extra challenge to delivering audits and, for some, additional pressure” (EY). 
 
“There are now significant pressures on audit firms to complete audits as 
quickly as possible to meet various reporting deadlines imposed on 
companies. In addition, major changes in requirements of regulatory 
standards, applicable to audits and audit firms of all sizes, have resulted in 
auditors spending a large quantity of their audit time demonstrating 
compliance with such standards. This ultimately has the potential to have a 
negative impact on audit quality” (ICAI). 
 
The above statements manifest the changes in regulation that have created 
additional tasks for the audit firms. The firms need to stretch their resources to 
meet the regulatory and clients‘ requirements as well as to fulfil other stakeholders‘ 
needs. The respondents voiced significant concerns about the availability of staff to 
perform the additional work demanded by the current regulations. Analysis 
suggests staffing and cost becomes a major concern to the firm. In the light of the 
ongoing debate about the benefits of new regulation, it seems worth investigating 
the costs and benefits of the oversight function to audit firms and overall audit 
quality. 
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4.3  Questions for Consideration 
This preceding discussion has reported a documentary study based on the thirty-
nine responses submitted to the discussion paper Promoting Audit Quality published 
by the FRC. The chapter presents a snapshot of a small part of the audit quality 
debate, through the eyes of those who responded to the discussion paper. This 
study did not intend to draw specific generalised conclusions about the research 
topic from these responses but, the study was felt necessary to provide an 
additional information source to draw out areas that are potentially relevant for 
further investigation and that can enhance our knowledge about audit quality in 
practice. A number of questions and areas for further investigations arise from 
analysis of the data and are discussed in this section.  
Interpretation and Understanding of Term of Audit quality  
The discussion paper proposed a framework of audit quality that comprised of 
drivers and threats but without a clear definition and concept of the audit quality. 
While there may be advantages to understand the term audit quality based on its 
drivers and threats, however, the relationship between audit quality and the factors 
in the new audit environment remains unclear. While questions of how audit quality 
is defined and understood by professional practitioners are indeed important 
(Schroeder et al., 1986; Carcello et al., 1992; Duff, 2004), analysis of the 
responses draws attention to the lack of a practitioners‘ construct of the meaning of 
audit quality. The expression ‗high audit quality‘ featured in the responses but its 
meaning is unclear. What is audit practitioners understanding of audit quality and 
its impact on the audit performance? The meaning of the term of audit quality 
remains implicit rather than clearly articulated. The practitioners said relatively little 
about ‗true quality‘ or ‗technical‘ definition of audit quality in terms of what it 
means. They had more to say that they being committed to have high quality that 
relate to issue such as expertise, skills, professional judgement and culture of the 
audit firm. 
Audit quality is a concept that needs to be clearly understood, thereby allowing 
greater understanding of the link between the meaning of audit quality and 
auditors‘ evaluation and delivery of quality work. Similarly, understanding of the 
term of audit quality from the perspective of other audit market constituents such 
as audit committees and quality inspectors may provide further evidence on their 
role in commissioning and evaluating what sort of audit is delivered to them and on 
behalf of society.  
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The Commercial Culture of the Audit Firm 
Identification of culture as one of the key drivers of audit quality may indicate 
considerable concern for the regulator concerning ‗commercialised professionalism‘ 
that promote a culture of client-centred services (Hanlon, 1994) that may be 
viewed as detrimental to audit quality. As the AIU (2006, p. 13) points out, 
commercial considerations and measures continued to be a driver of performance 
measurement in the audit firm rather than audit quality. The investor respondents 
in this study voiced concerns regarding the commercial business approach of the 
audit firm that had contributed to decline in audit quality in recent years. In like 
manner, some prior research has shown deterioration of the culture of 
professionalism causes conflicts in values and practices within the audit profession 
that affect audit performance (Wyatt, 2004; Baker, 2008). 
Previous research in auditing examining the impact of culture on audit quality is 
relatively scarce. There is a lack of understanding of what culture means for the 
auditors and how it relates to audit quality. In addition, there is insufficient 
information concerning how culture is measured or is capable of being monitored in 
the firm. Finally, it is unclear how the current auditing environment negatively 
affects the culture of the audit firms as claimed by the respondents to the 
discussion paper issued by the FRC. Recent corporate scandals have called into 
question whether accounting firms have nurtured cultures that emphasize an 
appropriate level of professionalism and commitment to serving the public interest 
(Jenkins et al., 2008, p69).  
Expertise and Professional Judgement  
Quality of people – expertise and professional judgement is the traditional sphere in 
auditing. Central to this claim, the audit firms and professional bodies argued that 
the changes in audit regulation may bring a threat to that core value of the audit 
profession. In general, analysis of responses highlighted concern of the respondents 
on the impact of the changes in the audit regulation that may devalue of a core 
area of expertise through and argued that changes in the nature of audit practices 
that more to do to tick box approach in audit performance are detrimental to 
professional judgement. While accepting potential negative impacts of the changes 
in audit regulation on the quality of people, the responses provided by the audit 
firms and professional bodies can also be seen as an important defence against the 
imposition of more prescriptive regulations that may be detrimental to market 
dominance, power and social status, and jurisdiction of their work. Analysis of 
responses showed there is a considerable tension around regulation and concern of 
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the audit firms concerning further regulation that might be proposed as a result of 
the debate around the discussion paper. Given this context, responses from audit 
firms on this issue can be viewed as an objection towards development in the audit 
regulation and eventual independent oversight and direct regulation of the audit 
profession. As such, an emphasis on expertise and professional judgement is 
entirely to be expected as it reflects an aspect of firm self interest. Attributes of 
professional claims to special knowledge and expertise are necessary to sustain and 
legitimate professional status and the related social and economic rewards 
(Richardson, 1987). For this reason, professionalism often involves a traditional 
stance against regulation.  
Overall, professional audit firms always emphasised the importance of quality 
people to audit quality. Does emphasis on this give firms more freedom to argue 
they have good quality? Clearly, it is much more difficult for the regulators to 
regulate ‗individual quality‘ or to measure the quality beyond the threshold of 
qualification and experience. Could focuses on professional judgement through the 
quality of individuals relate to certain regulations that they found constraining to 
the profession? The audit firms also suggested the important of the selection and 
training procedures in the audit firm to advance knowledge and skills of the 
auditors to achieve high audit quality. One of the limitations with this explanation is 
that it does not explain how the quality of people is used in controlling perceived 
and actual audit quality. Further, what sort of skills or professional behaviour that 
are promoted by the audit firms towards achievement of audit quality in practice? 
In relation to the quality of people, one significant issue that emerged from the 
analysis of the responses is the importance of auditors‘ professional judgement in 
maintaining and promoting high audit quality. Hatherly (1999, p.54) describes 
professional judgement as the interaction of the individual auditor‘s reasoning 
facility, experience, personality traits, and internal and external factors in the audit 
environment. For example, auditors need to decide what is considered as 
‗appropriate‘ and ‗sufficient‘ audit evidence to support the audit opinion. They are 
also interacting with other members within the audit firm and with the other key 
participants in the auditing system and this may influence their judgement. One 
question that needs to be asked is: if the quality of audit does depend 
fundamentally on the auditors‘ professional judgement, what effects do changes in 
audit regulation and interactions with other key participants in the auditing system 
have both on auditors‘ professional judgement and overall audit quality? Another 
issue that needs to be addressed is whether the emphasis on professional 
judgement provides a platform to object to direct-regulation of the profession and 
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demand more freedom for the profession? Moreover, what are the implications of 
the changes (regulation of the auditors that is independent from the professional 
bodies) for audit quality? Traditionally, the quality and consistency of audit 
performance has been assessed by fellow professionals.  
The Role of Audit Committee 
This study has shown that most of the commentators acknowledged the important 
role of AC as part of key participants in the audit process and audit quality. This is 
in line with the changes in the corporate governance framework – the UK Corporate 
Governance Code has now outlined more explicit responsibility of the AC in 
overseeing external audit function and evaluating audit quality. The new framework 
has also put greater emphasis on the importance of communication between the 
external auditors and the AC towards the achievement of audit quality in practice. 
Prior research shows mixed results concerning the effect of audit committees on 
audit quality (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Abbott et al., 2003a; Abbott et al., 2003b; Lee 
& Mande, 2005; Piot & Janin, 2007). Further, these archival studies failed to 
document the processes involved between the auditors and audit committees 
members and its impact on audit quality. Hence, this provides an opportunity to 
investigate further how audit committees understanding of the concept of audit 
quality influence their operation and process and its effect on audit function and 
audit quality in the new auditing environment.  
The Role of Regulation and Discussion Paper 
The audit firms and professional bodies tended to view regulation as one of the key 
drivers for audit quality, but on the other hand they also mentioned regulation is 
complex to deal with and potentially undermines audit quality. This shows some 
internal inconsistency or contradiction from the respondents and leads to questions 
as to the extent to which this kind of submission and document represents an 
expression of ‗true feeling‘ and the extent to which it is a kind of political response. 
Therefore, it is important to note that the nature of documentary records is not 
purely a set of objective comments; it is part of a participatory process in which the 
participants that is the commentators have self-interests and motivations. Their 
responses would be aligned to their self-interest, particularly the audit firms but 
also other interested parties. Does the content of the responses carry real weight or 
is the process of discussion more important as a way of managing the credibility 
and legitimacy of various participants in the auditing setting? 
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4.4  Summary  
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is the breadth of 
ideas that the participants to the discussion paper perceived as associated with 
audit quality. The concept of audit quality is dynamic and has to be seen in the 
context of a range of interwoven regulations and guidance, the cooperation of 
executive management, participation of the AC, individual auditors and the 
effectiveness of the audit firm‘s procedures and policies, all of which promote high 
audit quality. The results of this investigation suggest that audit quality is 
influenced by various elements within and outside the audit firm. However, the 
overall impact that these various elements have had on audit quality is subject to 
further examination. Therefore, the study of the consultation around the FRC 
discussion paper has made a considerable contribution in selecting issues to 
emphasise in the interview. Details of the impact of various elements gathered from 
the interviews are provided in the following three chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Audit Partners’ Perceptions Concerning Audit Quality 
in Practice 
5.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the results of the interviews that were 
conducted with audit partners to elicit their views concerning the meaning of audit 
quality, factors that influence the construction of that meaning and the 
representation of that meaning in practice. The background to and structure of the 
interviews and the methodological approach to the analysis of the evidence 
collected were described earlier in the thesis (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1.2 
respectively); this chapter presents and comments on the views expressed.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 addresses research question 1, 
and describes multiple meanings audit partners associate with audit quality in 
practice. Section 5.2 discusses factors that shape and influence the construction of 
the meanings of audit quality, thus addressing research questions 2 and 4. Section 
5.3 how the meanings of audit quality are represented in the operation of the audit 
partners, which is the subject matter of research question 3. Section 5.4 presents 
empirical evidence that highlights the existence of quality conflicts in practice. 
Section 5.5 addresses research question 5 and discusses the impact of the AC on 
the external audit function. Section 5.6 provides a summary discussion of the 
findings and the conclusions of the chapter.  
5.1 Meanings of Audit Quality in Practice  
The thematic analysis of the responses demonstrates that the audit partners 
predominantly frame their meanings of audit quality around three important 
constructs. First, the notion of audit quality is associated with the concept of the 
professionalism of the external auditors. Second, audit partners place great 
emphasis on compliance with internal and external quality requirements in 
operationalising the meaning of audit quality in practice. Finally, the concept of 
audit quality is connected with the construct concerning the commercial values of 
the audit firm. The discussion that follows will show that the three elements serve 
to give structure to the meaning of audit quality in practice.  
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5.1.1. Professionalism 
A first aspect to the audit partners‘ understanding of the meaning of audit quality 
relates to what may be called ‗professionalism‘. This meaning is connected to a 
range of potential individual attributes and values that can have an impact on the 
conduct of the audit, such as professional judgement, providing an independent 
challenge to management, experience, knowledge, competence, professional 
scepticism, independence and objectivity. Analysis suggests that audit partners‘ 
sense of meaning of audit quality is related to some extent, to the background that 
they possess, which is consistent with their status and expected role as a member 
of a professional occupation.  
“Audit quality...I think it is a combination of knowledge and technical 
competence, with an appropriate state of mind about bringing independent 
and professional scepticism to what we do” (AP7). 
 
“You have independence and integrity and those two things are more 
important than anything else. So, if your clients were to ask you to do 
something, you have to behave with integrity and independence even if it 
costs you money basically. That is the difference between being a 
professional and not. I have a much higher standard of ethics that is an old 
fashioned view” (AP11). 
 
When discussing the meaning of audit quality, audit partners expressed the view 
that relates people to the element of audit quality. The quotations below illustrate 
the importance of people and refer to the auditor‘s professional attributes to audit 
quality. Frequently during the interviews, the audit partners argued that auditors‘ 
knowledge, experience and skills influence various audit tasks such as risk 
assessment, planning decisions and evidence evaluation to arrive at an audit 
judgement. Consistent with the dominant audit quality discourse (as discussed in 
section 2.1.1.) and with the two other groups in the study (AC members and quality 
inspectors), the quotes below assume that audit quality is achieved through the use 
of auditors who have the ‗right‘ level of knowledge, competence and experience, 
which shows that characteristics related to individual auditors are generally 
perceived as an important determinant of audit quality. For example, when 
discussing the meaning of audit quality, several audit partners mentioned that the 
strength of the auditor‘s professional attributes, such as judgement and experience, 
provided ‗comfort‘ as to the fulfilment of appropriate audit quality. Here, quality of 
audit is articulated by way of how auditor‘s experience and knowledge play a part in 
the identification and resolution of significant key risk areas that could affect the 
audit opinion or judgement. The audit partners appear to believe that having the 
ability to understand and identify the risks of a particular audit client, makes them 
117 
 
better able to carry out work on a specific risks issue (for example, impairment of 
assets) that reflects audit quality. The importance of risk as part of construction to 
the meaning of audit quality is also shared by the AC members in the study. 
Therefore, it appears that professional attributes may generate feelings of 
confidence not only for the auditors but also the others about audit quality, which 
possibly affects their performance during the conduct of the audit (e.g. being more 
confident may translate into asking more challenging questions during the conduct 
of the audit and being more critical during evidence evaluation).  
“I think the firm‟s internal message about audit quality is actually people 
quality... audit quality is very much about the people we have and the way 
in which they understand what they are doing” (AP5). 
 
“Audit quality is about doing the right thing at the right time, involving the 
right people, having the right set of reviews, doing the right amount of work, 
and resolution and application of judgement in matters arising” (AP3). 
 
The audit partners viewed auditors‘ professional attributes as a manageable input 
and seemed to argue that the more professional the auditors, the more likely that 
the auditor will produce quality work. Consequently, the underlying notion of 
professionalism is an important aspect of audit practice and are used by all audit 
partners to provide structure and meaning to the quality of work that they perform. 
Such rationales provide support for the claims of auditors to knowledge bases that 
portray auditors as an expert group and equate quality with auditors‘ professional 
characteristics.  
5.1.2  Compliance Obligations 
Again, consistent with the dominant audit quality discourse (as discussed in section 
2.2), it was apparent during the interviews that all of the audit partners strongly 
associate the meaning of audit quality with satisfying the requirements of the 
standards and guidelines during the course of the audit. The quality inspectors in 
the study also view compliance with standards and guidelines as important to audit 
quality. For example, in the first quote below, the audit partner emphasised that 
high audit quality is linked, to some extent, to his/her meeting the requirements of 
standards and guidelines. The next quote provides a picture of how the auditing 
standards were operationalised to give meaning about audit quality in the day-to-
day audit practices, where standards are regarded as a ‗rulebook‘ that govern the 
conduct of auditors. Further he/she suggested that compliance obligations with the 
standards and guidelines play a key role in providing assurance about audit quality, 
not only in the eyes of the audit partners but also to outside people. 
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“...I think, in a sense, quality audit is expected to be high quality from a 
compliance perspective...” (AP3). 
 
“I do not mean going over and above the standards, we have a rulebook as 
such, which is the suite of auditing standards and we have to comply with 
that in every audit that we do. So, to my mind, producing the quality audit 
is to make sure that we comply with those standards and that the outside 
world has confidence in what the audit product is” (AP4). 
Some of the audit partners viewed performing the audit beyond the requirements 
of the standards as important to demonstrate that they have performed a high 
quality audit, that is, at a level that exceeds the minimum acceptable level of 
quality. They suggested that the development of regulatory inspection (the AIU) 
has had an impact in recent years and has caused increasing emphasis on 
performing the audit in a manner that goes beyond the standards. In contrast, 
some partners expressed the view that because the auditing standards are set at a 
high level, compliance with the standards would actually be sufficient to indicate 
that they have performed a high quality audit. These conflicting views about the 
current level of the auditing standards and the extent to which they reflect an 
appropriate expression of audit quality are illustrated by the following quotations:  
“(If) we do not get good quality audit works we will get a negative finding 
from the regulators report. The AIU reports are now publicly available. There 
is an increased need to make sure that what we do is demonstrably beyond 
the minimum standards” (AP2). 
 
“Well, the auditing standards themselves, I think it is wrong to say well this 
is like a minimum standard because I would say they are quite a high 
standard anyway...” (AP4). 
The regime of inspection also marks another aspect of these compliance obligations 
of audit quality as expressed by the audit partners, which refers to the importance 
of producing sufficient audit documentation to satisfy the assessment of quality 
carried out by the AIU. It was evident that documentation standards were one of 
the main focuses of the auditors as a means of ensuring high ‗compliance‘ quality. 
The following comment summarises the views of auditors on this issue: 
“...the audit process or the audit documentation process. I think that is 
influenced by regulatory factors because from a regulatory perspective, for 
example, the AIU have a general rule, which is commonly known, „if it is not 
documented it does not exist‟. Therefore, I think there is an appropriate 
focus within our firm to ensure that there is appropriate audit 
documentation... I think the audit documentation is part of the audit quality 
equation. It is not the full equation” (AP7). 
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The above quotations suggest that the auditing standards and the activities of 
regulators are seen as relevant in determining what constitutes high audit quality, 
by influencing the extent of audit work and the required level of quality. Here, the 
regime of inspection has established another discourse around the notion of audit 
quality in practice among the audit practitioners. Compliance quality is give 
meaning by doing enough to satisfy the quality assessment carried out by the AIU. 
Nonetheless, only a small number of audits will actually be inspected by the AIU 
and, therefore, the partners‘ approach might represent a reaction to the threat of 
inspection rather than the actuality, as expressed by the following audit partner: 
“I would say the minimum standard has increased over the last ten years 
because anybody who wants a licence to audit has to adhere or meet certain 
minimum standards to keep it...Quality is the overarching requirement. Yes, 
it is in part a response to the regulator. To demonstrate to the regulator how 
we embedded quality in everything that we do, however, overtime it impacts 
on the way people behave day to day and they do strive for better quality. 
Increasingly, these days, if you do not execute it well you might lose your 
job. Really, that is the most brutal driver of all” (AP2). 
Some respondents did discuss another way in which they perceived compliance with 
the standards and external inspection as useful, namely as a legitimating tool to 
gain wider public acceptance that audits are conducted with suitable quality. This is 
important to gain wider acceptance from society at large (audit clients, 
shareholders and other stakeholders) about the quality of audit services offered by 
public accounting firms. The benefit derived from external regulation provides the 
comfort that the public need concerning audit quality.  
“So, to my mind, producing the quality audit is to make sure that we comply 
with those standards and that the outside world has confidence in what the 
audit product is” (AP4). 
 
“It gives me some comfort and I think it should give investors more comfort 
that there is a regulator there, that there is a regulatory body looking at and 
challenging the auditors and their approach to the audit ...” (AP9). 
 
As noted above, the construction of audit quality can also be explained as reflecting 
the issue of the auditors‘ need to gain social acceptability and credibility. The 
auditor‘s work arrangements and procedures are structured and conditioned by 
their institutional arrangements. It is important for them to be seen as adhering to 
such arrangements in order to gain legitimacy. Consequently, it can be argued that 
compliance obligations are an important legitimating vehicle for the individual audit 
partner, audit firms and the audit profession as a whole. To some extent, it 
demonstrates the auditors‘ desire to maintain wide societal acceptance of their role, 
to enhance survival and the stability of the profession. This is perhaps important to 
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the audit firms because audit quality is difficult for people external to the process to 
observe directly. 
Another new set of discourse and ideals around audit quality relates to the audit 
firms‘ monitoring and micro-quality control. The meaning of audit quality is 
connected to meeting requirements of internal quality review and other quality 
control procedures within the audit firm. As implied in the first quote, the audit 
partner stated that compliance with the internal quality standards would ensure a 
sufficient level of audit quality by way of ensuring sufficient challenge to the 
management and appropriate audit judgement, as illustrated by the audit partner 
concerning the application of a monitoring tool - professional standards review 
within his/her firm. The following quote provides insight into how monitoring and 
micro-quality control are used to justify how ‗right‘ or ‗appropriate‘ audit quality is 
achieved during the conduct of the audit.  
“Part of the concept of quality is addressed by something that we call 
professional standard review, which is a hot independent review of any 
opinion that the firm is issuing in relation to auditing, accounting and 
financial reporting matters. We also have various compliance functions, 
which are manifested in something called an audit quality partner 
dashboard, whereby there are various quality and compliance procedures 
that partners have to comply with...I would say the concept and the 
approach are an independent challenge/review of the judgment and 
documentation of the engagement teams and compliance with external and 
internal standards” (AP1). 
 
In general, it is evident that compliance obligations are important as a key aspect 
to gain acceptance or legitimacy about what the audit firm and auditor are doing to 
promote and achieve audit quality in practice.  
5.1.3  Commercial Values 
The partners‘ views also revealed the importance of commercial values to the 
meaning of audit quality in practice. Analysis indicates that commercial 
considerations influence the idea of audit quality in the minds of the audit partners, 
as the concepts of service quality was very prominent in most interviews. During 
the interviews, the attribute of audit quality involved frequent references to the 
added value or additional benefits that audit clients expected from auditors. This 
attribute was widely considered as an integral feature of audit quality, in which 
most of the audit partners make sense of the concept by relating it to improving a 
client‘s business operation and financial performance. The importance of this aspect 
of ‗service quality‘ is also shared by the AC members in the study.  
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“We are a client service practice so we have to provide our clients with a 
service in a way that the client expects the service to be delivered” (AP5). 
 
“The other part of audit quality is where clients get the benefit of the 
auditor‟s input in terms of improvements to the business, improvements in 
efficiency and more effective controls...” (AP9). 
Quality, as value for money, reflects the auditor‘s concern about providing quality 
audit services to the audit client at a reasonable cost. In the interviews, most of the 
audit partners drew attention to the intense competition in the audit market, which 
exerts pressure on them to offer a better service by providing better outcomes or 
return to the audit client at a given cost. This is also important for them to retain 
their audit clients, as suggested by Beattie and Fernley (1995); value for money is 
an important consideration for companies in selecting external auditors. As such, 
this notion of audit quality is important because providing quality through value for 
money is important in meeting client‘s expectations. This leads to a satisfied client 
that can lead to client retention and profitability.  
“...certainly in the current economic environment it is really important for us 
to retain our existing client base and the easiest way of doing that is doing a 
good job and making sure that the client is really happy with the 
service...we are not seeing as many of our clients coming out for re-
proposal... the economic downturn comes and clients start thinking whether 
they are getting good value for money from this...if they are not getting 
good value that is when they maybe decide to test the market. I mean that 
is a whole other area of quality in terms of what the client is seeing as a 
quality audit” (AP3). 
The audit partners also suggested that audit quality is reflected in the way they 
maintain quality relationships with the audit client. This attribute of quality is 
important for them, because, as a client service firm, maintaining a ‗good‘ 
relationship with the management and keeping them happy is crucial. As suggested 
by Behn et al. (1997), the quality of the relationship is a key determinant in 
satisfying the client.  
“Audit quality is all about the people we have...the way in which they 
interact with the client. I think that is the key message and what we would 
say is the people that drive quality and how they react to the client‟s 
situation” (AP5). 
 
“I think, in a way, it is very difficult for our clients to assess the quality of 
the work that we are doing, I think they form a perception and an 
impression based upon their relationship with us, the interaction they have 
with us” (AP3). 
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Commercial values also relate to the way in which notions of efficiency and 
effectiveness are reflected in the audit partners‘ comments and how they appear to 
give meaning to the concept of audit quality in practice. The notions of efficiency 
and effectiveness are highly related to commercial considerations over pressure for 
cost reduction and profit maximization. The following quote illustrates how 
efficiency and effectiveness are used to justify that ‗sufficient‘ audit quality is 
achieved in practice. In that sense efficiency and effectiveness focus on the content 
of the actual evidential processes and procedures that comprise the audit, as 
discussed by the following audit partner:  
“Fees are a feature of the market so, at times, there is a lot of pressure on 
fees. You then work out what the job is going to cost and that should drive 
the budget...you can challenge the audit effectiveness by getting proper 
involvement of the partners at the planning stage. For example, ensuring 
that they use their experience of the job...to focus the work on the right 
areas, on the risk areas, make sure you do not do too much work in the 
wrong areas, waste time, you can make sure it is efficient in terms of the 
longer a process is drawn out the more leakage points there are in it in 
terms of downtime and inefficiency so you can plan the audit in conjunction 
with the client...there is a huge issue around project management and an 
efficient close down of the job at the end to make sure that it is closed down 
in an efficient way” (AP10). 
The importance of creating value to auditing in the perceptions and expectations of 
the audit client was evident in the interviews. The audit partners‘ views suggested 
that quality in practice was always being looked at from the perspective of their 
client. As argued by Jeppesen (1998), the management is perceived as the client 
by the auditors. Some of audit partners even described success in re-tendering for 
an appointment or the length of tenure in retaining the audit client, which reflect 
management satisfaction with the audit, as offering one important piece of 
evidence of audit quality, as illustrated by the following quote: 
“It is only fair to say that from the firm‟s point of view, the centre or the key 
focus for us in terms of what is great, is the clients... the client is at the core 
of it and when we look at audit quality from the client‟s point of view, you 
have a number of outputs, which will be how long you can keep the client 
for and your success on re-tendering and these sort of things...” (AP6). 
 
“So again, you might say that the heart of the audit quality is that the 
auditors should never be in a position where the people that they potentially 
criticise can sack them, which is what you have. I am not saying that inhibits 
people‟s behaviour but it can influence people‟s behaviour” (AP2). 
The majority of the audit partners believed that audit quality is not only about 
meeting the various requirements of the standards and guidelines (compliance 
obligations) but also about meeting the expectations of the audit client (the 
management). In the following quotes, it is evident that audit partners want to be 
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regarded as more than a company‘s auditor and wish to provide valuable audit 
service that can be beneficial to the audit client. In this light, the client expects the 
auditor to be a business partner rather than a ‗police officer‘. The second quote 
illustrates that the audit partner believed that audit quality is something that 
cannot be measured and he/she thought that what is considered to be quality is 
closely related to the ‗value‘ that the audit services can offer to a particular audit 
client.  
“what does audit quality mean to me? Well, on the one side, it means 
compliance with the strict accounting standards and auditing standards, and 
on the other, it means in terms of the client‟s perception what is the quality 
of the audit, has it been a beneficial experience for them and that it is more 
than just compliance with the standards...we are trying to do more than just 
a purely compliant audit because, ultimately, I do not think you are ever 
going to exceed your clients‟ expectations if all you are doing is ticking the 
boxes in respect of compliance; audit quality is very important to us as a 
practice... hopefully we can get to the stage of being a trusted business 
advisor, which is a bit more than just being the auditor” (AP3). 
 
“An audit is not something you can necessarily say this is high, medium or 
low quality, it is not a service in that sense, it is either valued or it is not 
valued...So, in that sense, it is actually easier for the client to recognise 
what you do for them...you hope they will continue to use you because it is 
a valued experience” (AP11). 
In general, from the analysis of the interview evidence it can be deduced that audit 
partners perceived audit quality as having multiple meanings. Interestingly the 
interviews suggest that commercial interests, that is, profit maximizing and 
reducing cost, play a role in giving meaning to audit quality in the eyes of the audit 
partners. Consequently, providing value added services and meeting the 
expectations of audit clients become important constructs for the meaning of audit 
quality perceived by the audit partners.  
The above analysis shows different elements and attributes of the concept of audit 
quality held for the audit partners interviewed, specifically professionalism, 
compliance and commercial values, and illustrated how these elements featured in 
the partners‘ comments. The discussion below relates those elements to the 
broader regulatory, societal and economic factors that influence the construction of 
practical meaning for the concept of quality. The concepts of role expectations and 
self-image are also considered in the assessment of the interaction process that 
shapes and influences the construction of meanings of audit quality.  
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5.2 Factors Influencing the Construction of Meanings of 
Audit Quality 
Intrinsic to a discussion of the meanings that audit practitioners ascribe to the 
concept of audit quality is a consideration of how the meaning is made. This section 
attempts to answer the second research question, that is, to look at factors that 
influence the process of construction of the meaning for audit quality. In particular, 
it explores the influence of broader societal, regulatory and economic forces and 
the concepts of role expectations and self-image on the meanings of audit quality. 
In so doing, the discussion below directs specific attention towards understanding 
the competitive, commercial and professional factors that underlie what audit 
quality means for day-to-day audit practice. This section also discusses the 
potential impact of the AIU on audit quality, thus addressing research question 4.  
In the interviews, three key elements of audit quality were identified that give 
meaning to audit quality – professionalism, compliance obligations and commercial 
values, which are closely related to two underlying facets of auditing. First, 
professionalism and compliance obligations are two elements that stem from the 
concept of auditing as a profession. These elements of audit quality emerge when 
the audit partners perceive that their role should adhere to the standards of the 
professional or expert group of which they are members (Burns and Haga, 1977; 
Miner et al., 1994). From this perspective, to understand audit quality one needs 
first to understand that auditing is a professional service that concerns the 
possession of knowledge or expertise and the display of appropriate behaviour 
(Grey, 1998). As a result, how auditors perceive their roles will be likely to have an 
effect on what they consider as legitimate and useful knowledge and, consequently, 
on their actions (Cooper and Robson, 2006). This perspective also requires 
recognition that auditing is an activity that involves the negotiation of a legitimate 
and institutionally acceptable knowledge base and practice (reflected in, for 
example, codified rules and regulations, education, training, audit methodology and 
quality control procedures), which influence the institutional significance of auditing 
and auditors (Power, 1996). From this perspective, audit quality primarily relates to 
professional attributes, values and appearance that individual auditors have such as 
judgement, expertise, competence, knowledge, interpersonal skills, ethics and 
independence, which it can be argued can influence their performance in executing 
audit responsibilities. In addition, audit quality is also about meeting the 
requirements of the standards and guidelines in the conduct of the audit. From 
another angle, compliance obligations also have some commercial aspect of it 
where if auditors fail to comply with those standards and guidelines it can expose 
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them to the threat of litigation, which could possibly, involve high cost and damage 
to their economic reputation (Palmrose, 1988). 
Second, commercial values stem from the concept of auditing as an industry, 
where, at the same time, auditors are also members of commercial professional 
service firms that are motivated by profit and capital accumulation, which is likely 
to determine their practices and actions (Cooper and Robson, 2006). This element 
of audit quality appears where the auditors perceive that their role is to fulfil the 
client‘s (the management) expectations and the audit firm‘s business objectives. 
From this perspective, to understand audit quality one needs first to understand 
that auditing is a commercial professional service that emphasises profit 
maximisation and cost reduction for supporting the business of auditing. 
Accordingly, representation of audit knowledge and practice should be consistent 
with economic pressure and client legitimacy. From this perspective, audit quality is 
primarily about client service, particularly providing value added service and 
satisfying the client‘s needs and expectations.  
The discussion which follows will show that the two concepts (audit as a profession 
and audit as an industry) serve to give structure and justification to the meaning of 
audit quality in practice. In other words, the concepts influence the construction 
and presentation of the meaning of audit quality.  
Analysis of the interviews suggests that social factors influence the meaning of 
audit quality in practice through the concept of ‗professionalism‘ of the auditors. In 
this context, professional self-image influences the way in which meanings are 
constructed and the circumstances in which the idea of audit quality is interpreted 
and given practical meaning. In the interviews, the audit partners affirmed these 
notions of professionalism and linked them to audit quality, most notably to 
professional judgement and expertise or knowledge. The impact of auditors‘ self-
image is also connected to values and behaviours that are regarded as an 
important part of auditors‘ culture. As such, attributes, such as behaving in a 
professional manner, independence and integrity are significant in giving meaning 
for audit quality in practice.  
“The essence of a profession is that people behave in a professional manner, 
which is not something you can ensure by only writing things down or by 
having other people review what you do. If you do not have it inside then it 
is not going to be there. So we train people and recruit people to actually be 
proper professionals, therefore, to have an ethos and a culture of 
professionalism and independence as well as having procedures to do that. 
However, I suppose that the first essential is that it should be from the 
inside out” (AP11).  
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During the interviews, the audit partners tended to express pride regarding their 
professional status, while simultaneously expressing feelings that the recent 
changes in the audit regulatory framework did not appear to regard them as such. 
To some extent, the audit partners‘ comments suggested that more independent 
regulation of the audit profession invalidates their professional identity or questions 
their professional standing. Regulatory intervention might reduce their professional 
privileges and status in society. Considered from this perspective, it is not really 
surprising that the symbolism of professional values is strongly embedded among 
auditors. Not only did it confirm the auditors‘ sense of themselves as professionals, 
but it was also seen as maintaining their professional identity:  
“...I think audit quality is taken very seriously because it is the lifeblood of 
most firms and I think the profession is professional and is often 
misunderstood” (AP10). 
 
“So the fact that the AIU can come in, and I do feel very strongly about this, 
the fact that the AIU comes in and spends as much time reviewing a job as 
we spent doing it is just ridiculous and they can come up with just hundreds 
of questions as to “why did you do this, how did you do that, why did you 
not do this” it is just ridiculous...” (AP3). 
 
From the institutional perspective, the auditing profession established its role and 
responsibility for the public interest in order to gain legitimacy. As contended by 
Hall (1968), a belief in social obligation requires an individual to recognize the 
importance of their work to society, and the fact that their work benefits not only 
the organisation and individual, but the public as well. The profession also creates 
professionalism as an ‗image‘ in order to attain social acceptability and credibility. 
Public interest becomes the ‗ideology‘ in providing a socially integrative function 
and ensures wider societal acceptance of the profession, as explained by one of the 
audit partners: 
 
“I think, ultimately, that audit quality means that the recipient of an audit 
opinion can place reliance on the fact that the opinion is right and, hence, 
that helps the stability of capital markets and helps people to make informed 
decisions on the basis of the accounts on which the opinion is given. So that 
is probably why we have audit opinions, therefore, why audit quality is 
important” (AP10). 
The construction of quality through compliance obligations can be partly explained 
as having occurred through the influence of regulatory forces. As other authors 
have noted, in the context of the auditing profession regulatory pressures could 
affect the behaviour and structure of the audit firm (Dirsmith et al., 1997; 
Covaleski et al., 2003; Humphrey et al., 2009). This is because audit firms, as 
suppliers of the audit services, operate in an environment where connections to 
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professional associations and regulatory bodies are important for their reputation 
and legitimacy and have the potential to exert a significant influence on the design 
of their audit work, procedures, processes and practices. The interviews provide 
evidence that the interaction between the auditors and the regulator, in particular 
the AIU, influences the behaviour of the auditors and changes that are made in 
audit practice to reflect the expectations of the regulator. Similar to Nagy and 
Cenker (2007), recent changes in regulatory framework introduce pressure that 
influences audit firm procedures and practices.  
“What you see through the AIU is more emphasis on file review, it is 
documentation quality certainly. Fundamentally, people are much more 
thoughtful now when somebody looks up the file. Most people have their file 
review by the external regulator now. It is around documentation, making 
sure it is documented and has appropriate support on files. So, I would say 
the biggest area where the regulator has changed things recently” (AP2). 
In respect of the impact of the AIU on the process of the conduct of audit, the 
evidence shows that the regime of inspection has had a significant impact on the 
process of documentation of audit work. Specifically, it has influenced the audit 
firms‘ monitoring and control procedures in relation to file review and the use of 
formalised electronic support systems that enhance audit quality through 
compliance with the auditing and documentation standards. Most of the partners 
indicated a rigorous process of review on closing down the audit files, which 
reflected a greater focus on the quality of documentation to satisfy the expectations 
of the regulator. Some of them mentioned the use of computerised audit systems 
to ensure compliance with the documentation requirements within the firm. 
Consequently, a number of the audit partners revealed how meeting the 
expectations of the regulator has created an additional challenge to them, which 
highlights the struggle of the practitioners to attain a balance between spending 
time on documentation rather than the audit itself. Further, the majority of the 
audit partners were apprehensive about the impact of the AIU on cost and the 
benefits associated with the inspection. They suggested that they need to spend 
considerable time and provide the necessary staff to meet the requirements of the 
AIU, which affects the cost of the audit. The situation has created additional 
pressure on audit firms because increases in audit fees do not always correspond 
with the audit costs. The following quotation illustrates the views concerning this 
issue:  
“You start in the area concerning audit fees for the audit work and the 
associated costs. The balance between spending enough time on something 
to make sure it is documented, every last detail...The client is prepared to 
pay a fee, which will not necessarily cover all the time costs associated with 
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it. In the market, at the moment, we can see very aggressive pricing for 
some firms to win work...clients would have a fixed idea of what they would 
prepare to pay for that. They will try to get it as cheap as possible. It is true 
that in many cases you will not get a different audit opinion if you document 
it any less or you document every single conversation with the auditors 
down to any degree. You might be able to give them a better fee” (AP7). 
Frequently, during the interviews, the audit partners expressed deep concern that 
the current efforts undertaken by the AIU are moving away from principles to a rule 
based audit approach that might emphasise tick box compliance at the expense of 
their professional judgement. Findings from interviews with auditors in the US by 
Nagy and Cenker (2007) support the claim that the changes in audit regulation 
influence the nature of audit that become more procedural to reflect regulatory 
compliance. This expression of discomfort by the audit partners may be also 
construed as the effect that regulation has in diminishing professional judgement of 
auditors or the ‗de-professionalization‘ of the audit profession that is related to the 
value of an audit. As mentioned by the following audit partners: 
“It does overly encourage teams to focus upon the process and 
documentation at the expense of appropriate judgment. I think it is just a 
kind of side effect of the influence of the regulators and sometimes there is 
a perception with the audit teams that we have to do this because of the 
regulator. However, it should not be just a process and should not remove 
the fundamental need to apply audit judgment, because, if it does, you 
come back to your first question in terms of what counts in terms of an 
audit. The auditors will not be providing the appropriate challenge to clients 
and providing appropriate reporting if it is just a tick box process” (AP1). 
 
“There is greater and greater emphasis on what is written down rather than 
what is actually done and the judgments that are formed” (AP11). 
 
Several views on the role of the AIU were expressed by the interviewees. In 
general, most of the audit partners tended to voice feelings of unease when 
discussing the inspection process. The AIU‘s approach was perceived to be 
burdensome and highlighted overwhelming workloads resulting from such 
inspections. Some of the audit partners felt that a lack of beneficial feedback was 
given in the review. The audit partners also commented on the unpleasant 
experience of working with the AIU. The audit partners also believed that the 
regime of inspection does not have a significant impact on the attributes of 
commercial values in relation to their audit client. The following quotations illustrate 
the partners‘ views on the above issues  
“It is a pretty onerous experience and it is a pretty unpleasant experience to 
be reviewed by the AIU and I am not sure that is actually how it should be. I 
fully acknowledge they have got a job to do and I do not think anybody 
would want them to not be on the side of high quality audits, however, 
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equally I think they ought to be coming in from the perspective that you are 
innocent until proven guilty rather than “actually this is a bad audit and now 
you have got to prove that it‟s a good audit”, which, personally, I think is 
the wrong way to come at it” (AP3). 
 
“Regulators... whether it has actually improved the quality of audits, I am 
not sure that it has. I think we do good quality audits anyway, if we do not 
we get sued... I do not think it will necessarily improve the quality or indeed 
that it will help the clients get a better service...” (AP11). 
Another significant concern of the audit partners in relation to the regime of 
inspection is the impact of public reporting, that is the AIU public reports on the 
perception of the users‘ concerning the audit quality. In particular, they were 
concerned that the public would misinterpret the information published in the 
report, which might affect public confidence and trust concerning the quality of the 
services that they offer. This might also affect the business of the audit firm.  
“My concern is that the man on the Clapham Omnibus may see some issues 
as being more severe than they really are in practice if they are 
misunderstood in a report...I do think that if people misunderstand things it 
might just be some documentation around something, quite a small matter 
could be perceived by an external reader thinking “oh my gosh, you know x, 
y or z firm does not know how to do this” so if it is not well written or the 
issue is not clearly understood it could be very detrimental to the firm‟s 
market position” (AP9). 
 
Despite concerns about the negative impact of the inspection, some of the 
interviewees accepted the important role of public reporting to enhance confidence 
and provide additional comfort to the users of the audit report about the level of 
audit quality offered by the audit firms. A small number of respondents viewed the 
inspection as having a positive impact on the audit profession by promoting greater 
transparency concerning the conduct and control of audit quality in practice. The 
views expressed about these issues are illustrated by the following quotations: 
“Obviously we have external regulators who come in and assess audit 
quality, and obviously that is one of the changes that I have seen over the 
last ten years. They come in and make an assessment of quality. If that is 
what is needed to give the external world further comfort about the 
adequacy of the quality, then I suppose that is where one has to be” (AP8). 
 
“I think it is forcing discipline amongst the players, which must be a good 
thing, so it is forcing everyone to demonstrate how to do things, so the 
control processes are there in place. So my personal view is that it is 
improved audit quality and processes across the board, I think what is 
undeniable is that it is giving more assurance to the public that someone is 
looking at audit quality and someone is making sure it is happening” (AP6). 
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The use of a construct of commercial values to give meaning to the concept of audit 
quality can be understood by looking at the nature of the market of auditing 
services. The audit market is subject to active competition and pressure on the fees 
for audit services (Humphrey, Moizer and Turley, 2007). As a result, there has been 
increasing need for audit firms to retain their client base through both creating and 
promoting perceptions of the value of the audit. This effort can also reflect the 
firms‘ objective to enhance profitability. In the interviews, commercial values were 
represented by comments referring to quality attributes such as value for money in 
the delivery of the audit, attempts to promote a view amongst clients that the audit 
represents a value added service and the importance of meeting the expectations 
of customers (i.e. client company management). Commercial values are part of the 
culture within a firm in which audit partners emphasise delivering services that are 
valued and expected by their clients. This establishes the fundamental importance 
of serving the client by the audit firm. During the interviews the majority of the 
audit partners made comments referring to the importance of these attributes and 
connected them to the overall objective of audit quality, as illustrated by the 
following quotations: 
“I think what works for us in the long term is clearly a culture that 
encourages our people to be really engaged with clients...delivering and 
bringing value to the clients. I mean, ultimately, we are a service industry” 
(AP3). 
 
“... there are four strong players, it is going to be competitive, it will be 
competitive. We know that if we do something wrong for one of our clients, 
if we do not deliver the quality that the client expects or the service the 
client expects then we are not going to be there for very long, so it is a very 
competitive market” (AP7). 
The importance of commercial values also fundamentally relates to the economic 
nature of the auditing services and the manner in which audit appointments are 
made and contracts negotiated. The audit involves an independent examination of a 
set of financial statements prepared by the company management. In economic 
terms, the audit service relates to the monitoring costs borne by shareholders to 
ensure that the management acts in their best interest. In this economic 
arrangement, the auditors are accountable to the shareholder, however, in practice 
they are paid and appointed or selected by the company management. This 
arrangement signifies the interdependence of economic interests between the 
auditor and the management (Simunic, 1980). The arrangement has also 
substantiated the imbalance of power between the auditor and the management, 
for the reason that the power to hire or fire the auditors as well as the 
determination of audit fees and scope reside with the management. The 
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asymmetrical power can create a conflict in the auditor and client relationship when 
the dependence of the auditor on the client is much greater than the dependence of 
the client on the auditor (Nichols and Price, 1976). Some audit partners‘ comments 
explicitly refer to how the commercial and contracting arrangements for audit 
appointments influence the meaning of audit quality in practice: 
“The heart of the matter is that we are been paid by somebody to give an 
opinion on their accounts. There is an element of interdependence. Although 
you could say it will always be there regardless of the regulation being in 
place, it is always the commercial pressure that you are under...I am not 
saying that inhibits people‟s behaviour but it can influence people‟s 
behaviour” (AP2). 
 
“The auditors‟ fees are theoretically set by the shareholders, however, in 
practice they are set by the directors and one of the auditor‟s prime 
responsibilities is to check what the directors have been doing, so, by 
definition, there is in built tension” (AP11). 
The idea that differential audit quality is not observable to those on whose behalf 
the audit is conducted, nor to those monitoring the delivery of the audit, and that 
differential quality can be signalled to management, reinforces the notion of the 
importance of satisfying client expectations to achieve appropriate audit quality. To 
understand audit quality from this perspective, it is of course relevant to note the 
nature of audit firms as commercial enterprises operating in a competitive market. 
Commercial pressure and the interdependence between the auditor and the client 
management may shape the meaning of audit quality and how it is made 
operational in practice. One critical issue here is whether task interdependence and 
commercial pressure create a conflict of interest that might result in the 
independence of the auditor and the technical quality of the audit being undermined 
and the auditors not acting in the best interests of the owners to whom they report. 
“I think it is very difficult for our clients to in a way assess the quality of the 
work that we are doing. I think they form a perception and an impression 
based upon their relationship to us, the interaction they have with us. I think 
as a big four firm and the biggest professional firm they would expect our 
quality to be absolutely tip top and that is just a general expectation and it 
gets back to the point that that is a fundamental attribute that we are 
expected to fulfil is a top quality audit” (AP3). 
The construction audit quality –efficient and effective audit, that is, quality in the 
design and conduct of the audit procedures and processes reflects considerable 
regulatory and economic pressures facing the audit firms. Hatherly (1999) suggests 
that regulatory and fee pressures could influence the audit firm‘s efforts to be more 
efficient and effective. The economic climate may impose significant pressure on 
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the firms to ensure profit and survival and, consequently, minimizing cost is 
deemed important.  
“I think what we are particularly focusing on at the moment is that it is 
really important that we get the audit planning right and that really means, 
among other things, that this is an area where there needs to be significant 
input from senior members of the audit team including the audit partners 
who have the judgment and experience...They are going to tell you before 
they start the audit what the issues are. Now, that is not to suggest you 
should not be doing the detailed audit testing, but it is to recognise where 
the productive areas of an audit are” (AP1). 
The above analysis shows that the construction of the meanings of the audit quality 
in practice is influenced by interactions – role expectations, self images, regulatory, 
social and economic factors in the auditing environment faced by the auditors. The 
audit environment is constituted by an array of factors and actors that interact with 
one another, which can be said to influence and shape the perceptions of audit 
quality.  
5.3 Representations of Audit Quality in Practice  
This section answers the third research question: to document the different 
representations or symbols associated with the meanings of audit quality in 
practice. A first dimension to the interviewees understanding of the meaning of 
audit quality connected to what may be called ‗professionalism‘ that associated with 
a range potential individual attributes that can have an impact on the conduct of 
the audit, such as professional judgement, skills, experience, knowledge, 
competence and expertise Analysis of the evidence from the interviews 
demonstrates that various symbols are brought into play to represent and 
communicate that meaning in practice. All of the audit partners believe that audit 
quality is largely determined by the quality of the people. The audit firm creates 
explicit mechanisms to operationalise this meaning through entry prerequisites, 
professional examinations, institutionalized programmes of academic education, 
work related training and experience. Auditors use these strategies to establish that 
credible intellectual knowledge – ‗professional expertise‘ – underlies their practices, 
which gives some indication or signal concerning the quality of work performed by 
its members, which, in itself, is difficult to observe not only by the outside people 
but also for the audit practitioners themselves. 
Consequently, certain representations were emphasised by the audit partners to 
signify the meaning of audit quality. For instance, people quality is represented 
through the rigorous recruitment process of the audit firm and the academic 
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qualifications of the individual auditor. They emphasised that these are critical to 
ensure they have the ‗right‘ people of the appropriate calibre doing the audit. 
Furthermore, the skills, competence and knowledge of the auditors are associated 
with the training they attend that keep them up to date with various aspects of 
accounting, auditing and business issues, which is important to reflect the level of 
competence and expertise that they have, as illustrated by AP3 in quotations one. 
In the last quote, the audit partner elaborates on how job training on various 
industries could enhance the professional experience of individual auditors, which 
might possibly affect their performance during the conduct of the audit by asking 
more challenging questions or posing a sufficient challenge to the audit client (the 
management). This quote and several others also imply the beneficial impacts of 
training concerning the ability of the auditor in assessing and resolving significant 
audit issues during the conduct of the audit that could affect the auditor‘s opinion 
or judgement.  
“We invest hugely in our people over the first three years in terms of getting 
their skill and competence raised to a reasonable level, lots of training, 
either classroom based training or on the job training, lots of coaching and, 
ultimately, we have a feedback and appraisal mechanism to ensure that the 
quality of the work that people are doing is of the right standard and that 
people are rewarded and appraised on that basis” (AP3). 
 
“We try to give our people at the beginning of their career as broad an 
experience aspossible...they can be working one day in insurance and one 
day in the media sector, one day in the manufacturing sector and I think it 
exercises their brain, helps them challenge how people do things. Because if 
you always work in the same sector, you tend to be used to how people just 
do things in that sector, but if you have had experience of other sectors, you 
can bring a fresh perspective to things and ask different questions, more 
challenging questions” (AP6). 
The analysis shows that audit partners represent audit quality by emphasising the 
need for coaching and the involvement of audit partners or seniors during various 
stages of the audit to achieve high audit quality. In particular, the audit partners 
emphasised the importance of their involvement in the audit planning by way of 
ensuring that audit efforts are concentrated on the right areas, as illustrated by the 
following quotes. 
“...it is just getting the right coaching, the right seniority of people involved 
at the right time of the audit. It is right up front in the planning stage of an 
audit, really getting the input from the people that have been there 
before...if you get the quality right, then you ask all the right questions at 
the right time, you plan it properly, you have had someone on site making 
sure it is working correctly” (AP5). 
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The majority of the audit partners identify consultation as being central for audit 
quality and this representation of quality appears to be believed in and shared by 
all the audit partners interviewed. The quote indicates that consultation is practised 
across the hierarchy of the audit while suggest that failure to consult with the 
technical department on high-risk audit engagements could lead to unfavourable 
consequences for the auditor. It is evident that considerable formal and informal 
consultation has been practiced throughout the audit firm and that it is one of the 
important features in the process of the conduct of the audit. This aspect of the 
process of the conduct of the audit is highly associated with the symbol of the 
quality of audit judgement. 
“We encourage people to consult each other as much as possible, sometimes 
these are like information consultations. If you have got decisions and you 
are looking at something and you think „oh, I am not sure about this‟ you 
will go next door and speak to one of the other partners, maybe informally 
and just say „what do you think about this?‟ Then you have very informal 
consultations, however, then, if you think you have got an assignment 
where you are going to have a lot of issues, you would ask to have a second 
partner quality control reviewer to look at your judgements. Obviously, that 
is in any high-risk jobs. We also have a technical department that people 
can go to and ask if they are not sure, so consultation is actively encouraged 
where other people feel the need. When we come along and do the cold 
reviews, if we look at something and we think „you did not treat this right‟ or 
„you should have consulted somebody else‟ then they will get criticised for 
not following due process. It is actually written down in our policies and 
procedures” (AP4). 
Analysis of the evidence from the interviews demonstrates the important role of 
internal quality reviews to operate and communicate compliance quality to various 
internal and external compliance obligations. For example, the review process is 
represented in practice to define compliance quality with the internal quality 
standards by way of ensuring that auditors follow firm-wide policies and 
procedures. The reviews are also symbolised to various attributes of 
professionalism and commercial values. For instance, it symbolises audit quality by 
way of ensuring a consistent audit approach or methodology across clients and 
increasing audit efficiency and effectiveness. The reviews also symbolise decision 
quality by having a quality review partner to assess the quality of audit 
judgements. In general, the internal quality review is one of the important symbols 
in constructing and attaining comfort that the audit partners achieve adequate audit 
quality.  
“How do we ensure that we deliver good quality audits? We have a 
widespread internal programme of training for the staff and the partners. 
We have an internal audit licensing system where partners demonstrate that 
they have done sufficient training every year to keep that licence and they 
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are regularly reviewed by our own internal quality control and review 
programmes. If their work is not up to standard then they effectively get a 
conditional licence and if they continue to not be up to standard they cannot 
take audits” (AP11). 
Answers were sought about the format and assessment of quality during the 
review. The audit partners mentioned that the format of the review consists of a 
detailed list of yes and no questions that cover areas such as compliance with the 
auditing standards and documentation standards. The audit partners generally 
insisted that the internal engagement quality review is extensive in terms of its 
focus. The review process also covers the scope of the audit process, including the 
appropriateness of the audit approach, which is linked to risk assessment, 
sufficiency of the audit work, and identification and resolution of various key 
auditing or accounting issues. In addition, the assessment also involves reviewing 
other important areas such as reporting and communication with the audit client 
and other relevant parties such as the audit committee.  
“What our internal inspection does is much wider...things like quality 
deliverable, have we properly met the audit committees report” (AP2). 
The following quotation illustrates the process of the internal quality review that 
supports the comfort of the audit partner concerning the level of audit quality. First, 
a quality review partner would be required for high-risk audit engagements. Then, a 
report will be prepared based on the review. The findings of the review will be fed 
back to the engagement team, where, if issues emerge, they are required to be 
resolved by the engagement team. Finally, the quality review partner will formally 
sign off the file for clearance before the engagement partner signs off on the audit 
report.  
“Independent reviews by another senior manager, basically against a check 
list, to make sure that the team has done their job properly and that it is 
ready for me to sign off. So reviewers record their findings from that review 
on a form that goes back to the engagement team, the engagement team 
respond to that document and that gets formally signed off as being 
satisfactorily cleared by the quality review partner” (AP3). 
The views collected from interviewees about the role of audit methodology tend to 
emphasise the importance of a risk-based audit approach to represent quality 
audits. The auditors pointed out the impact of a risk-based audit approach on audit 
quality in several ways. First, it assists in ensuring that sufficient audit work has 
been performed in the areas where there is a higher risk of misstatement. Second, 
the approach helps in facilitating an efficient audit by concentrating on the risk 
areas. The risk-based audit methodology is perceived as being important in 
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achieving an effective and efficient audit. The symbolic representation of efficiency 
and effectiveness links quality with the audit firm‘s methodology, in that sense, the 
notion of audit quality focuses on the content of the actual evidential processes and 
procedures that comprise the audit. Perhaps not surprisingly, the emphasis on 
firms‘ audit approaches on risk based auditing and the importance of planning in 
the conduct of the audit also appear to be significant in the way in which the quality 
of the content of the audit process is understood.  
“Well I say audit quality we have a phase, which is risk and quality. I mean 
we tend to sort of have the two very much allied together...Well I think they 
are pretty good bed-mates… our audit approach is very much designed to 
focus on risk, risk in the business and identifying significant risks and 
focusing our audit work on the areas of key risk and higher risk and, 
therefore, I think addressing those key risks adequately should lead to a 
good quality audit. Then clearly you need to do all the compliance bits 
around the edges, however, if you are addressing the key risks within the 
business and as long as you have identified the key risks correctly to start 
with then I think that should sort of lend itself to fundamentally moving 
down the path of the high quality audit” (AP3). 
From the interview comments, it can be deduced that various representations are 
negotiated, developed and sustained within an audit firm in constructing the 
meaning of audit quality in practice. This highlights the significance of the various 
symbols in constructing social realities and in impacting behaviour and action. The 
meaning of audit quality, as articulated by the audit partners includes such symbols 
such as comments through references to the way auditors carry out the audit and 
policies and procedures established and implemented within the audit firm. 
For instance, academic qualifications, trainings, recruitment process, internal 
quality reviews, audit partners, coaching, business risk auditing, audit planning and 
consultation within the audit firm are some of the important aspects of behaviour 
and ‗objects‘ that were discussed in the interviews as representing audit quality. 
5.4. Quality Conflicts in Practice 
Having identified a number of elements concerning the meaning of audit quality to 
practitioners, it should be recognised that these elements cannot easily be ranked 
or placed in a hierarchy of importance or influence. Rather, there are likely to be 
tensions and conflicts between the activities necessary in order to deliver the 
competing elements and consequently potential choices in the conduct and content 
of what is done in any individual audit engagement. Auditing is not a unitary 
phenomenon and can mean different things to different people (Humphrey, 1997) 
and, similarly, audit quality can hold different meanings for different constituents 
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because of their divergent interests and expectations. To the extent that the 
elements of the meaning of audit quality for the audit partners interviewed reflect 
attention concerning the varying interests of different constituents, then emphasis 
on specific elements will affect audit practice. The interview comments provide 
evidence that auditors recognise the diverse expectations of other constituents in 
the audit setting regarding audit quality and the associated perception gaps that 
can create role conflicts for auditors and the profession (Mills and Bettner, 1992). 
As implied in the quotes below, auditors perceive that different roles are expected 
by various constituents in the auditing environment. Consequently, some of the 
audit partners recognise the expectation and perception gap concerning their roles.  
“My guess is that the public has a very ill considered view of what audit 
quality is, audit quality is a lack of failure in a quoted company.....from a 
client‟s perspective, I guess the feedback we have is that a lot of quality 
issues from a client‟s perspective are due to financial reporting actually 
rather than audit quality. Again, their view is that what goes out in the 
public domain is the set of accounts and then sometimes they are more 
interested in whether the accounts comply with the accounting rules rather 
than the quality of the audit and the challenge.....if you talk to all the 
committees, there would have to be a challenge from the auditors to the 
management and I think the quality seen at that level is the degree of 
challenge. In addition, probably because people are very practical, I think it 
is just the way in which the audit is done, it is very much seen as the quality 
of the audit, so just the effectiveness of the process, the relationships built 
up and just looking at your timetables” (AP5). 
 
“I think there is still this huge perception gap between what the public at 
large think an audit involves and actually what it does involve and I mean I 
think the public expect us to be sitting there adding up lists of numbers and 
checking every invoice that the company has issued and they have no real 
idea and, maybe, they do not want to know. I mean they would be surprised 
in a sense that where you have a strong control environment how little 
detail testing sometimes actually goes on and you obtain your comfort 
elsewhere...” (AP3). 
Audit quality in practice will frequently be viewed from the perspective of the audit 
clients. For this reason, public or regulatory interests may be in conflict with the 
auditors‘ and clients‘ financial interest. The quotation below highlights one auditor‘s 
view about the potential conflict between compliance obligations and commercial 
values, that is, between the different interests of satisfying the expectations of the 
regulator and other objectives (e.g. profit maximisation) of the audit firm. The 
commercial and competitive forces that affect the audit market may create conflicts 
in practice, in particular, concerns about the cost of audit (either from the point of 
view of client management or the audit firm itself). A quality conflict arises because 
auditors are faced with practical choices about providing high quality services at a 
reasonable price (Mills and Bettner, 1992).  
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“…and then, I suppose the other thing is the commercial pressure, in a time 
of recession, profits are lower, people are trying to do more with the time, 
people are trying to do more in the time they have got available, are you 
getting things right from that perspective? In a recession, it can give rise to 
more challenge to audit quality” (AP5). 
 
“The two main levels to make more profit on an audit, first it is the amount 
you spend on the audit and second there is the seniority of the people you 
put on the audit... so I think there is clearly a conflict there between making 
a significant profit and good quality audits” (AP6). 
The analysis also suggests possible tensions in various areas of audit between the 
audit regulator and the audit practitioners. For instance, the following quotes 
highlight possible tensions concerning the appropriateness of the audit opinion as 
well as the sufficiency of the audit work and the adequacy of audit documentation 
during interactions between the audit partners and the regulator.  
“There was probably less emphasis on file completion 15 years ago. 
Certainly, if the partners felt that there was enough evidence on the file, 
then that was pretty much enough really. Now it is the perspective where we 
have a very stringent control over closing down of files. We have a files 
review to see whether we got the right things on file from a completion point 
of view. Have we got the right sort of approach documents on file and that is 
done with the regulator in mind. That is what I would say drives what quality 
of audits now. As we provide better opinion, are the accounts more accurate 
now than they were 15 years ago? I am not convinced to be honest” (AP2). 
 
“I think we probably are more regimented in documentation...I think the 
standards are very demanding and if you look at the audit inspection unit‟s 
approach to reviews, sometimes they seem to want even more documents 
than we think is necessary” (AP5). 
During the interviews the auditors also made reference to a potential conflict 
between what has been described here as the element of compliance obligations 
and that of professional values. For example, comments indicated that a tension 
between these dimensions is reflected in the procedures through which audit 
engagements are evaluated within the firms themselves. As suggested by Curtis 
and Turley (2007), in the audit firm setting there is tension between the 
practitioners and the firm‘s ‗administrator‘, that is the managerial control part of 
the firm. Most commonly, this idea is present in views complaining about a 
potential emphasis on completing checklists – that there is a conflict between 
ensuring that the audit involves the exercise of professional judgement and ‗box 
ticking‘ to satisfy internal and external compliance obligations. In the words of one 
audit partner:  
“One of the frustrations of the audit partners within this firm is that 
sometimes we come down on the side of quality evaluations that end up 
being basically a huge check list, tick what have you done, have you done 
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these 900 things on your audit …and it is basically yes or no and for every 
no answer you justify why it is a no answer and if you have got lots of no 
answers then potentially that becomes an issue as to whether you have 
done a quality audit...” (AP3). 
Generally, the auditors interviewed regarded attaining high audit quality from the 
perspective of their clients as their highest priority. That perspective may give rise 
to a further conflict between the desire to fulfil commercial values and the auditors‘ 
perceptions of what is appropriate in terms of professional values. As stated by one 
interviewee:  
“You will always get a partner and if it is a relatively small, or what appears 
to be a relatively small client, that partner can get too close to an audit 
client. They can get sucked into a position whereby they will do something 
out of a desire to provide client service and they will see it as a client service 
objective and, like I say, we are a client service firm and they will not see 
the difference between a client service and audit quality. I think that is a 
very difficult thing because we preach message to the staff that we must 
provide good client service, you must do a good quality audit and they are 
not always the same. And being able to identify and being able to ensure 
that our partners can identify where there is a conflict, is important. So, in a 
way, is something that worries me. I suppose the other thing is the 
commercial pressure, in a time of recession, profits are lower...In recession, 
it can give rise to more challenging audit quality” (AP5). 
Collectively, the existence of these conflicts suggest that for the individual audit 
practitioner the process of attaining what he or she considers to be an audit of 
suitable (high) quality is likely to be complex and may involve considerable 
tradeoffs between conflicting pressures. In that sense, the ‗process‘ of audit quality 
is more multifaceted than simply the presence of certain signals or attributes 
associated with the inputs supplied to the audit engagement or the characteristics 
of the financial statements after completion of the audit.  
5.5 Perceptions Concerning the Impact of the Role of the 
Audit Committee on Audit Quality 
This section reports on comments made by the interviewees regarding the extent to 
which interactions between auditors and the AC influence audit quality in practice, 
which addressing research question 4. First, each partner was asked a question 
about their general view with respect to the overall role of the AC. On the whole, 
the majority of them agreed that the role of the AC has strengthened in the last few 
years. Some of the partners indicated that the AC was now seen as being more 
rigorous and critical in their approach than had previously been the case. For 
example, the AC was taking an active role in their oversight activities through 
questioning, challenging and discussing critical accounting and audit issues, the 
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audit approach and the results of the audit with the audit partners. The AC 
sometimes asked for additional reporting or further detail on the auditors‘ work but 
there is little evidence of the AC having a direct influence on the design of the audit 
work. Others noted the important role of the AC regarding matters such as auditors‘ 
fees and enforcing additional pressures on management concerning difficult issues 
that emerge during the course of the audit that can facilitate the process of 
conducting an audit.  
“They are demanding more from the auditors and the auditors are 
acknowledging their central role... Increasingly I am seeing that audit 
committees are taking a robust position, which is very noticeable...in terms 
of influencing or changing procedures, my answer will be no, on the 
assumption that there is no reduction on procedures. Would they sometimes 
ask us to do additional work in relation to that in addition to what is required 
to the audit. Sometimes, not the norm but sometimes when there are 
specific issues that really everybody knows are on the table from day one, 
only sometimes would I say they actually request additional work”(AP1). 
 
“the audit committee has been very supportive of us in terms of the 
approach that we want to take in respect of that audit and to the point 
where they basically, even though I mean naturally we are under sort of fee 
pressure in the current market place, they have said “we want you to go and 
do a good, thorough audit of that and we are really interested in what your 
findings are” and in a sense, well keep an eye on the cost but do not worry 
about the cost because we want you to go away and do a good audit which 
is a slightly different message than you get from the FD because yes she 
wants a good audit but ultimately she wants to tie us down to a fee as 
well..... So, I think there are lots and lots of areas where you can have good 
sort of robust but educative and informed debate with the audit committee, 
which then actually does have a sort of positive impact rather than just 
trying to sort of agree with the FD” (AP3). 
 
Most of the audit partners also took the view that the effectiveness of the role of 
the AC was very much dependent upon the individual characteristics of the 
chairman of the committee. The audit partners regarded the knowledge and 
understanding of the chairman concerning auditing, financial reporting and the 
client‘s business, experience and their judgement to be an important part of the 
characteristics for the AC to be able to fulfil its role and its responsibilities 
effectively. At the same time, the audit partners perceived that the approach of the 
AC was varied and that it was very much influenced by the chairman of the AC. 
They also perceived that the chairman would be likely to influence the type of 
working relationship that existed between the auditors and the AC.  
 
“It varies on the personalities involved on the non-executive side. They will 
ask detailed questions of the auditors and have a very good understanding 
of the accounts. Others will be much more hands off, they do not 
particularly want to see any report from the auditor. Others will be 
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challenging in terms of the information that they get from the auditor, in 
terms of the approach, in terms of the planning approach, the result of the 
work. It usually manifests itself in a way, I do not understand that number 
or that area in the accounts, can you explain that and deep-deep down that 
way. It does come down to the individual” (AP2). 
 
Although there was a general agreement among the audit partners that the role of 
the AC has strengthened over the years, there were mixed views in relation to the 
impact of the role of the AC on audit quality and content or conduct of the audit. 
Some of the partners believed that the role of the AC influences the knowledge of 
the auditors by enhancing the auditors‘ understanding of the client‘s business. They 
believed that discussion with the AC on various business issues enhanced audit 
quality. Others mentioned the greater need to show that they posed sufficient 
‗challenge‘ to the company‘s management in accordance with the expectations of 
the AC. As implied in the above quotations, there is evidence to suggest some 
impact from the AC on the content and conduct of an audit where there are 
instances in which the AC asks for additional work or detailed reports, questioning 
and challenging the work of the external auditors. In contrast with Cohen et al. 
(2002), the interviews evidence suggests active roles of the AC in their interactions 
with the external auditors.  
Nonetheless, some partners viewed the role of the AC as being more related to the 
quality of financial reporting, that is, the output of the audit rather than the 
‗process‘ of audit quality. They mentioned that a great deal of interaction and 
discussion with the audit committees focuses on the financial reporting and 
business issues rather than audit issues or the procedural aspects of the audit 
engagement. Several of the partners opined that there was little contribution of the 
AC with respect to the conduct of the audit. The following comments summarise the 
divergent views of partners on this issue:  
“I think having a good understanding with the Audit Committee will enhance 
audit quality because if you have an Audit Committee member who is close 
to the business you can share ideas and very often they can give you their 
perspective and their insight of what is happening...I think that enhances 
the auditor‟s understanding of the business and the business issues” (AP9). 
 
“I think the existence of audit committees and the quality of those audit 
committees has been a huge benefit. It has been very beneficial in terms of 
improving the quality of audit financial reporting, and, therefore, by 
definition, the audit opinion. I would say audit committees are more attuned 
to financial reporting obligations and the financial reporting requirements 
than they are of audit regulations, so you will have far more discussions with 
audit committees around accounting issues than you would around audit 
issues” (AP8). 
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Analysis of the evidence from the interviews demonstrates greater interaction and 
communication between the auditors and the AC over the years. For instance, 
beyond the formal business of the regular meetings, significant informal 
interactions occur between the chairman of AC (e.g. informal meetings and 
telephone conversations) and the auditors. The auditors have regular informal one-
to-one contact with the chairman of the AC. During these informal interactions, the 
chairman expects the auditors to keep him/her informed of emergent accounting or 
business issues and this informal discussion also aims to brief the chairman about 
reports to be formally submitted to the committee. Informal interaction also 
provides an opportunity to discuss potential conflicting issues before meetings or 
solving problems in advance of AC meetings. Further, these informal interactions 
are an important aspect of the relationship between the AC and the auditors. In this 
respect, auditors can be open and honest about the difficult issues that unfold 
during the conduct of the audits or answer sensitive questions concerning the 
competency of the management. Several partners perceived their relationship with 
the AC as interactive, productive and effective. However, there were also comments 
that reflect a more passive relationship.  
 
“I have informal meetings before every audit committee meeting I will have 
an informal meeting with the audit committee chair… maybe a call or a catch 
up so there will be interaction between myself and the audit committee chair 
before each key meeting and then during the year end audit we will be in 
contact once or twice a week and we will probably have a lunch or an 
informal meeting once or twice during the year so quite a lot of interaction” 
(AP9). 
 
“[if] you have got a good relationship you pick up the phone to the chairman 
of the audit committee and just make sure they are aware of any issues, so 
they can put pressure on management to address it. They have the 
opportunity to engage and get themselves up to speed on the issues before 
the relevant meeting...a good relationship is where you can have an open, 
honest relationship with the audit committee and they do not immediately 
turn round and just go back and tell senior management what you have told 
them, they use their experience and judgement as to how to present it back 
or whatever, so you would expect the formality of the meetings and then 
you would expect some sort of informal contact as well to ensure that there 
are no surprises and you can both use them as it were to help” (AP10). 
The evidence from the interviews also suggests that more detailed reports are 
prepared for the AC. In terms of the content of the reports, a significant part of the 
reports concentrate on highlighting key audit issues that emerge in the 
performance of the audit. The interviewees also stated the importance of showing 
that they are challenging the management on those audit issues.  
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“I think the time devoted to audit committee report preparation content is 
much greater than it was. In terms of the style of reporting in the final 
report we increasingly focus on the key audit issue” (AP1). 
From the analysis of the responses, it can be deduced that there were mixed views 
about the beneficial impact of the AC in promoting audit quality. Nonetheless, most 
of the auditors acknowledged the effective role of the AC in achieving financial 
reporting quality rather than audit quality. The audit partners also recognised 
greater interaction and communication between them and the AC, which they 
perceived as being beneficial to the audit quality.  
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This study adopts a symbolic interactionist perspective that offers an alternative 
framework to examine multiple meanings and various symbols of audit quality, the 
influences behind the construction of those meanings, and potential quality conflicts 
in practice. Primarily, this study suggests that audit quality can simultaneously hold 
different meanings for individual auditors. Three key concepts of audit quality in 
practice are identified. First, the concept of audit quality is related to the 
professionalism of the individual auditors. Second, concepts of audit quality concern 
the compliance obligations of the practitioners to the relevant auditing and 
accounting standards, and the related aspects of internal and external quality 
assessment. Finally, commercial or entrepreneurial values influence the 
practitioners‘ notion of audit quality. The study also reveals that commercial values 
are far more influential than others, such as compliance obligations, to the way in 
which notions of meaning of audit quality in practice are understood and the way 
audit is carried out in practice. Further, these multiple interpretations of meanings 
emerge from the different ‗roles‘ played by the auditors.  
The empirical evidence on the perceptions of audit quality by audit partners 
provides some interesting insights. The general pattern based on the responses 
indicates that the auditors attach different meanings to audit quality, which are 
influenced by various expectations, interests and concerns by different constituents 
in the auditing environment. This is consistent with Turner et al. (2010) who view 
auditing as a multi-service activity that serves different types of customer groups 
that judge quality differently, for example, the compliance obligations and 
professional values as a result of public, regulatory and normative pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in the auditing environment underpinned by the need 
to legitimise the conduct of the auditor to build and maintain the trust and 
confidence of the public at large concerning the quality of their services. 
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Compliance obligations are important for the auditors to legitimise their own 
standards and overall audit methodology and processes to the outside constituents, 
as argued by Scott (2001); legitimacy relates to social acceptability and credibility.  
The auditors‘ professionalism, reflected in factors such as professional judgement, 
competence and independence is represented by symbolic representations such as 
academic qualifications, training, technical guidance and consultation. These 
features were frequently described in the interviews and constitute a major part of 
the production of quality in practice. Further analysis shows that the auditors make 
these recommendations based on their claim to expertise and knowledge, which 
becomes one of the fundamental concepts that gives audit its value. As suggested 
by Richardson (1988), auditors‘ claim to have knowledge that is important for the 
protection of professional privileges and autonomy of power that is enjoyed by the 
audit profession. In this respect, the compliance obligations and professional values 
concepts of audit quality are important to reflect the audit as a profession that is 
connected to the value of an external audit.  
The analysis suggests that commercial values influence how auditors perceive audit 
quality and this reflects the business of auditing (Power, 2003). The competitive 
and commercial pressures on the audit market significantly affect the profitability 
and survival of the audit firm. As a result, to increase profit, meeting client‘s 
expectations and providing value added services drive the idea of the concept of 
audit quality in practice. The results show that the commercial interests become the 
audit firm‘s organisational values system that influences the production of ‗quality‘ 
and the commercial concerns affect every aspect of auditing (Sikka et al, 2009).  
Further reflections on this issue reveal that the power asymmetry and task 
interdependence may put additional pressure on auditors to deliver the ‗quality‘ 
that is expected by their audit clients. The auditors‘ appointment and re-
appointment and determination of the audit fees are decided by the client‘s 
management (Gavious, 2007). This condition has important implications for the 
concept of audit quality in practice, thus showing the importance of the concept in 
relation to the audit as an ‗industry‘.  
Overall, the analysis indicates that the concepts of audit quality in practice are 
changing and moving as they are subjected to social, regulatory and economic 
pressures. Auditing practices are interacting with the internal and external 
pressures for quality in the auditing environment that constantly change practical 
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framed of meaning of audit quality for the audit practitioners. In a sense, audit 
quality is subjectively constructed and changes with context.  
It is notable that the audit partners‘ configuration of meanings are reflected to 
some extent by symbols and the construction of the notion of audit quality that 
focuses on the inputs and processes of the audit rather than the outcome. 
Regarding the input of an audit, the audit partners emphasised that the quality of 
people is key in the production of a quality audit, in which various quality symbols – 
codified rules, auditing standards, professional examinations, training, coaching and 
consultation - are reinforced and recognised as giving some dimension of audit 
quality in the auditor‘s mind. These symbols are important to establish and 
legitimise abstract audit knowledge.  
Concerning the processes, the audit partners emphasised audit judgement, asking 
challenging questions, internal quality review, audit planning and risk analysis as 
essential for comfort in ensuring production of audit quality. These processes and 
procedures provide the representations of audit quality, that is what audit partners 
see as tangible indications of quality in the absence of more observable features of 
audit quality. Overall, the meaning of audit quality in practice is operationalised 
through various representations in the inputs and the audit process for the 
members in practice and to other external constituents with whom they interact.  
This chapter also argues that audit quality in practice is more appropriately 
envisaged as a set of persisting conflicts and tensions, which result from the 
mutually related and competitive dimensions of audit quality. There is conflict 
between practitioners‘ values and institutional demand for acceptable 
representation of audit quality. The first tension is between compliance obligations 
(in particular, external compliance obligations) and the professional values of the 
audit practitioners. Observation from analysis of the interview comments highlights 
that this tension is an important issue, as there is a continuous battle between the 
practitioners and the regulator (the AIU) in controlling who can lay down the 
parameters of the work that the auditors do. In the UK the introduction of the AIU 
by the FRC has introduced a prominent actor in the auditing system that might 
have a different conception of what audit quality is.  
It appears that the regulatory changes regarding what constitutes quality translate 
into anxiety and unease in the audit partners‘ understanding of the concept of audit 
quality. To her/him, recent regulation removes the ‗status quo‘ in the audit, which 
implicitly undermines the professional judgement, expertise and knowledge 
146 
 
possessed and claimed by the auditors. The effort is sometimes viewed as de-
professionalizing the audit profession through removing the status of the public 
accounting firm as a ‗profession‘ and the professional power that is perceived as 
threatening the core existence and survival of the audit profession. These feelings 
were articulated during the interview when the auditors voiced their concerns about 
changes in the nature of audit practice – the change from using professional 
judgment to audit practice that is prescriptive.  
In general, the overall impression that emerges from the interviews discussed in 
this chapter is that what is considered as ‗quality‘ in practice, as perceived by the 
auditors, is without doubt the outcome of social relations, which is consistent with 
the argument offered by Power (1996; 2003) contesting the dominant view that 
‗quality‘ is objectively constructed by following relevant standards and applying 
appropriate auditing techniques. This study argues that audit quality in practice is 
socially constructed. This shows that the meanings of audit quality represent 
diverse issues including legitimacy, image management, role conflict and the 
survival of the audit profession.  
In conclusion, this chapter shows that: (i) the audit partners perceive multiple 
meanings of audit quality in practice, (ii) the perceptions of the audit partners 
concerning audit quality are influenced by internal and external factors, such as 
commercial and regulatory factors in the audit environment, (iii) various symbols 
are operationalised and communicated to signify meanings in practice to gain 
legitimacy and ensure survival of the audit firm, (iv) quality conflicts exist because 
of multiple roles performed by the external auditors, (v) the AIU influences the 
meaning of audit quality in practice, and (vi) the AC has minimal impact on the 
content and conduct of an audit. 
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Chapter 6 
Audit Committee Members’ Perceptions Concerning 
Audit Quality in Practice 
6.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the results of the interviews that were 
conducted with AC members to elicit their views concerning the meaning of audit 
quality, factors that influence the construction of that meaning and the 
representation of that meaning in practice. The background to and structure of the 
interviews and the methodological approach to the analysis of the evidence 
collected were described earlier in the thesis (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1.2 
respectively); this chapter presents and comments on the views expressed.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 addresses research question 1, 
and describes multiple meanings AC members associate with audit quality in 
practice. Section 6.2 discusses factors that shape and influence the construction of 
the meanings of audit quality, thus addressing research question 2. Section 6.3 
examines how the meanings of audit quality are represented in the operation of the 
AC, which is the subject matter of research question 3. Section 6.4 addresses 
research question 5 and discusses the impact of the AC on the external audit 
function. Section 6.5 provides a summary discussion of the findings and the 
conclusions of the chapter.  
6.1 Meanings of Audit Quality in Practice 
The thematic analysis of the responses demonstrates that the AC members 
predominantly frame their meanings of audit quality around four important 
constructs. First, the notion of audit quality is related to the characteristics of the 
audit firm. Second, the idea of audit quality is associated with the concept of 
professionalism of the external auditors and includes professional attributes, values 
and the reputation of the external auditors. Third, AC members place greater 
emphasis on external auditors‘ own assessment and discussion of risks in 
operationalising the meaning of audit quality in practice. Finally, the concept of 
audit quality is connected with a construct concerning the credibility of the financial 
information that is produced by the management. The discussion that follows will 
show that the four elements serve to give structure to the meaning of audit quality 
in practice. 
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6.1.1  Characteristics of the Audit Firm 
The first meaning of audit quality expressed by the AC members concerns the 
attributes of the audit firm, thereby linking audit quality with the size, reputation 
and industry expertise of the firm. Consistent with the dominant audit quality 
discourse (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981b; Knapp, 1991) the majority of the AC members 
interviewed associate audit quality with the size of the audit firm. The interviewees 
perceived that Big Four audit firms or larger firms can provide a better audit service 
because they have adequate resources in terms of people, systems and processes 
to provide a high quality of audit service.  
“Most of the companies that I have been involved are large companies, very 
large and some of them are international. Sometimes the issues been dealt 
are complex and difficult. I think another aspect that important is the 
experience of the auditor who has well place to be able to deal with all 
aspects of the audit issues that might arise. Perhaps a large audit firm would 
be better to deal with a large complex company. That would be my opinion. 
If the company is international and global then I would think that the type of 
the auditor that to be used should also international and global. They have 
access to expertise, knowledge and resources” (AP1).  
The AC members expressed the view that the larger audit firms can attract more 
highly skilled employees and that the Big Four firms have sufficient capacity to hire 
and train the best people. As a result, they believed the big firms have sufficient 
resources in terms of quality people, their competence and experience to carry out 
the audit. The Big Four firms are also believed to have strong quality control 
systems connected to the audit process and a strong audit methodology or 
approach that is associated with higher audit quality. Furthermore, the AC members 
believed that the big size audit firms have strong policies and internal procedures in 
place that monitor and facilitate the audit process.  
“First of all I think you want to make sure you are dealing with an audit firm 
that has a very strong worldwide reputation...we are working with the Big 
Four. There has been a lot of debate recently, in which I have participated, 
about whether public companies could use non Big Four auditors to a certain 
extent. While I would not rule that out I think you would feel a lot more 
comfortable with one of the Big Four because they have strong internal 
control procedures themselves and they have back up partners who review 
the work on the audit” (AC5). 
The AC members also emphasised that larger audit firms can provide high audit 
quality because of their reputation, industry specialisation and experience. During 
the interviews, the AC members emphasised that the special skills and knowledge 
of the audit firm concerning a particular industry can bring greater in-depth 
understanding to the unique audit risks that will be reflected in audit quality. The 
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larger audit firms are also perceived to have greater ‗international‘ experience and 
better practices, which are important and beneficial for international and complex 
companies.  
“If you are choosing between those Big Four...experience of your industry. 
That is one place where the firms will differentiate because they have 
different strengths in different industries” (AC10).  
It was apparent that the perception of the AC members concerning the meaning of 
audit quality depends upon observable features of audit quality such as size, 
reputation and industry specialisation of the audit firm. In general, the 
characteristics of the audit firm as a construct of audit quality is important to signal 
audit quality through selection of credible and high quality auditors.  
6.1.2  Professionalism of Individual Auditors 
Another construct reflected in the comments expressed by the AC members links 
audit quality to the professional attributes, professional values and professional 
appearance of the external auditors. Similar to Schroeder et al. (1986) and also to 
the evidence obtained from the other two groups (audit partners and quality 
inspectors) in this study, analysis of comments suggests that AC members 
perceived the professional attributes of the audit team or individual auditors to be 
an important construct of audit quality. All of the AC members identified 
competence and knowledge and experience in the industry or with the client to be 
critical attributes for auditors to be able to deliver appropriate audit quality. For 
example, experience and knowledge are essential for the auditors to understand 
and identify risks and issues faced within a particular industry. These attributes 
allow auditors to identify strengths and weaknesses in the processes and 
procedures of the audit client‘s internal control and accounting systems. The AC 
members also elaborated upon the importance of the technical skill of auditors - 
sound understanding of accounting standards that reflect audit quality because of 
the financial reporting regulatory requirements.  
“I would be very concerned if I thought there were close personal 
relationships between the audit partners and our auditors and the senior 
executive...I think that is very important, and I think when it comes to 
failures, it will very often relate to the judgement of an individual auditors” 
(AC6). 
The quotation below implies that the appearance of professionalism and the 
behavioural and interpersonal skills of auditors are very important attributes when 
AC members reflect on the meaning of audit quality. In this light, the AC members 
expressed the view that auditors‘ interpersonal skills are important for them to feel 
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comfortable and confident that the auditors are delivering a high audit quality. In 
other words, the AC members felt that the auditor should be able to demonstrate 
his/her ability to identify, describe and articulate issues during interactions and 
communication with the AC. The auditors should also be able to demonstrate the 
ability to listen and respond to questions. The AC members also referred to the 
importance of auditors‘ behavioural skills – gestures, the ability of auditors to 
interact, relate and respond during interaction and communication with the AC 
members and with others (such as the management and the internal auditors), as 
reflecting audit quality. In general, most of the AC members considered the 
interpersonal and behavioural skills of the auditors to be very important for 
perceptions about audit quality.  
“They (external auditors) also need an interpersonal chemistry...an ability to 
listen...somebody who is highly competent technically but cannot talk to 
people in the factory or the office is not going to be as productive. I am 
interested in the interpersonal skills of the auditor because that is the way 
they collect a very large amount of their knowledge. Therefore there is an 
element of chemistry and behaviour and then if you couple that with 
technical knowledge and ability to talk about the subject, to reciprocate in 
some ways. Then you hear him talking about it and you will think he knows 
his job and you will feel more comfortable” (AC8). 
Overall, the above analysis indicates that the auditors‘ professionalism, comprising 
professional characteristics, values and appearance, is important for audit quality, 
and dominates the idea of meaning of audit quality for AC members. Whether the 
auditors have delivered sufficient audit quality is related to the extent to which the 
AC is persuaded by their ‗presentation‘ of the audit rather than detailed knowledge 
of the process of the audit itself. This may not be surprising because the AC 
members are not in position to examine the process and conduct of the audit in 
detail. This finding is in line with Carrington (2010) who identifies the appearance of 
professionalism as a construct of audit quality in the absence of a clear relationship 
between inputs (the external auditors‘ professional attributes and values) and the 
process of the audit.  
6.1.3  Risks Orientation 
In the interviews, the AC members generally saw the auditors‘ presentation and 
discussion in the area of risks as giving structure and meaning to the concept of 
audit quality in practice. The AC members believed that external auditors‘ 
understanding and assessment of risks can enhance audit quality in two ways. First, 
the identification and assessment of risks by the external auditors will be likely to 
influence audit planning and approach, which can influence the sufficiency of the 
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audit work in the conduct of the audit and the resulting outcome of the audit. 
Second, it would ensure that the external auditors focus and challenge the 
management on the right key issues and make certain that they form their 
judgement on the right key areas. This finding highlights that the ability of the 
auditors to present and communicate on business issues and in particular risks are 
important to convey an impression of their expertise, knowledge and competence 
and will be taken to reflect their ability to deliver audit quality.  
“So audit quality is that the risks to the enterprise are being managed 
effectively. The AC is really looking at the risks to the enterprise, more 
important than are they adding up the numbers correctly” (AC4). 
 
“What does audit quality mean to the Audit Committee? Well it is ensuring 
that when the plan is originally devised it focuses on the right things, that it 
is cognisant of the key risks in the business and that it is focused on 
ensuring that there are the right controls in those areas. In addition, the 
judgements that the audit focuses on are the ones that are critical to the 
risks in the business. Therefore, audit quality is about that sort of mapping 
between the business and its risk profile, the environment in which the 
business is in” (AC6). 
 
In general, the area of risk is important for the AC members to be comfortable with 
the quality of the work performed by the external auditors and is one of the 
important features in the discourse of audit quality among the AC members. This 
finding is consistent with Gendron et al. (2004, p. 166), who identified external 
auditors understanding, assessment of risks and associated audit planning as being 
an important part of the perceptions of AC members concerning audit quality. In 
like manner, the first group (audit partners) in the study also expressed views 
about the importance of ‗risk‘ in delivery of high audit quality. In this context, the 
presentation and discussion about risks by the auditors gives structure to the AC 
members‘ attention and directly guide their conception of the meaning of audit 
quality.  
6.1.4  Financial Reporting Orientation 
During the interviews, the AC members strongly associated financial reporting 
quality with the meaning of audit quality. The interviewees connected attributes 
such as compliance with the accounting standards and accuracy of the financial 
information to the dimension of financial reporting quality. It was apparent during 
the interviews that the majority of the AC members strongly associated audit 
quality with the reported numbers on completion of the audit and the resulting 
outputs, which is the audit opinion. In general, they regularly mentioned the 
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important role of external auditors to ensure the credibility of the financial figures 
produced by the management, which reflect audit quality.  
“I want to know the company‟s results that we present to the outside twice a 
year, the figures that we are presenting and what we are saying about those 
figures, an accurate and fair representation of what is actually 
happening...are the disclosures that we are making the disclosures that we 
should be making...there is integrity in the numbers, the profits of the 
company are being fairly and accurately stated...that‟s what I‟m looking for, 
that is what I think about audit quality...integrity of results” (AC11).  
 
“It is very clearly laid out what the auditors are expected to do, so the audit 
quality...It has to be seen at the level of what work has to be done in order 
to form a clear, coherent, definitive picture of the company‟s finances” 
(AC7). 
 
The AC members mentioned that they are very interested to receive some in-depth 
discussion about half year and full year financial results from the external auditors 
to give them comfort about the quality of their work. The AC members also pointed 
out that discussion between the AC members and external auditors are normally 
centred on the application and resolution of accounting issues or standards, such as 
impairment, revenue recognition and interpretation of new accounting standards, 
which might have an impact on the reported financial results of the company. It is 
evident that most of the AC members are concerned that there is ‗no surprises‘ or 
any potential threat of audit qualification because of the management‘s accounting 
choice. Accordingly, audit quality is connected to the ability of the external auditors 
to demonstrate that they pose ‗significant challenge‘ to the management about 
various accounting issues related to the company as expressed by the following AC 
members:  
“The way numbers are presented, the accounting standards actually give 
you quite a lot of scope in terms of net income, profit and all that sort of 
thing, the way numbers are manipulated as opposed to just the straight 
operating cash flow which is the really hard number. I think the quality you 
look for in the external auditors is really whether they can go a little further 
than the management can go and say what about this, what about that” 
(AC4). 
 
“What do I see as audit quality?...I would expect there to be what I call a no 
surprises environment...to be open about issues and get to them early and 
get the auditor engaged in them, this is what I mean by issues; how are we 
going to approach impairment this year? How are we going to tackle this 
new accounting standard? How are we going to get on with revenue 
recognition? (AC3). 
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In this context, the underlying rationale is that the AC members want the external 
auditors to keep them out of trouble, so therefore, the auditors are expected to 
object to or challenge the management on accounting policies that might lead to 
problem in the future.  
“The sort of thing that really cheeses off the executive is when external 
auditors change their mind about something, very close to our half year 
reporting time. What you always want is that the external auditors sign off 
and give you a clean bill of health on the accounts. The last thing you want 
is to have queries being voiced publicly. So what we do not want is that 
things change late on in the piece. It is very important that if external 
auditors have got concerns that those are flagged to the management and 
the AC early, so actions are taken to resolve the concerns” (AC4). 
In general, the AC members emphasised a notion of financial statement quality 
where the focus is on the validity of the reported numbers and compliance from an 
accounting perspective. The quality of the financial statements dominated the AC 
members‘ perceptions of audit quality rather than a technical interpretation of the 
quality of the audit process. This perhaps reflects the unobservable nature of audit 
quality and the AC‘s focus on the output of the financial reporting process.  
Having identified different constructs and attributes of the concept of audit quality 
held by the AC members interviewed, and illustrated how these constructs featured 
in the members‘ comments, the discussion below relates those constructs to the 
broader regulatory and societal factors that influence the construction of a practical 
meaning for the concept of quality. 
6.2. Factors that Influence the Construction of the Meanings 
of Audit Quality 
This section attempts to answer the second research question, that is, to look at 
factors that influence the process of construction of the meaning for audit quality. 
In particular, it explores the influence of broader societal and regulatory and the 
concepts of role expectations and self-image on the meanings of audit quality. It is 
relevant to recognise that AC reform has resulted in tighter standards and 
regulations that have demanded greater roles for the AC to oversee the external 
audit function. The AC is now required to approve the appointment and 
remuneration of the external auditors. They have also been given responsibilities to 
review auditors‘ independence and the effectiveness of the audit process, and to 
approve commissioning of non-audit services from the incumbent audit firm. At the 
same time the collapse of businesses has brought about criticism of the role and 
effectiveness of the AC as a control mechanism in the governance structures and 
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has threatened their legitimacy. For these reason, there is an increased need for 
ACs to demonstrate the legitimacy of their behaviour to conform to their role 
expectations and maintain their credibility. The discussion that follows will show 
that role expectations and legitimacy influence the meaning of audit quality, as 
perceived by the AC members. 
One element influencing the AC members‘ sense of meaning for audit quality 
derives from their own monitoring responsibilities. To some extent this can be seen 
as consistent with the present regulatory approach, which emphasises the role of 
‗those charged with governance‘ for making auditing and financial reporting 
effective. Accordingly, how the AC perceives their role will be likely to shape and 
influence the meaning, operation and representation of audit quality which should 
be consistent with the concern for high standards of corporate governance. For 
instance, the UK Corporate Governance Code (C.3.2) outlines that the principal 
roles of the AC include monitoring the integrity of the financial statements, 
reviewing significant reporting judgements and reviewing risk management 
systems. Frequently during the interviews the AC members mentioned these 
features as attributes of audit quality. The quotations below show how the expected 
role of AC members in reviewing risks influences the construction of the meaning of 
the audit quality. For instance, the auditors‘ reports, presentations and discussions 
in the area of risks seem to dominate the AC members‘ perceptions concerning 
meaning of audit quality. As implied in the quotations, the AC members perceived 
that their role is centred on monitoring of the business‘s risks and believe that one 
important function of the external auditors is to support that role. Some of the AC 
members also believed that the value of the audit comes from the ability of the 
auditors to assess the risks of the business and their impact.  
“If I think of the role of the AC and the role of the external auditors, the 
whole process revolves around risk, that is the key word” (AC11). 
 
“I would say there is not a great value to the audit other than there is one 
exception, from my point of view, the auditors can highlight risk that I have 
not picked up through the normal channels. I am particularly interested in 
the auditors‟ assessment of risk or any information that helps me to assess 
risk” (AC9). 
The AC members also emphasised that to some degree comfort about audit quality 
is related to his/her financial and auditing background. Frequently, during the 
interviews, the interviewees felt that their experience is significant for them to fulfil 
their oversight responsibilities because assessment of audit quality involved 
considerable judgement. Similar to DeZoort (1997), the evidence from the 
interviews indicate that the perceived oversight role of the AC of the external audit 
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is related to the background of the members and their knowledge and experience in 
the financial, auditing and business sectors, which is consistent with regulatory 
recommendations (The Smith Committee Report, 2003; The  UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010). One of the interviewees compared the nature of their 
work to the external auditors, which involved gathering information as evidence to 
support their judgement. A number of the AC members described a process of 
triangulation of information that is gathering of various information provided by the 
external auditors, the management and the internal auditors to assess audit 
quality.  
“The chair of the AC is likely to have been a finance director himself with 
financial and auditing experience and it is therefore reasonable to assume 
that he will have a fairly good eye as to whether the job is being done 
technically to a reasonable standard” (AC11). 
 
“I am a professional accountant and know about auditing so that contributes 
an important part to the discussions that I have with the audit partners and 
the audit manager” (AC5). 
Nevertheless, the interview evidence suggests that the expected role of the AC to 
monitor audit quality is somehow challenging and problematic for the AC 
themselves. As suggested by Roberts and Dietrich (1999, p. 981), for the purchaser 
of professional services, assessing performance of services can be problematic due 
to an information problem: that the attributes of quality service are not identifiable 
and the activity of the producer of the services is unobservable. In the case of audit 
services, the notion of audit quality is obscure, the characteristics of ‗good audit‘ 
are not known and the AC has a limited capacity to observe the conduct of the 
auditors or the process of producing the audit.  
For example, analysis shows that the perception of the AC members about size and 
audit quality is based on a ‗taken for granted assumption‘ about the processes of 
and inputs to the audit services because of the unobservable nature of audit 
quality. The following quotes illustrate the importance of that assumption for the AC 
members to feel comfortable with the audit quality; the reason being because of 
the limited ability of AC members to examine the audit process and procedures of 
audit firms. 
“I think if you are working with the Big Four auditors the honest truth is that 
you take the general systems for granted...You do not go and study the 
details of their procedures...one of reason for having one of the Big Four as 
your auditors is that you can take their internal control procedures for 
granted” (AC5). 
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“I think the basic assumption is any one of the Big Four they have got the 
skills... the assumption that their audit approach is good and it meets all the 
standards,...you are making this assumption, I think it is a valuable 
assumption because I cannot go and test it” (AC3).  
Analysis further suggests that the AC members are to some extent struggling to 
define the right concept because audit quality is not immediately or directly 
observable and is difficult to measure. For these reasons, the AC members use 
proxies such as the quality of the relationship, auditors‘ reports on the audit and 
their discussion of issues to demonstrate they have reasons for being satisfied 
about audit quality. Importantly this suggests that the perceptions of the AC 
members concerning audit quality are largely influenced by and dependent on the 
external auditors themselves, as illustrated by the following AC member: 
“What does audit quality mean to you? [Interviewer] It does not have a 
meaning, I cannot give you one. One of these papers say there is no 
definition of audit quality and I agree with that...If I can say straight away, 
the ACs are meant to assess audit quality and the effectiveness of audits. I 
think that is not a job that they should be given. The reason is that auditing 
is a highly technical skill, no member of an AC is likely to have that skill and 
even if they have they will not see the product, which is the audit paper. So 
all ACs use proxies and my discussions with external auditors say they all do 
the same. So what do they look for, they look for relationships with the 
partners in the external firm because that is all they see, you know how well 
a paper is presented, do they reach the main issues, are there any 
repercussions for the audit and the FRC, and if so, are they important or are 
they „nit picking‟, do they highlight issues in advance, do they keep to their 
audit programme, all those things they can do directly” (AC10). 
Furthermore, evidence from the interview comments suggests that some of the AC 
members may not have the technical expertise and knowledge to discharge of their 
expected roles effectively (see, for example, Knapp, 1991; DeZoort, 1997; Lee and 
Stone, 1997). In consequence, they put reliance on the external auditors for 
technical and specific aspects of accounting and business issues because of their 
own limitations of knowledge and expertise in those areas. The AC members also 
emphasised that their indirect involvement in the day-to-day operation of the 
business and consequent information asymmetry requires them to rely on external 
auditors to provide an overview about the conduct and activities of corporate 
management. Accordingly, the AC members tended to stress the importance of 
professional characteristics such as technical knowledge, competence and 
experience for high audit quality. As noted above, the knowledge base and process 
of the audit is difficult for the AC members to observe. For this reason, the 
appearance of professionalism of the auditors also becomes an important construct 
of the meaning of audit quality that is influenced by the interaction between the AC 
members and the auditors. This is in line with a more general perception that audit 
157 
 
practitioners tend to promote a professional appearance or behaviours in relation to 
their work rather than increasing knowledge of relevant parties that they interact 
because of the abstract nature of auditing knowledge (Anderson-Gough et al., 
2002; Carrington, 2010).  
“ACs are not the auditors and the ACs are not expert auditors themselves 
and they have not been trained as an expert auditors, in addition they 
depend on the auditors professional knowledge, for particular technical 
aspects. The ACs cannot be expected to be as technically competent as the 
auditors themselves. Each party has to understand the role of the other. 
Quite frankly if the auditor says something, the AC has to rely on his 
knowledge that he is right even though it may be sometimes illogical or hard 
to understand” (AC9). 
 
“I came across another nice expression the other day, when somebody 
presents to you or when somebody talks to you, you do not actually 
remember most what they say what you remember is how they make you 
feel, that is quite an important distinction to draw. I do not remember most 
of what the audit partner says about the audit I will be quite honest with you 
I do not remember most of it, I do not even find a lot of it very interesting 
or engaging, I find a lot of it reasonably tedious but I do remember how he 
makes me feel. Does he make me feel that things are okay, does he make 
me feel that things are on track and does he make me feel that he„s got to 
grips with things” (AC11).  
The AC members‘ construction of the meaning of audit quality through constructs 
such as the characteristics of the audit firm is influenced by their own need to 
create a credible image for legitimacy with the external parties (for example, 
regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders) in relation to their roles and 
responsibilities in monitoring audit quality. The AC members believed that engaging 
with a credible audit firm reflects high audit quality that can add an aura of 
credibility to their own work. Such ‗image management‘ is especially important as a 
source of legitimacy for the AC members and to manage public perceptions 
concerning the level of audit quality. Hence, to fulfil the need for legitimacy, the AC 
members‘ emphasis the size, industry expertise and reputation of the audit firm to 
signal high audit quality.  
“First of all I think you want to make sure you are dealing with an audit firm 
that has a very strong worldwide reputation. We are working with the Big 
Four. There has been a lot of debate recently, which I have participated in, 
about whether public companies could use non Big Four auditors to a certain 
extent. While I wouldn‟t rule that out, I think I feel a lot more comfortable 
with one of the Big Four and that the outside people has more confidence 
because they have strong internal control procedures themselves, they have 
back up partners who review the work on the audit and so on” (AC5). 
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It appears that the perception (of size and quality) exists because it may generate 
feelings of comfort and confidence about audit quality not only for the AC but also 
the wider public. Additionally, the perception is also influenced by the limited 
exposure of the AC to different size audit firms. The AC members perceived that the 
non-big four firms are unlikely to be able to deliver the required audit quality. In 
contrast to the viewpoint of the above interviewees, however, a small number of 
the AC members perceived that there is no real audit quality difference between the 
size of the audit firm, but the perception still exists that there is a threat of being 
criticised if the AC fails to discharge its roles and responsibility effectively if a non-
big four firm is appointed, as illustrated by the following comment:  
“I would expect that the top ten audit firms are all capable of doing a good 
job for you, would all be technically competent...I expect that they would be 
capable of doing a perfectly acceptable job. Do I think that the bigger plc‟s 
are going to go on using the Big Four? I expect they will because they will be 
worried about criticism if something went wrong and they had not” (AC11). 
Thus, the constructs of audit quality that relate to audit firms‘ characteristics and 
the professionalism of the individual auditors can be argued to be connected to the 
issue of legitimacy for the AC. This perspective is particularly relevant in the AC 
context where legitimacy is linked to engaging high quality external auditors. This 
aspect of audit quality is also crucial in managing the impression of others (such as 
shareholders) because credible audit is to some extent is important to the AC‘s own 
credibility. 
The construction of audit quality can also be described as reflecting the AC‘s need 
to provide assurance to outsiders, in particular the shareholders, that financial 
information provided by management is legitimate. Here, the concept of audit 
quality is related to efforts to enhance the legitimacy of the financial reporting 
process and at the same time to assist AC members discharge their formal roles, 
functions and activities to relevant parties.  
“I am one of the people that is responsible for ensuring that when you as an 
investor in that company see the company‟s results that those results 
represent a fair view of the company‟s performance, that the company is 
and will continue to be a going concern and that the results you are seeing, 
based on all of the knowledge that is available to us, are likely to be 
sustainable. That seems to me to be a very important responsibility. 
Secondly it is my job as a member of the board to be confident that the 
company has a strategy for the future that is targeted upon increasing value 
of the company in the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders... 
the role of the external auditors is to make an effective contribution to the 
board being satisfied that its overseeing of those two key things is being 
done as well as you possibly can. That is what I think the AC is there for” 
(AC11). 
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Overall, the above analysis shows that role expectations of the AC and interactions 
between the AC and the external auditors can be said to influence and shape the 
AC members‘ perceptions of the meaning of audit quality in practice. The next 
section provides further evidence about acts and objects that are used as symbols 
to communicate and represent meaning of the of audit quality in the process and 
operation of the AC.  
6.3 Representations of Audit Quality in Practice 
This section answers the third research question: to document the different 
representations associated with the meanings of audit quality in practice. Analysis 
of the interviews evidence shows that various symbols are identified in the 
operation of the AC members in order for them to obtain a sense of comfort in the 
quality of work performed by the external auditors. In this case, both formal and 
informal interaction and communication, namely AC meetings, external audit 
reports and external auditors‘ presentation and communication are important acts 
and objects in deriving comfort about audit quality (see, for example, Gendron et 
al., 2004). The evidence here is consistent with Power (1997) who suggests the 
importance of formal audit reports, presentations of auditors in meetings and 
informal communications as representations of comfort in the process of 
verification. Similar to studies by Gendron et al. (2004; 2006) and Beasley et al. 
(2009), the analysis indicates that these various representations are internally 
developed, sustained and promoted in the operation of the AC, and serve to make 
members comfortable concerning the quality of the work of the external auditors.  
The interviews suggest that formal reports that are prepared by the external 
auditors become a key object in signifying audit quality in the eyes of the AC. For 
example, in the following quotes the AC members signified audit quality through 
his/her assessment of the content of the auditors‘ reports. The AC members 
explained that the external auditors prepare various written reports at different 
stages of the audit. For example, before the first AC meeting, at the beginning of 
the audit, the external auditors prepare a detail report that outlines the scope of 
the audit including the audit plan, technical accounting issues to be addressed and 
the key risk areas that they would be focusing on in the conduct of the audit. The 
AC then has the opportunity to read the information prior to the meeting. Here, the 
AC members stated that they get comfort about audit quality through examining 
the content of the report by ensuring that the auditors identify and concentrate 
their work on the right key areas, which means that the audit plan reflects the key 
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risk areas of the business. The content of the report also influences the subject of 
discussion of certain issues in the AC meetings.  
“You do expect a pretty detailed report from them (external auditors) and it 
is really about making an assessment of the quality of those reports...The 
assessment of the committee as a whole about the quality of the work done 
will be based upon the written reports submitted to the board and the verbal 
explanation that is given to the committee” (AC11).  
 
“The external audit will present to the AC a report showing the key areas 
that the external auditor believe needs to be examined. The key issues in 
their mind as they design the external audit procedures - the key accounting 
issues, the key system issues, the key concerns that they may have, and 
discuss those with the AC in advance of the audit and reach an agreement 
on that. It is quite a comprehensive report and would go in advance of the 
audit, from the external auditor to the AC. After the completion of the audit, 
a very detailed report would go to the AC from the external auditor, setting 
out the findings as a result of the audit in relation to the factors that have 
been previously reviewed by the AC and discussed with them in advance. 
The audit partner or perhaps one of the audit staff will come to the AC and 
discuss the findings, in the detailed report with the AC, face to face in the 
audit meeting. Of course, all of that would also happen separately with the 
management of the company” (AC1). 
The AC members have a high interest in risk matters, not least because risks 
underlie the external auditors approach in the audit but also they rely on this 
subject to develop their own understanding of audit quality. For example, the 
reports are used by AC members to develop expectations about the conduct of the 
audit. Thus, some sense of comfort about sufficient audit quality would be derived 
when the AC members find that the performance of the external auditor is in line 
with their expectations. It appears that such reports shape AC members 
interpretive schemas by providing them ‗ideal‘ features that the AC members 
should be focusing on when assessing audit quality. The finding highlights about 
how content of the report is used to operationalise or give meaning to audit quality 
for AC members, influencing their focus on the work of the external auditors. This 
reinforces the central role the external auditors play in influencing the AC members‘ 
understanding of audit quality.  
“Clearly one of the things that audit committees have to do is to approve at 
the beginning of the financial year the audit scope that they (external 
auditors) are going to carry out...you would expect them to identify what 
they see as the particular risks that year. Therefore, to some extent you are 
ensuring they do have a good understanding of what are the particular risks 
because of the economic environment. Therefore, it is important to make a 
judgement about whether they have identified the right ones and 
understood the right ones...Demonstrating they have completed the audit 
scope they have said they would complete, reporting back on their findings, 
obviously their overall findings but particularly around those key risks” 
(AC3). 
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“...you hear him (external auditor) talking about risks and you will think he 
knows his job and you will feel more comfortable...the auditor has to convey 
their views and they have got to do that in a way which is going to 
encourage a response. The auditor has to make certain the AC hears it, 
understand it and responds to it. So they have to coach and push along...” 
(AC8). 
It is also evident that reports that are prepared by other parties such as 
management, internal auditors and the regulator are an important source of 
information for the AC when seeking comfort about the quality of the work of the 
external auditors. For example, some of the AC members described how they used 
the internal audit report on risk analysis to evaluate whether the external auditors 
have incorporated key risks in the audit plan and have examined the right key risk 
areas during the conduct of the audit.  
“The internal auditors report to me as chairman of the AC so I can get an 
independent view from them. So I go into the meeting with a view of the 
problem myself and then I find out whether the external auditor has looked 
at the same issues and analysed them in a kind of sensible way and I 
understand where he is coming from” (AC5). 
The report that is prepared at the beginning of the audit also gives them an 
opportunity to examine the profile of the audit team members. In particular, the AC 
members will examine the experience of the partner and manager who will be 
involved in the audit. The interviewees acknowledged that they are using the 
information in getting comfort that the audit firm is using the right quality people - 
individuals that demonstrate the necessary knowledge and expertise in the 
company‘s business as well as having sufficient knowledge of technical accounting 
issues.  
As shown in the above quote, at the end of the audit, the final report that is 
produced by the external auditors will predominantly highlight the key audit 
findings. For the AC members, this report is very useful to make certain that the 
auditors have carried out the audit according to the scope that has been agreed at 
the beginning of the audit. They also want to ensure that the auditors have carried 
out sufficient audit work on the key risk areas, which they feel will have an impact 
on the quality of the financial reporting and audit quality. In general, reports that 
are prepared by the external auditors are considered to be an important working 
instrument for the AC members to assess and gain comfort about audit quality.  
Analysis of the evidence shows that presentation and communication by auditors in 
AC meetings are important symbols that signify meaning for audit quality. The AC 
members stated that these symbols are important for them to assess audit quality. 
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The majority of the interviewees described the importance of the professional 
image: inter-personal and behavioural skills of the external auditors, 
communication, responsiveness and body language during the meetings, as 
providing a sense of comfort for them on audit quality. This finding is consistent 
with the finding of Sarens et al. (2009, p. 15), who found that auditors‘ 
interpersonal and behavioural skills act as a source of comfort for the AC. 
Therefore, an interesting aspect of the AC members‘ approach to the evaluation of 
the adequacy of the audit, and by implication their construct of audit quality, 
concerns the manner in which the external auditors communicate to the AC and the 
auditors‘ presentation during the AC meetings. 
“I came across a rather nice expression the other day, when somebody 
presents to you or when somebody talks to you, you do not actually 
remember what they say so much as how they make you feel, which is quite 
an important distinction to draw. I will be quite honest with you I do not 
remember most of what the audit partner says about the audit. I do not 
even find a lot of it very interesting or engaging, I find a lot of it reasonably 
tedious. However, I do remember how he makes me feel. Does he make me 
feel that things are okay, does he make me feel that things are on track and 
does he make me feel that he has got to grips with things” (AC 11).  
 
“I think it is just as important through their presence at the audit committee 
and through dialogue with them to get a sense of how on the ball they are, I 
think you want to feel they have got a very clear decision making process 
around, you want to feel that that is a good sound process that is also an 
efficient and fairly slick process. Frankly, I think most of it is around the 
softer stuff rather than the harder stuff, how they conduct themselves, as I 
say „are they on the ball‟?” (AC3). 
More specifically, the AC members signified audit quality by assessing the extent to 
which the external auditors are able to communicate about risks and the company 
business to convey an impression of quality: knowledge, expertise and competence 
of the external auditors and the conduct of the audit. Thus, ‗risk‘ becomes a 
meaningful symbol signifying audit quality which is communicated during 
interaction between the AC members and the external auditors. Some of the AC 
members also mentioned that in the AC meetings there is considerable discussion 
with the auditors in relation to financial reporting issues, such as application of new 
accounting standards and their impact on the financial statements.  
The informal channel of communication and interaction is also part of the important 
act to operate meaning of audit quality whereby the AC members perceived that 
continuous discussion plays an important role in building openness and 
trustworthiness with the external auditors to give them comfort about audit quality. 
The AC members consider this informal process as a strength that helps them to 
raise and discuss ‗difficult‘ matters with the external auditors. For example, the AC 
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members perceived that private meetings between the AC members and the 
external auditors provide a venue for the AC members to ask difficult questions, for 
example regarding the cooperation and integrity of the management, or to discuss 
sensitive matters or concerns that cannot be done during the formal meetings. 
They believed that the external auditors are more willing to express things openly 
about various issues during informal discussion. In general, the majority of the AC 
members perceived that these informal interactions and contacts were an essential 
aspect of the relationship between the AC and the external auditors.  
“The key things that you are looking for are openness and 
trustworthiness...do you trust them, do you respect their judgement, and 
are they capable of having a dialogue with you. So can they discuss a 
problem with you or are they very defensive. The less able you are to have a 
dialogue with them and the more defensive they are, the less you trust 
them...you are assessing situations and people” (AC7).  
 
“In many ways I think the important meetings are the ones I have privately 
with the auditors because as a professional accountant I can talk to the 
external auditors on an equal basis and I can ask them to be quite frank 
with me about how they feel about things and they always are. Whereas in 
the committee the external auditors may be a bit more careful in how they 
say things. When I have a private meeting with them they just tell me what 
they think and that is very important for me to know” (AC5). 
In general, the evidence discussed above suggests that a significant aspect of the 
AC members‘ approach to audit quality is what may be called ‗relational‘. That is, 
their interpretation of the quality of audit delivered in practice is dependent mainly 
on symbols (acts, objects and words): their relationship with the auditor, views 
about personal qualities, external audit reports, presentations and communications, 
rather than by any kind of technical assessment of the quality of the content of the 
audit process itself. Accordingly, the meaning of audit quality is signified, created 
and communicated through the use of symbols – meetings, auditors‘ presentations 
and documents used in interactions between the AC members and the auditors. 
6.4 Effects of the Audit Committee on the External Audit 
It is also important to consider precisely how the AC impacts upon the work of the 
external auditors. Accordingly, the discussion below gives specific to the effects of 
the AC on three aspects of auditing: the audit process, auditor appointments and 
remuneration, and auditor independence. In practice the AC members‘ impact on 
the scope and conduct of the audit is very limited because it is not very easy for the 
AC to deal with something that is as technical and specific as an audit and to 
influence or change the audit approach. The external auditors‘ audit plan is 
considered by the AC at one of its meetings. In that meeting, the AC members 
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contribute to the discussion about the scope of the audit, but do not make decisions 
with regards to the audit plan and approach. Hence, the audit plan is really 
reported and presented to the AC for authorisation or consideration with a minimal 
input from the AC. In the AC meetings, questions and discussion tend to be 
concerned with risks and business aspects of the audit client rather than the 
content of the audit process itself. There have been instances where, after 
reviewing the audit plan, the AC has asked the external auditors to do a bit more in 
certain areas or to include certain things in its plan. Nonetheless, the level of 
questioning and probing into matters is not ‗intense‘. In a typical situation, the AC 
would look at the audit plan and ask, ‗are there any matters that you would like to 
bring to our attention?‘ to which the external auditors would reply there were no 
matters. In this context, the limited role of the AC in specific matters dealing with 
auditing and accounting matters may be explained because of their lack of detailed 
knowledge and expertise in those areas. However, the lack of critical assessment by 
the AC can also be perceived as a consequence of the AC being able to trust and 
get comfort from the external auditors on those areas.  
“I think they have correctly assessed the risk areas which of course they 
have done with management before they come to the AC. Sometimes we 
have asked them to give more emphasis to certain areas but we have never 
changed their approach and I would regard that as a really bad sign if we 
had to...” (AC10). 
The AC is not always passive however. There is some evidence of the extent of the 
AC members questioning and challenging the auditors‘ work during meetings. For 
instance, on a couple of occasions the AC members referred to having asked the 
auditors to perform additional work or provide further details in matters of concern 
as a result of the AC seeing and reviewing their reports. There is also some 
evidence concerning the impact of the AC on the audit process. For example, one of 
the AC members mentioned that he sometimes asks the external auditors to 
increase the sample size or to adjust the level of materiality being used as a result 
of matters of concern to the AC. Nonetheless, overall the AC members mentioned 
that changes to the external audit plan as a consequence of AC enquiries are rare 
and subject to consideration by the auditors themselves. 
“When I sit there with the audit partner, if there are particular concerns that 
the audit committee have got in connection with the company...I can raise 
those with him and ask him to add those to his procedures or ask him to be 
careful in certain areas... we would be saying to the external audit firm, we 
are potentially worried about this particular division, could you perhaps 
increase your level of testing in that particular business, perhaps increase 
your sample sizes, or reduce your materiality levels, each year you agree a 
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materiality level with the external audit firm, perhaps you would ask them to 
go beyond that” (AC1).  
 
“What happens in this company‟s case is there is a pre audit meeting with 
the auditors in which they go through all their plans and those plans are 
discussed, and if we feel that there is something deficient in the plans, then 
it is the AC‟s job to actually highlight those and discuss them. Maybe they 
would not be incorporated in the plan and if there was something the auditor 
was doing that we did not feel relevant we would tell him. Nonetheless, at 
the end of the day it is the auditors‟ decision” (AC9).  
The AC members‘ comments in interview also imply that the AC members have a 
rather limited impact on hiring and firing and on setting the remuneration of the 
external auditors and regarded this as a matter primarily for the management. For 
instance, any dissatisfaction with the work of the auditors that leads to a proposal 
for a change of audit partner or audit firm would come from the management but 
the AC would generally be involved in the process of tendering. Some of the AC 
members described the audit tender process as a ‗beauty parade‘ where a number 
of audit firms would come and present to the management and the AC, but 
selection of the external auditor is normally subject to considerable influence from 
the management.  
“Occasionally you will find that they (the management) want to change a 
partner, even change a firm, more frequently change a partner in a 
subsidiary jurisdiction, occasionally they are dissatisfied with the quality of 
the team but all of those come through management and there is no real 
way of the AC doing other than accepting that” (AC10). 
 
“We have a tender process which is called a beauty parade. If the 
management really believe the auditor is the best person against the other 
firms then they (the management) will come to the AC and say we actually 
think this firm has the best people ” (AC8). 
One of the AC members opined that the role of audit quality in the selection and 
appointment of the external auditors by the AC is rather limited because audit 
quality is difficult to measure and quality differentiation between audit firms is 
unobservable. For this reason, selection of external auditors is normally based upon 
observable features such as reputation, industry specialisation and size of the audit 
firm. Some of the AC members mentioned that change or selection of audit firm 
may not necessarily be based on consideration of audit quality but it may also be 
related to the costs of the audit. Most of the AC members acknowledged that the 
management is always under pressure to cut down costs including the cost of the 
audit. As a result, appointment of the external auditors is very much driven by 
considerations such as whether the management think they get value for money 
from the external auditors. This may suggest that appointment of the external 
auditors is influenced by costs rather than audit quality. 
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“I don‟t think ACs are in a good position to judge but I think they could 
accept that the Big Four all have very high standards and the difference 
between them in terms of standards is not something that they can 
measure. If you do a beauty parade although that is theoretically out on the 
table it is not something you are going to be able to judge” (AC7). 
 
“I mean here for example we did change auditors probably five or six years 
ago. Always one of the concerns of the company is the cost of the audit and 
whether you feel you are getting value for money. So things can change 
purely on economic issues, nothing to do with the personalities... So the 
mere fact of going to tender always reduces fees, not necessarily quality 
either” (AC9). 
Although the AC members do not make the decision concerning audit fees, they are 
particularly concerned that the fees are not significantly reduced by the 
management to an extent that would impact on the work of the external auditors or 
that put them in a situation of having to ‗cut corners‘. The AC members also expect 
to be fully informed about additional work undertaken by the external auditors that 
gives rise to additional fees or that create potential sources for disagreement 
between the management and the external auditors.  
“Most companies are looking at costs much more carefully and they are 
seeking to cut costs everywhere, and of course the auditors are rightly 
challenged around their costs. From an AC point of view you need to make 
sure that the external auditors fees are not being hit so hard that maybe 
they would not do as much work as you would like them to do. I think you 
have also got to be a little bit careful making sure that the management is 
not cutting down too heavily on the audit fees and then the auditors might 
think of cutting corners” (AC3). 
 
“The only area where potential disagreement may be would be if additional 
problems arise which end up giving rise to additional fees which were not in 
the original budget. I think if that happens the audit partner should be 
warning the AC chairman as soon as he can see that costs are going to be 
higher than they were originally expected to be” (AC1).  
Similarly, the AC members are made aware of any non-auditing services provided 
by the external auditors. The decision in determining types of non-audit services 
and fees are normally decided by the management, but the AC members are 
required to give their approval on these matters. Most of the AC members 
mentioned that certain types of non-audit services such as valuation of intangible 
assets and improvement of accounting systems or any work that would result in the 
external auditors ‗verifying‘ their own work should not be performed by the external 
auditors. On the other hand, a majority of the AC members expressed the view that 
certain services like tax, due diligence reviews and work related to mergers and 
acquisitions is not likely to impair the auditor‘s independence. Most of the AC 
members mentioned that those types of non-audit services are better provided by 
the auditors because of their in-depth knowledge of the business.  
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“[If] there is a large non-audit fees involved, the AC has to give its consent 
and if it goes over a certain proportion of audit fees they also have to give 
their consent. So the monitoring is quite straightforward” (AC10). 
The interview evidence also suggests that the management decision to select the 
external auditors to perform non-audit services is influenced by cost considerations. 
For the management, appointing another firm to perform non-audit services will 
normally cost more. As a result of the economic pressure (from the point of view of 
client management), the AC is generally willing to accept the management 
recommendation to appoint the external auditors to perform the non-audit services 
although it may perceived to impair independence.  
“By using somebody else it costs you more and you have to educate the 
other party, so you can argue that actually it is not effective for the 
organisation. That is true, so we pay a higher price but we believe that is 
just something that has to be done in order to keep our auditors objective. 
Our auditors would not agree with that, they say they will always be 
objective and independent, it does not matter how much other business we 
give them. For us we just think, well it is much better not to have any doubt 
about the objectivity” (AC6).  
 
Overall, the AC interviews provide evidence about the limited effects of the AC on 
external audit (see, for example, Turley and Zaman, 2007). The impact of the AC 
on the audit process is minimal, but is also limited with respect to auditor 
appointment, remuneration and independence. Similar to Spira (1999), this 
suggests that with respect to many of these aspects of the system of auditing, the 
AC role is largely for ritualistic and ceremonial purposes and in many cases may 
lack substantive purpose.  
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has provided empirical evidence on the process of making meaning for 
audit quality from the perceptions of the AC members. It has provided some 
interesting insights into factors that influence the construction of the meaning and 
the AC members‘ approach to the evaluation of the adequacy of the audit, and by 
implication their constructs of audit quality. As discussed in the theoretical 
framework chapter, individual‘s understanding of audit quality is formed through 
interaction between various constituents in the auditing environment and influenced 
by various environmental factors. Thus, the meaning of audit quality is socially 
constructed and has to be created, signified and communicated through various 
symbols.  
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For the AC members, their perceptions of audit quality are relevant to 
understanding the operations and effects of AC in relation to external audit. It is 
notable that AC members‘ construction of meaning concerning the concept of audit 
quality involved significant reference to aspects of their relationship with the auditor 
and to whether or not they feel comfortable about the audit quality that is delivered 
in practice. While it may be appropriate that AC members look for evidence of 
personal and professional qualities in the auditor, there could also be a concern that 
this opens up an ‗image management‘ aspect to audit quality in practice. It should 
also be noted that the study identifies the struggle of the AC members in defining 
the term of audit quality, which has contributed to the minimal impact of the AC 
members on external auditing. From the process of constructing meaning of the 
audit quality discussed in the chapter, it can be seen that the AC members have 
difficulties in defining the concept of audit quality because it is difficult to measure 
and observe, and the AC members may not have sufficient knowledge and 
expertise to handle something that is specific and technical like auditing. Rather 
than having their own clear point of reference of what audit quality is based on, the 
AC members are taking some of the concept of audit quality from the external 
auditors themselves as a frame of reference. An example of this is the influence of 
the auditors‘ reports, and their presentation and communication concerning risks 
which become an important source of discourse concerning audit quality for the AC 
members. The external auditors help to bring about a ‗schema‘ of audit quality for 
the AC members. Thus, AC members are depending on external auditors for their 
understanding of audit quality and their conception of its meaning is very much 
influenced by the external auditors themselves.  
Similarly, the indirect nature of the AC‘s observations of audit quality have caused 
AC members to rely on ‗proxies‘ of audit quality involving a combination of 
measures linked to audit inputs and outcomes related to audit quality, such as 
characteristics of the audit firm, professionalism of the external auditors and the 
quality of the financial statements in defining meaning of audit quality. The AC 
members identified the quality of the financial statements, which are the output of 
the financial reporting process, as a construct of audit quality rather than a 
technical interpretation of the quality of the audit process. Likewise, perceptions of 
the AC members about the meaning of audit quality is associated with the ‗input‘ 
factors such as characteristics of the audit firm (size, industry specialisation and 
reputation) and professionalism of individual auditors (characteristics, values and 
appearance) that indicate high audit quality.  
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Analysis of the ‗input‘ factors from the interviews evidence also provides some 
interesting insights into the perceptions of the AC members concerning the 
meaning of audit quality. For example, professional appearance: the interpersonal 
and behavioural skills of the external auditors during interactions are significant for 
the AC members in constructing meanings of audit quality in practice. The findings 
show that the presentation of the external auditor during interaction and 
communication with the AC members become an important means for assessing 
audit quality and are important for the AC members to derive comfort about audit 
quality. The findings suggest that the perceptions of the AC members concerning 
audit quality go beyond the technical skills of the auditors, thus, suggesting that 
relational rather than technical aspects of external auditors are more important in 
influencing the perception of AC members about audit quality.  
This study suggests that the various constructs of audit quality are important for 
the AC members to show that they are having an acceptable basis for concluding 
there is appropriate audit quality, which is important for their legitimacy. Internally, 
the AC members legitimise their roles and responsibilities by reviewing of external 
audit reports and asking questions, and assessing the external auditors‘ responses 
during the formal and informal meetings. Externally, the AC members legitimise 
their roles and responsibilities through engaging with a reputable and specialist 
audit firm that has individuals with the ‗right‘ quality and possess the required skills 
and knowledge to indicate high audit quality.  
This study also provides some interesting evidence on AC effects. The interview 
evidence shows that the AC has a rather limited influence on the work of the 
external auditors, in particular the external audit process. The evidence provides 
limited support concerning the effects of the AC on the content or conduct of an 
audit. The role of the AC is often restricted to the approval of scope of the audit. 
Similarly, the formal responsibilities of the AC members in auditor appointment and 
remuneration, and provision of non-audit services (auditor independence) are 
rather minimal and often restricted to the approval without much enquiry. This 
evidence suggests that the role of the AC members is rather for ceremonial 
purposes and casts doubt about the effectiveness of the AC in monitoring quality of 
the external audit.  
In conclusion, this chapter shows that (i) the perceptions of the AC members 
concerning audit quality are influenced by societal and regulatory factors, such as 
the expected roles and responsibilities of the AC in the corporate governance 
arrangements, (ii) the AC members‘ conceptions of meaning of audit quality is 
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influenced by the external auditors, (iii) assessment and comfort about the quality 
of work of the external auditors is substantially influenced by the interpersonal and 
behavioural skills of the external auditors during interactions and communications 
with the AC, and (iv) the roles of the AC in relation to external audit are rather a 
ceremonial feature where the impact of the AC to external audit is minimal.  
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Chapter 7 
Quality Inspectors’ Perceptions Concerning Audit 
Quality in Practice 
7.0 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the results of the questionnaire survey that 
was conducted with quality inspectors to elicit their views concerning the meaning 
and standing of audit quality, and the influence of external and internal factors in 
the auditing on that meaning The structure and analysis of the questionnaire survey 
were described earlier in the thesis (see Section 3.3.1.3). The results of the 
interviews that were conducted with two representatives from quality inspections 
and public reports published by the AIU were also used to gain further insight into 
this study and amplify the questionnaire survey findings. 
The views of the quality inspectors concerning audit quality are potentially 
important for three reasons. First, their views may provide some indication about 
how good or bad auditing is in practice because the quality inspectors have the 
opportunity to assess and form judgement on external auditors‘ performance 
through records of the audit that is not available to any other group other than the 
auditors themselves. Second, an interview and questionnaire survey may provide 
evidence about quality inspectors‘ conception of meaning of audit quality and their 
perceptions on the potential impact of internal and environmental factors on the 
quality of work on individual audit assignments and their conception of the meaning 
of audit quality in general. Finally, the quality inspectors are a corporate safeguard 
as they monitor the external audit and publish their judgement based on their 
assessment; their opinions may influence the practices implemented and quality 
achieved within the audit firm. 
It is important to note that due to the limit of the sample in this study, analysis of 
results is primarily descriptive in nature, and discussion of the results has to be 
impressionistic. In consequence, a caveat should be stated about the interpretation 
of the evidence from inspectors. When there is a strong consensus from the twelve 
responses, it is indicative of a widely held opinion but when there are variations, 
there are limits to the strength of conclusions that can be drawn. The sample is 
relatively small and does not allow for further statistical analysis, such as testing for 
differences within the sample (such as experience in practice, educational 
qualifications, etc.). It is also important to note that the study does not aim to test 
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any hypothesis or examine cause and effect. Nonetheless, within these limits, this 
study is interesting and relevant to look at because it provides some evidence of 
audit quality inspection, a part of the overall audit system that is not easy to 
penetrate and which has not been extensively covered in prior research.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 presents a descriptive profile of 
the quality inspectors participating in the questionnaire survey study. Section 7.2 
describes the attributes quality inspectors associate with audit quality in practice, 
which addresses research question 1. Section 7.3 addresses research question 2 
that primarily concerns the perceptions of the quality inspectors on environmental 
factors that influence the concepts of audit quality in practice. This section also 
discusses the internal factors that influence the quality attained on individual audit 
engagements. Section 7.4 presents some evidence that highlights the existence of 
quality problems in practice. The final section, 7.5, provides a summary discussion 
of the findings and concludes the chapter.  
7.1 Profile of Quality Inspectors 
This section provides details on the characteristics of the respondents surveyed. All 
respondents were asked questions about gender, age, educational and professional 
qualifications, job title and experience. Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 present the 
frequency results for these questions. A small majority of the respondents (58%) 
are male. As shown in Table 7.2, 33%, 33% and 25% of respondents are aged 
between 28-37 years, 38-47 years and 48-57 years, respectively, whereas only one 
of the respondents is aged more than 57 years (9%). Most respondents in the 
sample have as their highest education level achieved a first university degree 
(75%) and 25% have a master‘s degree. All the respondents (100%) have a 
professional qualification.  
Table 7.1: Gender of Quality Inspectors 
 
Gender Number 
Male 7 
Female 5 
Total 12 
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Table 7.2: Age of Quality Inspectors 
Age Number 
18 – 27 - 
28 – 37 4 
38 – 47 4 
48 – 57 3 
Above 57 1 
Total 12 
 
Table 7.3: Educational Level and Professional Qualification of Quality 
Inspectors 
Educational Level Number 
Bachelor degree 9 
Master degree 3 
Doctoral degree - 
Others - 
Total 12 
Professional Qualification Number 
ICAEW 12 
ICAS - 
ACCA - 
Others - 
Total 12 
 
As for job title, the largest group of the respondents described themselves as 
members of the inspection team. The rest of the respondents are either leaders 
(25%) or both leader and member (25%) of inspection teams. According to Table 
7.5, 17%, 33% and 17% of the respondents have auditing experience of between 
5-10 years, 11-15 years, and 16-20 years, respectively, whereas 33% have 
auditing experience of more than 20 years. Five of the twelve respondents (42%) 
have more than 5 years experience in audit inspection, while 33% and 25% have 
3-5 years and less than 3 years experience in inspection respectively. In interview, 
one of the interviewees described the knowledge and experience of quality 
inspectors as follows: 
“They (quality inspectors) have all conducted audits of a similar complexity 
to those audit engagements that we are asking them to review...we are 
using good people and experienced people....I would say that our top person 
is the equivalent of the top person auditing Barclays Bank; I am sure from a 
technical point of view” (R1). 
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Table 7.4: Position of Quality Inspectors 
Current position Number 
Leader of inspection team 3 
Member of inspection team 6 
Both leader and member of inspection 
teams 
3 
Total 12 
 
Table 7.5: Working Experience of Quality Inspectors 
Auditing Experience Number 
Less than 5 years - 
5 to 10 years 2 
11 to 15 years 4 
16 to 20 years 2 
More than 20 years 4 
None - 
Total 12 
Experience in the Audit Inspection Number 
Less than 3 years 3 
3 to 5 years 4 
More than 5 years 5 
Total 12 
 
Respondents were asked about the types of audit firm and types of audit 
engagement they had inspected in the previous twelve months. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 
show the frequency for responses to these questions. About 67% of respondents 
claimed that they spent more than fifty percent of their time reviewing the Big Four 
firms in the last year of inspection. As for the proportion of time spent on the type 
of audit engagement, 92% of respondents spent less than fifty percent on FTSE 100 
companies. About equal time was spent by the respondents on other listed 
companies. The respondents spent less than fifty percent of their time on inspecting 
other public interest entities.  
Table 7.6: Proportion of Time in Different Types of Audit Firms  
 
Type of audit firm Number Percentage 
Big four firms: 
More than fifty percent 
Less than fifty percent 
 
8 
4 
 
67% 
33% 
Total 12 100% 
Other firms: 
More than fifty percent 
Less than fifty percent 
 
2 
10 
 
17% 
83% 
Total 12 100% 
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Table 7.7: Proportion of Time in Different Types of Audit Engagement 
  
Type of audit engagement Number Percentage 
FTSE 100 companies: 
More than fifty percent 
Less than fifty percent 
 
1 
11 
 
8% 
92% 
Total 12 100% 
Other listed entities: 
More than fifty percent 
Less than fifty percent 
 
5 
7 
 
42% 
58% 
Total 12 100% 
Other public interest entities: 
More than fifty percent 
Less than fifty percent 
 
- 
12 
 
- 
100% 
Total 12 100% 
 
This section has presented a detailed profile of the personal backgrounds of the 
respondents to the questionnaire. In general, it shows that the respondents are 
generally experienced in the current positions, are educated and have considerable 
knowledge about auditing and experience of a range of inspection assignments both 
leading and participating in those inspections. Overall, it is felt this profile 
represents a representative group from which to gather evidence of audit quality as 
viewed within the inspection system 
7.2 Meanings of Audit Quality in Practice 
In this section, an analysis of the inspectors‘ views on the meaning of audit quality 
is presented. In other words, this section aims to understand attributes that the 
respondents are using in forming their judgements in assessing audit quality in the 
inspection engagements they undertake. Table 7.8 shows the rank (out of 22), 
mean and standard deviation for each attribute listed in the survey instrument. 
Overall, the majority, or fifteen of the attributes are rated above 4, which implies 
the importance of the attributes to reflect audit quality in practice.  
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Table 7.8: Attributes of Audit Quality in Practice 
Id Attribute Rank Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 The auditor demonstrates an appropriate level of 
challenge to the management of the audit client  
1= 4.92 0.39 
2 The auditor does sufficient work to obtain 
sufficient evidence to support an audit opinion 
1= 4.92 0.39 
3 The work done in carrying out the audit is 
subject to review before the audit is completed 
3 4.75 0.96 
4 The auditor reports the correct audit opinion on 
the financial statements 
4= 4.67 1.11 
5 The auditor is technically competent 4= 4.67 1.13 
6 The auditor is independent 4= 4.67 1.13 
7 The audit is carried out in accordance with 
ethical standards 
7 4.58 1.24 
8 The audit work undertaken is based primarily on 
an assessment of the risks associated with the 
client‘s financial statements 
8 4.50 1.28 
9 The audit is carried out in accordance with 
auditing standards 
9= 4.42 1.24 
10 The role of the audit partner is at the centre of 
the audit process 
9= 4.42 1.24 
11 The audit work is determined through an 
appropriate planning process 
11= 4.25 1.41 
12 The auditor maintains effective communication 
and interaction with the audit committee 
11= 4.25 1.11 
13 The audit meets the quality standards applied 
internally by the audit firm 
13= 4.17 0.92 
14 The auditor maintains a high level of 
documentation in the completed audit files 
13= 4.17 1.26 
15 The audit is carried out in accordance with 
quality control standards (ISQC1) 
15 4.08 1.32 
16 The audit is valued by the audit client 16 3.67 1.13 
17 The audit is completed in a timely manner 17 3.58 1.23 
18 The auditor maintains a good relationship with 
the management of the audit client 
18 3.17 1.65 
19 The audit firm is free from negative findings in 
inspection reports 
19 3.08 2.39 
20 The auditor satisfies the audit client‘s 
expectations 
20 3.00 2.56 
21 The auditor provides good value for money to 
the audit client 
21 2.33 1.34 
22 The audit firm provides additional services in 
association with the audit 
22 1.42 1.24 
 
Notes to table: 
 
1. Factors are shown in decreasing order 
2. Response scale is: 1. Little or no importance, 2. Unimportant, 3. Undecided, 
4. Important, 5. Very important 
3. High consensus (standard deviation ≤ 0.85 shown in bold) low consensus 
(standard deviation ≥1.25 shown in italics) 
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There is a strong consensus among the respondents that high audit quality should 
be reflected through adequate challenge to the management (mean 4.92), which is 
connected to sufficient audit work that supports the audit opinion or judgement 
formed by the external auditors (mean 4.92). The respondents also connected 
adequate documentation in the completed audit files to the attributes of audit 
quality (mean 4.17), which was also mentioned as a key feature of by the audit 
partners interviewed in the study. The AIU emphasises the importance of challenge, 
adequate audit work and documentation for the auditors to support auditors‘ 
judgement to form ‗correct audit opinion‘ (mean 4.67) as key attributes of audit 
quality, as stated in its public report: 
“The AIU‟s review of individual audits place emphasis on the appropriateness 
of significant audit judgements exercised in reaching the audit opinion, as 
well as the sufficiency and appropriateness of the evidence obtained. The 
AIU‟s inspections include, but are not restricted to, an assessment of 
compliance with the requirements of relevant standards and other aspects of 
the regulatory framework for auditing” (AIU, 2008, p. 4). 
The survey results show that the respondents see a strong link between audit 
quality and compliance with the ethical standards (mean 4.58), auditing standards 
(mean 4.42) and quality control standards (mean 4.08). The respondents also 
expressed strong support for the influence of internal standards within the audit 
firm and audit quality. For example, they perceived that ‗the work done in carrying 
out the audit is subject to review before the audit is completed‘ (mean 4.75) and 
‗the audit meets the quality standards applied internally by the audit firm‘ (mean 
4.17) as evidence of a high audit quality.  
In like manner, all of the audit partners interviewed in the study associated the 
meaning of audit quality with meeting requirements of standards and guidelines in 
content and conduct of an audit as well as how quality control is applied within firm. 
This is in line with the focus of the assessment carried out by the AIU on firms‘ 
compliance with the regulatory framework for auditing, and application of policies 
and procedures within audit firms to attain a high audit quality. As stated in the AIU 
Public Report (2010, Appendix A): 
“The AIU monitor firms‟ compliance with the regulatory framework for 
auditing, including the Auditing Standards, Ethical Standards and Quality 
Control Standards...The AIU‟s inspections of the major firms comprise a 
review of the firms‟ policies and procedures supporting audit quality...” 
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Frequently, during the interviews, the interviewees argued that although their focus 
in the assessment of audit quality includes auditors‘ compliance with audit 
regulation, their focus of assessment is more to do with the issue of the ‗quality of 
the challenge‘ of the auditors to the management. For example: 
“The auditor has to make judgments and the inspection teams make an 
assessment of whether those judgments were done in an appropriate 
fashion...whether they do sufficient in order to get sufficient reliable 
evidence...whether they robustly challenge the management...our criticism 
on quality will be on that challenge and not on did they actually follow the 
standards” (R1).  
 
“...the fact that we were given a responsibility for monitoring audit quality 
but nobody had told us what audit quality was. Therefore, we had to make 
an interpretation. The reality is that it is not only compliance with the audit 
regulations. To me, if it was merely compliance then all of the criticisms 
towards audit regulators would be valid because it then just becomes a tick 
box approach, but it is not only compliance with the audit regulations, which 
then brings in all the auditing standards and all the ethical standards...the 
auditor has to make judgments and we challenge the judgments...” (R1) 
 
As implied in the above quotation, one of the interviewees argued that some claims 
about compliance or the ‗tick box approach‘ to audit quality in the inspection 
process are unsubstantiated because that is not the only focus of the inspection 
unit. In other words, the interviewees suggest that the auditors‘ work performance 
in accordance with the standards is acceptable but that it is not sufficient in itself 
for audit quality. This may refer to possible inherent limitations of standards to 
equate entirely or codify completely what is necessary to form an opinion on the 
truth and fairness of the financial statements. It is possible that the criteria 
necessary to guarantee that the auditors do enough to form a suitable opinion at an 
appropriate level of assurance on the true and fair view would never be captured 
entirely by the procedures specified in a codified set of standards. 
The questionnaire respondents perceived both the auditor‘s technical competence, 
in terms of a high level of auditing and accounting knowledge, and objectivity as 
important for delivering high audit quality. The analysis in Table 7.8 shows the 
importance of attributes including the auditor‘s competence (mean 4.67) and 
independence (mean 4.67) to audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981b; Knapp, 1991). This 
is also consistent with the views was expressed by the audit partners and AC 
members interviewed in the study on the relative importance of these attributes for 
construction of the meaning of audit quality in practice.  
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The questionnaire evidence also shows the respondents rated ‗the auditor maintains 
effective communication and interaction with the AC‘ (mean 4.25) to be an 
important attribute of audit quality. The AC now has a primary role in 
communication between the company and the auditor and considerable emphasis is 
now placed on such communication (Turley, 2008, p. 218). As stated by the AIU in 
its first public report with regard to the importance of this attribute: 
“The auditors' communications with those responsible for overseeing the 
entity's financial reporting process (normally an Audit Committee reporting 
to the full Board) is a key aspect of the audit process. A quality audit 
involves appropriate and complete reporting by the auditors which enables 
the Audit Committee and Board to properly discharge their responsibilities” 
(AIU, 2004/2005, p. 7). 
The respondents expressed lower levels of agreement (a mean score of less than 4) 
with statements concerning seven possible attributes for audit quality that are 
mainly related to ‗service quality‘ or attributes that relate to aspects of the auditor-
auditee relationship. For example, the quality inspectors rated low ‗the auditor 
provides good value for money to the audit client‘ (mean 2.33) and ‗the audit firm 
provides additional services in association with the audit‘ (mean 1.42). This 
suggests less weight is given by the quality inspectors to the commercial aspects of 
auditing as a reflection of high audit quality. This is in significant contrast with the 
views of audit partners (as discussed in chapter 5) which suggested that their 
conception of audit quality is highly related to the construct of service quality.  
To summarise, the responses of the quality inspectors to the survey questions show 
that they consider the aspect of what might be called ‗the performance of the audit 
process‘ as the key construct of audit quality. The quality inspectors also considered 
compliance and technical attributes rather than service attributes as relevant 
concepts of audit quality in practice.  
7.3 Factors Influencing Audit Quality in Practice 
In this section, an analysis of the respondents‘ views on the influence of 
environmental factors on the development of the concept of audit quality is 
presented. This section also provides analysis of the internal factors within firms 
that the respondents perceived as influencing the quality of a specific audit 
assignment. 
Respondents were asked to answer questions regarding the impact of the business, 
accounting and auditing environment on audit quality. Table 7.9 shows the rank 
(out of 15), mean and standard deviation for each factor listed on the research 
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instrument. It is interesting to note that four of the higher ranked issues are related 
to factors on the business of auditing or the commercial side of auditing. The 
consensus amongst the inspectors is that competition in the audit market has had 
an impact on audit effort regarding: meeting expectations of the audit client (mean 
4.00), delivering value for money (mean 4.00), the auditor-auditee relationship 
(mean 3.83) and providing value added services (3.67). Although these factors are 
not considered by the respondents as key attributes of audit quality as such, that is 
what the auditors should be focusing on to achieve quality (as discussed in section 
7.2), the respondents seem to acknowledge the effect of economic pressures in the 
audit environment for the auditor to give attention to them in practice. In other 
words, the aspects of service quality that the quality inspectors consider are least 
important to the concept of audit quality are also exerting significant influence on 
conception of audit quality in practice. This position is supported by some of the 
respondents who believed that the approach and conduct of the audit in practice 
manifests the commercial aspects of the audit firms (see Table 7.10), as there is a 
greater need for the audit firms to focus on aspects of service quality to their audit 
clients because of intense competition, fee pressure and slow growth in the audit 
environment (Behn et al., 1997; Duff, 2004). One of the interviewees commented:  
“...firms are under increasing fee pressure from their clients who want to 
reduce costs and the recession is effecting the firms...fewer clients, fewer 
transactions and that is potentially an issue” (R2). 
The influence of economic pressures to the conception of audit quality in practice 
was also recognized by the audit partners interviewed in the study. The views 
expressed by both groups denote the way in which commercial pressures influence 
what the auditors do to demonstrate good auditing in practice. In consequence, it 
places pressure on what might be seen as the more public interest oriented role of 
the audit. 
The respondents also rated as high the impact on audit quality of some aspects of 
the regulation of accounting and auditing factors. This emphasis is also supported 
by the fact that when asked about what general factor is most reflected in the 
conduct of audits the item highest ranked by the inspectors was the compliance 
aspects of the audit (see Table 7.10). For example (see table 7.9), it is notable that 
the most highly ranked factor influencing quality is the complexities of accounting 
standards on the technical expertise required of auditors (mean 4.08). The analysis 
also shows the agreement of the respondents concerning the impact of audit 
regulation on auditor independence (mean 4.00), audit documentation (mean 3.75) 
and the audit process (mean 3.75).  
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Table 7.9: Perceptions of the Impact of Business, Accounting and Auditing 
Factors Affecting Audit Quality in Practice 
 
Id Factor Rank Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 Accounting standards requiring more estimation 
and judgements have resulted in greater need for 
technical expertise 
1 4.08 1.48 
2 Competition in the audit market has resulted in a 
greater focus on meeting client‘s expectations 
2= 4.00 1.28 
3 Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on delivering good 
value for money to the audit client 
2= 4.00 0.43 
4 The framework of audit regulation has led to 
greater attention to factors related to the auditor‘s 
independence from the audit client 
4 3.92 1.66 
5 Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on the auditor‘s 
relationship with the audit client‘s management 
5 3.83 0.92 
6 Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater attention being given to delivering value 
added services to the audit client 
6= 3.75 1.11 
7 Changes in the framework of audit regulation 
have led to increased emphasis on maintaining 
adequate audit documentation 
6= 3.75 1.42 
8 Factors in the auditing environment have resulted 
in greater reliance on consultation within the firm 
as part of the audit process 
6= 3.75 1.57 
9 The current business environment has resulted in 
greater reliance on risk based audit approaches 
9 3.67 1.14 
10 Changes in the framework of audit regulation 
have created a greater need for the auditor to 
demonstrate a challenge to client management 
10 3.33 2.07 
11 The current business environment has resulted in 
greater attention to audit planning 
11 3.00 1.48 
12 Factors in the auditing environment have resulted 
in extensive internal review of the audit 
engagements 
12 2.92 2.33 
13 The auditing standards are used by audit 
practitioners to justify doing less detailed audit 
work 
13 2.83 1.83 
14 The framework of audit regulation has led to 
increased focus on conducting an audit beyond 
the minimum requirements of auditing standards 
14 2.75 1.57 
15 The framework of audit regulation has resulted in 
less reliance on the auditor‘s professional 
judgement 
15 2.17 1.48 
 
Notes to table: 
 
1. Factors are shown in decreasing order 
2. Response scale is: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neutral, 4. Agree, 5. 
Strongly agree 
3. High consensus (standard deviation ≤ 0.85 shown in bold) low consensus 
(standard deviation ≥1.25 shown in italics) 
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This view about the important influence of compliance aspects to the concept of 
audit quality applied in practice was also evident in the interviews with the audit 
partners in this study. For example, as reported in Chapter 5, the interview 
evidence pointed to the importance of the quality of documentation, internal quality 
control applied within the firm to satisfy inspection and the assessment of audit 
quality carried out by the AIU.  
Table 7.10: Rank Items Influence on the Conduct of Audits in 
Practice 
 
Item Rank of 
order 
Number 
(n=12) 
Percentage 
The approach to the conduct of audits in 
practice reflects the compliance obligations 
placed on the public accounting firm 
1 5 42% 
The approach to the conduct of audits in 
practice reflects the commercial values of the 
public accounting firm 
2 4 33% 
The approach to the conduct of audits in 
practice reflects the professional values of the 
public accounting firm 
3 3 25% 
In the discussions with inspectors about potential influence of the AIU on audit 
quality, the interviewees indicated that they see some positive impact from 
independent inspection on the quality of audit performance or on important 
attributes that they believe represent audit quality: challenge, evidence and 
documentation. This perception is illustrated by the following comments:  
“What we do see is that when we go back and review an audit that we had 
previously reviewed the firm has addressed the points and it does not matter 
how challenging they were of the findings they do actually implement the 
recommendations we make...the firms are doing a better job and they are 
documenting their rationale or they are putting together their evidence in a 
better way and then they are more challenging and thinking historically. 
Therefore, I am pretty certain that we are doing better audits than we did 5 
years ago” (R1). 
 
“We get feedback from people who say that inspection has made a difference 
to the way the audit firms‟ work. I have had that feedback quite frequently 
that is rather sort of second hand or third hand from ex-partners of large 
audit firms or people working in companies. There is an example of where the 
auditors have been more robust because the auditors have used us as an 
excuse for not agreeing to things they did not want to agree with in the first 
place. For example, “we could not possibly agree to this, you must realise 
that nowadays our files are crawled over by the AIU and this is not an 
accounting treatment that I could countenance going along with” (R2).  
The AIU has also acknowledged in its public report the impact of inspections on 
actions taken by the audit firms: ‗firms respond in a positive manner to its 
inspection findings by altering their policies and procedures supporting audit quality 
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or providing training to staff‘ (AIU, 2009, p. 10). This shows some evidence of a 
positive impact by the AIU with regards to behavioural changes that it wishes to 
promote. Nonetheless, concerns have also been raised over the high level of 
recurring issues found in inspections (ibid). This issue is demonstrated by the lower 
level of support the respondents offered for the suggestion that audit regulation has 
led to an emphasis on going beyond the minimum requirements of standards or 
(mean 2.75) that environmental factors have led to extensive internal review 
(mean 2.92). The behavioural changes may be attributed to a reaction to the threat 
of the inspection rather than the actuality in practice. The interviewees explained 
some possible reasons for that: 
“I want to do things to make sure I do not get a bad report from inspection”. 
Auditors are probably doing it for a number of different reasons, the outcome 
of our inspection of their particular engagement does have an impact on their 
remuneration therefore “I am going to do that to make sure I do not get 
criticised”. Equally, if they are criticised to a certain degree, particularly now 
the letters go to the audit committee chair on our findings on individual 
engagement. “I might lose the job if the inspectors actually criticise me for 
something” (R1). 
 
“...audit firms tell us we are making a difference, well they might say that 
anyway because they fear that maybe something worse is coming along” 
(R2).  
From the analysis of the survey questionnaires, the respondents do not indicate 
that they see evidence of potential negative impacts from regulation on the 
development and approach of firms and auditors to audit quality. For example, the 
respondents tended to disagree (rating below 3) with the statements that: ‗the 
auditing standards are used by audit practitioners to justify doing less detailed 
audit work‘ (mean 2.83) and ‗the framework of audit regulation has resulted in less 
reliance on the auditor‘s professional judgement‘ (mean 2.17). This is in notable 
contrast with the audit partners interviewed in this study, who often drew attention 
to potential negative impacts of regulation on the quality of audit performance. For 
example, the audit partners frequently mentioned concerns with regard to changes 
in the nature of audit practice to a compliance or ‗tick box‘ audit approach that 
undermines their professional judgement.  
Overall, there is general agreement among the quality inspectors that the 
regulatory factors (both accounting and auditing) and the business aspects of 
auditing have an influence on the development and approach of firms and auditors 
with respect to audit quality. In particular, the impact of the economic factors, that 
is competition in the audit market, on the concept of audit quality in practice 
appears to be particularly strong.  
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Respondents were asked to answer some questions regarding their perceptions 
concerning how a large number of more specific behavioural, technical or relational 
steps affect the ‗actual‘ audit quality that is achieved on individual audit 
engagements in practice. The results are summarised in Table 7.11.  
Table 7.11: Internal Factors Affecting Audit Quality in Practice 
Id Factor Rank Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 The degree of involvement of the audit 
engagement partner during audit planning 
influences the quality of the resulting audit 
process 
1= 4.42 1.30 
2 Technical and other consultations within the audit 
firm enhance the quality of judgements made 
during the completion of the audit 
1= 4.42 1.30 
3 Technical and other consultations within the firm 
during planning influence the quality of the 
resulting audit process 
3= 4.25 1.11 
4 Training within the audit firm enhances auditors‘ 
technical expertise 
3= 4.25 0.96 
5 Internal reviews within the audit firm enhance 
compliance with the technical requirements of 
auditing standards 
5= 4.17 1.26 
6 Effective communication from the auditor to client 
management influences the quality of the 
resulting audit process 
5= 4.17 0.71 
7 Interaction between the auditor and client 
management influences the quality of the 
resulting audit process 
5= 4.17 0.71 
8 Training within the audit firm enhances the 
delivery of an effective and efficient audit 
5= 4.17 0.92 
9 Audit software facilitates compliance with the 
technical requirements of auditing standards 
9= 4.00 0.43 
10 Risk based audit approaches facilitate the 
achievement of an effective and efficient audit 
9= 4.00 0.43 
11 Audit software promotes compliance with 
documentation requirements 
11= 3.92 0.71 
12 Internal reviews within the audit firm improve 
compliance with documentation requirements 
11= 3.92 0.68 
13 Audit software facilitates the achievement of an 
effective and efficient audit 
13= 3.83 0.84 
14 Internal reviews within the audit firm enhance the 
quality of audit judgements made during the audit 
13= 3.83 0.92 
15 Internal reviews within the audit firm ensure the 
delivery of an effective and efficient audit 
15 3.75 1.23 
16 Training within the audit firm improves auditors‘ 
ability to challenge the management of audit 
clients 
16 3.58 1.24 
17 Internal reviews within the audit firm enhance 
auditor‘s technical expertise 
17= 3.50 1.75 
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Table 7.11: Internal Factors Affecting Audit Quality in Practice (continued) 
Id Factor Rank Mean Standard 
deviation 
18 Audit firm methodologies and manuals improve 
the quality of audit judgement applied during the 
audit 
17= 3.50 1.28 
19 Interaction between the auditor and the audit 
committee is influential in determining the content 
of audit work undertaken 
19 3.42 1.41 
20 Risk based audit approaches help the auditor to 
provide value for money to the client 
20 3.25 1.41 
21 Audit firm methodologies and manuals enhance 
the auditor‘s ability to challenge client 
management 
21 3.08 1.32 
22 Internal reviews within the audit firm ensure the 
auditor‘s independence from the audit client 
22 3.00 1.71 
23 Risk based audit approaches help the auditor to 
provide value added services to the audit client 
23 2.92 1.48 
24 Performance appraisal systems within audit firms 
increase compliance with the technical 
requirements of auditing standards 
24= 2.83 1.65 
25 Performance appraisal systems within audit firms 
improve compliance with documentation 
requirements 
24= 2.83 1.82 
26 Interaction between the auditor and the audit 
committee facilitates the correct audit opinion 
being reported 
24= 2.83 1.43 
27 Performance appraisal systems within the audit 
firm enhance the auditor‘s technical expertise 
27 2.67 1.34 
28 Performance appraisal systems within the audit 
firm improve the auditor‘s independence 
28 2.58 1.41 
 
Notes to table: 
 
1. Factors are shown in decreasing order 
2. Response scale is: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neutral, 4. Agree, 5. 
Strongly agree 
3. High consensus (standard deviation ≤ 0.85 shown in bold) low consensus 
(standard deviation ≥1.25 shown in italics) 
The questions that are the basis for Table 7.11 were intended to provide an 
understanding of quality inspectors‘ view about what differences they see in the 
specific practices and behaviours adopted between the audits they inspect that they 
perceive have an influence on the relative quality of those audits. Some of the 
items refer to things that may vary from audit to audit, even with the same audit 
firm or team, such as the degree of involvement of the audit partner, and others to 
things that may vary between firms, such as the nature of appraisal systems.  
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Overall, 18 of the 28 statements in the questionnaire were supported by the overall 
responses (mean score above 3.5) and suggesting that these factors were 
perceived by the respondents as having at least an effect on audit quality. The 
respondents perceived the role of the audit partner in the audit planning as having 
an important influence on the audit process (mean 4.42). The involvement of 
relevant staff within the firm through consultation etc. was also identified as 
influencing on the quality of audit judgements (mean 4.42) and, subsequently, the 
resulting audit process (mean 4.25). The respondents also strongly agreed with the 
influence of training, as they perceived the positive impact of training on the 
technical competency of the external auditors (mean 4.25) and the delivery of an 
effective and efficient audit (mean 4.17). This finding is echoed in the following 
comment by one of the interviewees:  
“The people aspect is a significant concern, so there is quite a focus looking at 
the human resource systems and performance appraisals...the overall firm‟s 
approach to training and whether the firm is in compliance with continuing 
professional development...” (R1).  
The factor related to internal audit firm monitoring and micro-quality control, that is 
the firm‘s quality review system, is also perceived as being influential in the 
conduct of an audit: for instance the statement that ‗internal reviews within the 
audit firm enhance compliance with the technical requirements of auditing 
standards‘ was given considerable support by the respondents (mean 4.17). These 
factors (of planning, consultation, training and quality control) that have been 
highlighted above were also referred to as an important representations of audit 
quality by the audit partners interviewed in this study (see section 5.3).  
Audit firm monitoring and micro-quality control are also perceived as influential 
concerning various aspects of the audit performance by the respondents. For 
example, the respondents perceived that internal reviews improve compliance with 
the documentation standards (mean 3.92), enhance the quality of audit 
judgements (mean 3.83), ensure delivery effectiveness and an efficient audit 
(mean 3.75), and enhance the auditor‘s technical expertise (mean 3.50). 
Nonetheless, interview evidence highlights some concern about the effectiveness of 
the firms‘ quality reviews on achievement of high audit quality, as pointed out by 
one of the interviewees:  
“As regards to sort of comparisons of the way we are looking at quality and 
the way the firms are looking at quality. What the firms have generally done 
is they have designed audit systems to be compliant with auditing standards 
and then in doing their own annual quality review. What they have done is 
just said “has the firm‟s system been complied with” because if the firm‟s 
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system has been complied with de facto this audit must comply with 
auditing standards because our system complies with auditing standards. So 
the amount of time they spend on doing a file review is very limited and is 
focused on whether all the requirements have been met and have things 
been completed in accordance with our system and does not drive down into 
did the work that the staff actually do meet the objectives of the particular 
audit test?...there is an issue as to whether the firm‟s own quality reviews 
are sufficiently rigorous” (R2).  
The respondents also recognised the impact of effective communication and 
interaction (both mean 4.17) between the external auditors and the client 
management on the quality of the resulting audit process. Consistent with other 
perception studies (Schroeder et al., 1986; Chen et al., 2001), this finding 
highlights the important role of the audit client in facilitating the achievement of an 
audit. Interestingly, although the respondents perceived effective communication 
and interaction between auditors and the AC as one of the key attributes of audit 
quality (as mentioned in section 7.2), the analysis of the responses shows low 
evidence of the actuality concerning the role of the AC in the achievement of audit 
quality in practice. For example, the respondents gave relatively limited support for 
the statements that ‗interaction between the auditor and the audit committee is 
influential in determining the content of audit work undertaken‘ (mean 3.42) and 
‗interaction between the auditor and the audit committee facilitates the correct 
audit opinion being reported‘ (mean 2.83). These views suggest only a slight effect 
of the role of the AC on the actual conduct of the audit whereas consistently a 
range of issues related to reporting and communication with AC are highlighted in 
the inspection reports (AIU, 2008; 2009; 2010). Overall, the findings suggest a 
minimal impact of the AC on the audit process, which is in line with the finding of 
Cohen et al. (2002) and Turley and Zaman (2007) who suggested that the AC has a 
weak influence on the audit process. In like manner, some of the audit partners 
interviewed in this study expressed views regarding the minimal impact of the AC 
on the content and conduct of the audit and achievement of high audit quality in 
practice. The analysis of the interview evidence collected from AC members, which 
was discussed in Chapter 6, also suggests limited effects of the AC on the external 
audit function. 
Although one of the aims of the AIU is to promote behavioural change amongst 
auditors in relation to audit quality through the performance systems of the audit 
firm, as illustrated by the interview quotations below, the respondents did not 
express support for statements regarding the influence of performance appraisal 
systems in various aspects of the conduct of the audit. For example, low mean 
scores were shown for the impact of performance appraisal systems on: compliance 
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with the technical requirements of auditing standards (mean 2.83), documentation 
requirements (mean 2.83), auditor‘s technical expertise (2.67) and auditors‘ 
independence (2.58).  
“If you look at how the key performance indicators or typical audit partner‟s 
objectives that audit firms establish and this is an area which I am very 
keen on that we go further on. There will be and partly as a result of the 
work of the audit inspection unit and the firms are getting better at this. 
There will be some attempt to assessing an audit partner based on quality 
and these things have evolved from, in my day which I was conducting 
audits” (R1). 
 
“We expect to see links between that annual quality review process and 
performance appraisals and we expect to see a link between performance 
appraisals and remuneration and these links are becoming more specific and 
clearer. We expect to see the results of our work reflected in performance 
appraisals and the results of the firm‟s quality audit review reflected in 
performance appraisals certainly” (R2). 
Overall, the top five factors that influence the performance of the audit engagement 
and potentially cause a variation of audit quality between audits, as rated by the 
inspector respondents, are related to audit partner involvement, consultations 
within the firm, training, internal reviews, and interaction and communication 
between the external auditors and the client management.  
7.4 The Level of Audit Quality Attained in Practice 
Having discussed the desired attributes of audit quality perceived by the 
respondents (section 7.2), and potential environmental and internal factors that 
influence the achievement of audit quality in practice (section 7.3), this section 
attempts to provide an analysis of respondents‘ views about the current level of 
audit quality in practice. The analysis aims to identify the existence of problems 
with audit quality in practice.  
In general, the majority (83%) of the respondents agreed that the current level of 
quality of audits in the UK is high indicating a high level of optimism regarding audit 
quality in practice (see Table 7.12). Most of the inspectors (67%) agreed with the 
statement that the quality of the audits has increased in the last decade, while 25% 
of the respondents expressed a neutral view about the issue and only one (8%) 
disagreed with the statement. Similarly, only 17% of the respondents agreed with 
the statement that the quality of the audits in the UK has decreased in the last 
decade, 58% of disagreed with the statement and 25% were undecided about the 
issue. In general, the respondents perceived that the level of audit quality in 
practice is appropriate, as the AIU put it, ‗the AIU considers the overall quality of 
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major public company audit work to be fundamentally sound‘ (AIU, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the AIU also highlights that a high number of audits require 
significant improvements based on their assessment in the recent public inspection 
report (AIU, 2010, p. 3).  
Table 7.12: General Views about Audit Quality in Practice 
Id Issue Quality Inspectors 
(n=12) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 In general, the quality of 
auditing in the UK is high 
 
- 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
10 
 
 
- 
 
3.75 
 
0.947 
2 The quality of auditing in the 
UK has increased during the 
last decade 
 
- 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
 
8 
 
 
- 
 
3.28 
 
1.231 
3 The quality of auditing in the 
UK has decreased during the 
last decade 
 
- 
 
7 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
- 
 
2.58 
 
1.545 
4 There is a high level of 
consistency between audits in 
the quality of auditing 
achieved in practice 
 
2 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
1 
 
 
- 
 
2.42 
 
1.408 
5 There is considerable 
variation between audits in 
the quality of auditing 
achieved in practice  
 
- 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
3.83 
 
1.085 
6 In general market 
participants perceive the 
standard of audit quality to be 
adequate 
 
- 
 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
6 
 
 
- 
 
3.17 
 
2.065 
7 General concerns about audit 
quality in recent years are 
based on a proper 
understanding of the conduct 
of audits in practice 
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
- 
 
2.00 
 
1.128 
 
Notes to table: 
1. Response scale is: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neutral or no view, 
4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree 
2. High consensus (standard deviation ≤ 0.85 shown in bold) low consensus 
(standard deviation ≥1.25 shown in italics) 
Perhaps of more significance is the fact that half of the respondents perceived that 
there is inconsistency between audits in the quality of auditing achieved. The 
majority of the respondents agreed (either agree or strongly agree) that there is 
considerable variation between audits in terms of the level audit quality attained in 
practice. This suggests a potential variation in audit quality in different audit 
engagements and audit firms inspected by the AIU.  
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The inconsistencies and variation could possibly be caused by audit partners‘ 
involvement in planning, technical and other consultations within the firm, training, 
internal quality reviews and other internal factors within the audit firm (as 
discussed in section 7.3, that is, all the factors commented on in previous section 
about causes of variation in quality of individual audit engagement). Different audit 
firms might have different resources in terms of people, policies and procedures, 
internal processes and systems that may influence the production of the audit and 
its quality. The variation may also be due to the inconsistency between the policies 
and procedures that are established within the firm and its application on the actual 
conduct of auditors, which may contribute to a deficiency in audit quality, as 
pointed out by the AIU: 
“...major firms have policies and procedures in place to support audit quality 
that are generally appropriate...nevertheless, improvements to these 
policies and procedures have been recommended at all firms...the number of 
audits assessed requiring significant improvement at major firms (eight 
audits or 11% of audits reviewed at major firms excluding follow-up 
reviews) is too high. Firms are therefore not always consistently applying 
their policies and procedures on all aspects of individual audits” (AIU Annual 
Report, 2009/2010, p.3). 
Only half of the respondents believed that the participants in the audit market 
perceived the standard of audit quality to be sufficient. Therefore, the current 
perceptions about auditing legitimise the role of an independent oversight body to 
restore trust and confidence of the users of audit services, in particular 
shareholders and other stakeholders, concerning audit quality. However, the 
majority of the respondents also believed that the concerns about audit quality in 
recent years are not based on a proper understanding of the conduct of audits in 
practice. One of the potential reasons for such a situation is because of the lack of 
users‘ understanding of the audit function which can lead to unreasonable 
expectations of audit services (Humphrey, 1991). This issue possibly indicates a 
lack of understanding about how audit quality is achieved in practice, thus, 
highlighting the unclear connection between the auditors‘ performance of work 
tasks in practice and the notion of audit quality. 
The questionnaire responses provide some evidence about certain issues that the 
respondents have experienced during the process of inspections (Table 7.13). There 
is strong agreement among the respondents concerning the lack of challenge posed 
by the external auditors to their audit client. Ten out of twelve respondents stated 
that the issue frequently or always appeared during the inspection process. The 
respondents rated the quality of audit documentation the most common issue with 
all of the respondents indicating that the adequacy of documentation either 
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frequently or always occurs during the inspection process. This view from the 
inspectors is interesting to set alongside the comments of the audit partners 
regarding the role of, and possible focus on, documentation in the inspection 
process (see Chapter 5). 
Table 7.13: Issues Arising in the Process of Inspection 
 
Id Issue Quality Inspectors 
(n=12) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning the adequacy of 
audit documentation? 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
4.50 
 
1.28 
2 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning compliance with 
auditing standards? 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
6 
 
 
3 
 
3.92 
 
1.27 
3 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning the adequacy of 
the auditor's 'challenge' to 
management? 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
1 3.83 0.84 
4 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning the sufficiency of 
audit work? 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
8 
 
 
1 
 
3.75 
 
0.99 
5 How often in the process of 
inspection are issues that 
arise resolved by discussion 
with the audit team 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
7 
 
 
1 3.58 1.41 
6 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning compliance with 
ethical standards? 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
4 
 
 
7 
 
 
- 
 
3.50 
 
1.30 
7 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning compliance with 
international accounting 
standards (IAS)? 
 
 
- 
 
 
2 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
1 3.42 1.41 
8 How often in the process of 
inspection do issues arise 
concerning the 
appropriateness of the audit 
opinion? 
 
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 1.92 1.07 
 
Notes to table: 
 
1. Response scale is: 1. Never, 2. Occasionally, 3. Seldom, 4. Frequently, 5. 
Always 
2. High consensus (standard deviation ≤ 0.85 shown in bold) low consensus 
(standard deviation ≥1.25 shown in italics) 
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The majority of the respondents stated that issues regarding the sufficiency of the 
audit work arise frequently or always in inspections. Another significant area of 
potential disagreement between the inspectors and the auditors concerns 
compliance with auditing standards. Fifty percent of the respondents stated issues 
of compliance frequently or always occur in the inspection process.  
Despite this evidence of areas where audit inspections regularly lead to potential 
doubts about aspects of audit quality, a large majority of the respondents indicated 
that issues concerning the audit opinion arise never or only rarely in inspections. 
This tends to suggest that the principal questions arise concerning aspects of the 
process by which the audit is conducted and recorded rather than the 
appropriateness of the final product in the form of the audit opinion issued.  
The above analysis provides evidence of the areas of problem that arise in the 
process of inspection. There are potential quality conflicts or disagreements 
between the inspectors and the external auditors a variety of attributes of audit 
quality. This may indicate some problems in the quality of audit performance in 
practice. As stated in the recent inspection report published by the AIU (2010, p. 
15) a significant improvement was required in some of the audits that they had 
reviewed. Some of the reasons identified by the AIU in the report were related to 
lack of evidence to support auditors‘ key audit judgements and some of audit 
reports reviewed were signed before all the required work had been done. The 
evidence from the survey supports such concerns of the regulator regarding certain 
behaviours of auditors that could compromise audit quality. 
The comments below, taken from the interviews with inspectors, provide some 
practical evidence of the above concerns in the AIU assessment process. One 
potential observation is that the regulator believes that a lack of challenge by the 
auditors, evidenced in, for example, acceptance of a weak explanation from the 
audit client, reducing the amount of work performed below what would be 
considered reasonable and reducing the amount of documentation (which have 
been identified as ‗quality threatening behaviour‘ in the literature, as discussed in 
section 2.1.2) may potentially undermine audit quality. Surprisingly, one of the 
interviewees mentioned the regularity of such incidents found in the inspection 
process, which may suggest regular evidence of such behaviours in practice. 
“Audit judgments are challenged and in that process we will raise queries for 
the auditors to answer. It might be something as basic as we could not find 
the bank confirmation letters or it could be something like the auditing 
standards require an assessment of risk but the auditors did not test the 
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design and implementation of the controls over those significant risks. That 
is again very common” (R2). 
“I had another example yesterday relating to a goodwill impairment 
calculation for an organisation involved in property...we said “on what basis 
did you accept the client‟s assertion that property transactions were going to 
double in 2009 and then double again in 2010?” The initial answer you get 
“there is no third party evidence that was the director‟s view”...effectively 
they should be doing more audit work to support decisions made in the 
accounts. So all I am trying to say is that actually we can challenge the 
judgments but it is not an easy task” (R1).  
This quotation below further implies some difficulty on the part of the AIU in 
promoting the behaviour they see as consistent with high quality (such as providing 
a robust challenge to the management and undertaking sufficient audit work) 
because it will always be contested by the audit firm. One of the interviewees gave 
practical evidence on the above issue, as follows: 
“We often see very inconsistent conclusions being drawn by different people 
or by different firms and indeed different teams within the same firm. The 
number of shops that are visited in stock counts will differ markedly between 
one team and another. Now it will be very difficult for us to say “well one is 
right and one is wrong” especially as within that firm those responsible for 
the methodology and technical advisory and professional practice would 
argue that, would and more or less have to argue that both are right so we 
cannot say that one. It would be difficult for us to say one is right and one is 
wrong. So we challenge judgments made by the audit team, frequently 
those judgments are around the acceptability or lack of challenge relating to 
auditing and accounting issues and we aim to do that on all audits (R2). 
 
In summary, the analysis suggests some evidence of disagreement between the 
regulator and the external auditors in what is regarded as an indication of audit 
quality in auditors‘ work performance. In addition, the analysis provides some 
interesting evidence about areas where problems arise. Thus, suggesting some 
potential problems in the achievement of high audit quality in practice.  
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Semi-structured interviews and a survey questionnaire were employed to elicit 
evidence from inspectors who are part of the AIU within the FRC about what they 
consider important in evaluating audit quality and what level of quality is achieved 
in practice. This group is responsible for monitoring and ensuring the quality of the 
auditing services. They are therefore in a good position to provide information on 
the standing of audit quality and possible factors that influence the attainment and 
operationalisation of audit quality in practice. Although the strength of conclusions 
that can be drawn from the survey is limited by the small size of the group 
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surveyed and the number of interviews conducted, the study nevertheless provides 
some interesting evidence about the topic under research from an important group 
that has not previously been incorporated in research.  
The responses obtained from audit inspectors provide, first, evidence of the 
existence of possible problems in the audit quality that is delivered in practice. The 
issues that create problems are the quality of the ‗challenge‘ to management, 
evidence and documentation. These are areas that lead to debate between the 
quality inspectors and the auditors in the process of inspection. Potentially this 
highlights the continuing difficulties faced by the regulator in changing certain 
aspects of behaviour of the auditors and the content of audit work.  
Second, the evidence suggests that the quality inspectors conception of the 
meaning of audit quality is mainly related to aspects of audit performance related 
to judgements and the conduct of audit work. Elements such as the adequacy of 
challenge by the external auditors to the management, the sufficiency of audit 
evidence that should be documented in the audit working papers and the concern 
about the impact of accounting standards which require greater judgement 
illustrate the importance of this aspect of the discourse of audit quality for the 
inspectors.  
Finally, the findings from the quality inspectors confirm that the concept of and 
approach to audit quality in practice are influenced by economic and regulatory 
factors in the auditing environment. They acknowledged that there is variation and 
inconsistency in the quality of individual audits that they inspected and that this is 
also potentially influenced by various factors that are internal to the firm and the 
audit process such as audit partner involvement and the firms‘ monitoring controls 
(through consultations, training and internal review).  
In conclusion, this chapter shows that: (i) inspectors‘ perceptions and assessment 
of the quality of auditors‘ work is substantially influenced by the process aspects of 
the audit, (ii) concepts of and approaches to audit quality in practice are influenced 
by firms‘ commercial interests and compliance obligations, (iii) the level quality 
attained on specific engagements is influenced by various internal factors such as 
the role of the audit partner, consultation and training, and (iv) there are a number 
of potential problems of audit quality in practice observed by inspectors and there 
will be continuing difficulties for the regulator to improve audit quality because their 
work is likely to be contested by the external auditors. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises and reviews the empirical evidence presented, makes 
comments concerning possible public policy implications arising from the study and 
makes suggestions for future research. The main body of the research that 
comprises this thesis is contained in the four previous chapters. In chapter 4, 
various issues relating to audit quality from comments submitted in response to the 
FRC discussion paper ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ were identified in order to draw out 
areas for further investigation in the subsequent elements of this study which were 
reported in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In these chapters perceptions of auditors, AC 
members and quality inspectors concerning audit quality in practice were explored.  
This thesis extends previous studies on audit quality by broadening the theoretical 
and empirical approaches to understanding the meaning of audit quality. Rather 
than looking at indirect signals of the level of quality achieved, the research has 
focused on the meaning contained in how audit partners, AC members and quality 
inspectors talk about the concept of audit quality, that is, how these people 
internalise and make sense of the term ‗audit quality‘. This thesis has sought to add 
to understanding concerning what factors influence the practical construction of the 
term audit quality and how the concept affects the content and conduct of auditors‘ 
approach to audit engagements, and AC members‘ and quality inspectors‘ 
evaluation of audit quality on those engagements.  
A review of the literature argued that most of the earlier research on this subject 
has employed a functionalist approach in investigating the topic of audit quality, 
which emphasises variables and hypotheses derived from agency theory to predict 
association between possible input and output signals that could be indicative of 
variations on audit quality and show possible cause and effect. Despite the 
important contribution of such research to the body of knowledge on audit quality, 
it provides limited information about what the term means to different actors (such 
as auditors, AC members and quality inspectors) and how organisational and social 
factors that exist in the auditing environment may shape and influence their 
understanding and operationalisation of the term ‗audit quality‘, and therefore 
those actors‘ actions. Since the basic contention of the thesis is that perceptions 
about audit quality in practice are shaped by various interrelated factors in the 
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audit environment, a theoretical and methodological framework that is capable of 
providing a richer and more meaningful way of exploring the concept‘s meaning 
and identifying the factors influencing that meaning is needed. Therefore, a 
qualitative approach has been considered suitable in order to provide insights into 
factors that may shape the meanings and perceptions. A theoretical framework and 
a methodology capable of addressing the complex nature of the interactions of 
various factors that have shaped and influenced the meaning and perceptions of 
audit quality are necessary. For this reason, symbolic interactionism was chosen as 
a theoretical or analytical perspective and document content analysis, face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews and a survey questionnaire were employed to address 
the research subject for the thesis.  
This chapter has three main sections. Section 8.1 provides a review of the findings 
of the study. The contributions to research and implications for public policy of this 
study are highlighted in section 8.2. Finally, section 8.3 outlines the limitations and 
suggestions for future research.  
8.1 Review of Significant Findings 
This section offers some reflections on the results of this study regarding 
understanding of the meaning of concept of audit quality by key participants in the 
audit process, the influence of various internal and external factors in the auditing 
setting on the meaning and representations of that meaning in practice. This 
section attempts to emphasise that the meaning of audit quality is context 
dependent and must be understood within its social, organisational and institutional 
context.  
In chapter 4, the comments of the 39 respondents to the discussion paper 
‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ made by the FRC were analysed in order to gain an 
understanding of the issues surrounding audit quality as perceived by parties 
sufficiently interested to submit comments. As illustrated in this study, the concept 
of audit quality develops dynamically and is influenced by many factors which are 
prevalent in the auditing setting. The process and impact of regulatory 
development may be significant, as are the economic environment and the 
influence of interactions between different parties (such as audit committee, 
regulator and audit client) with particular roles in the auditing system.  
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In chapter 5, 6 and 7 findings on perceptions of audit partners, AC members and 
quality inspectors concerning the meaning of audit quality in practice were outlined 
respectively. One general conclusion from this work is that the three groups have 
subtly different ways of constructing their perceptions of audit quality in practice. 
The first group of individual audit partners consider audit quality as resulting from 
the combined effects of parameters tied to client service, regulatory compliance, 
the technical process or methodological content of the audit, and individual 
auditors‘ characteristics. The factors tied to client service are considered to be more 
critical than other factors. These factors include meeting client‘s expectations and 
providing value added and value for money audit services. This aspect of audit 
quality was also recognised by the AC members who did refer to value added 
services to quality of communication and the relationship with the external auditor 
reflecting their interest in service quality. In contrast, although the quality 
inspectors acknowledged the influence of commercial aspects on the meaning of 
audit quality in practice, they did not consider aspects of service quality to be 
important and relevant evidence of audit quality.  
For the audit partners, among the factors tied to compliance and regulatory factors 
that were perceived as influential to the notion of audit quality are the quality of 
documentation of the audit process and the quality control applied within the audit 
firm. This aspect of quality overlaps with the views of the third group (quality 
inspectors). An additional conclusion from the study is that it makes clear the 
influence of regulatory factors on the audit partners‘ conception of audit quality. 
Finally, the audit partners also give high importance to factors tied to the individual 
auditor‘s attributes, such as professional judgement, independence and competence 
to the construction of audit quality. This aspect of audit quality was also recognised 
by the other groups. This implies the importance of auditors‘ professionalism to the 
meaning of audit quality in practice, which does have some connection to 
independence as one of the two attributes (together with technical competence) 
reflected in the explanation of audit quality most commonly cited in the research 
literature (DeAngelo, 1981a). Overall, audit partners have been shown to build 
conceptions of audit quality beyond the ‗technical‘ or core aspects of the auditing 
profession to accommodate a large range of attributes such as the relationship with 
audit client, applied methodology, work processes and documentation. These 
factors are taken into consideration by partners in making their quality judgements. 
Most notably the partners‘ understanding appears to place the audit client at the 
core of audit quality, which provides an interesting complement to other research 
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which has shown that finance directors rate aspects of service quality higher than 
the technical quality of auditors (Duff, 2004).  
The second group represented by the AC members reveal quite a different view of 
audit quality from the other two groups of the study. An important first conclusion 
from this part of the research is that for AC members the notion of audit quality is 
mainly tied to the ‗relational‘ rather than the technical attributes of individual 
auditors. In this case, professional appearance, which is a function of the 
interpersonal and behavioural skills of individual auditors during their interaction 
and communication with the AC, seems to play an important role in constructing 
the meaning of audit quality for the AC members. However, this group did also 
consider factors related to the attributes of individual auditors (such as 
competence, knowledge and independence) as important to the notion of quality, 
similar to the perceptions of the other two groups. In contrast, to the opinions 
expressed other two groups, audit firm attributes (size and industry specialisation) 
are also considered by AC members in forming their understanding and perceptions 
of audit quality. The study has showed that the AC members very much rely on 
such features in their conception of audit quality, partly due to their limited access 
to evaluate the detailed conduct of the actual audit engagement.  
Finally, a significant finding from the work with AC members was that the quality of 
the financial statements dominated the AC members‘ perceptions of audit quality 
rather than a technical interpretation of the quality of the audit process itself. This 
perhaps reflects the unobservable nature of audit quality and the AC‘s focus on the 
output of the financial reporting process. It was apparent during the interviews that 
the majority of the AC members strongly associated audit quality with the reported 
numbers on completion of the audit or the resulting outputs. This emphasis reflects 
how the AC members strongly associated audit quality with the end product of the 
financial statements. This is in notable contrast to the position with audit partners, 
who emphasised compliance with the auditing standards in the conduct of the audit 
but rarely referred to the quality of information in the final audited financial 
statements as a signal of audit quality. In contrast, the audit partners placed 
emphasis on compliance with the auditing standards in the process of an audit 
rather than the financial statement output for their meaning of audit quality. In 
general, AC members appear to derive confidence regarding audit quality through 
factors mainly relating to ‗interpersonal‘ aspects of the audit related to behavioural, 
presentation and interpersonal skills of external auditors than on the audit work 
itself.  
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The third group included in his study, quality inspectors who are the members of 
the AIU, exhibit quite a different view of audit quality to the other two groups. 
Notably, this group attached more importance to the conduct or content of an audit 
as key to the concept of audit quality. For this reason, the level of challenge to the 
management of the audit, the sufficiency of evidence and documentation are 
important to inspectors in constructing their perceptions of audit quality. Similar to 
the audit partners, this group also gives high importance to factors tied to quality 
control applied within the audit firm and various ‗compliance‘ attributes of the 
notion of audit quality. The quality inspectors‘ view also overlapped with those of 
the audit partners and AC members on the relative importance of auditor‘s 
competence and independence to audit quality. However, there is a significant 
contrast between the quality inspectors and audit partners regarding the position of 
service quality attributes as key constructs for audit quality in practice. Overall, this 
study shows that inspectors build their meaning and perceptions on a range of 
attributes that relate to: audit process or content, internal and external compliance 
aspects, and individual auditors‘ characteristics. Most essentially inspectors place 
the audit process and conduct at the core of audit quality, which might reflect the 
ability of the audit quality inspectors to, and their responsibility to, examine directly 
the content and conduct of individual audit engagements, in contrast to other non-
auditor actors in the auditing system.  
Taken together, the results from the research involving three important groups who 
have responsibilities for assessing audit quality in practice show the social meaning 
of audit quality and illustrate the socially constructed nature of auditing activity and 
the multifaceted meanings that can be associated with audit quality. This aspect of 
the evidence from this study supports the observations reached by Fischer (1996), 
who recognised the socially constructed nature of audit quality which derives from 
its unobservable nature.  
From the interactionist perspective, Blumer (1969) and Charon (2007) have 
suggested that social meaning is best understood in terms of interaction between 
people and their environment and the role of various representations to signify 
meaning. The literature addressing audit quality in an organisational and social 
context (section 2.1.5) suggests role expectations, economic and regulatory factors 
may influence and shape the practices or performance of auditors. It also highlights 
how, in the absence of observable features on audit quality for both practitioners 
and users of audit services, audit practices and other ‗impression techniques‘ are 
not only important to represent the technical audit function but it also for the 
legitimacy of auditors‘ conduct and the knowledge base of audit. This study reveals 
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a variety of technical, compliance and service concepts attached to the meaning of 
audit quality, reflecting influences from internal and external factors in the auditing 
setting. Therefore, the contextual dependence of the meaning of audit quality and 
possible understanding of factors that influence and shape meaning and perceptions 
concerning audit quality have been made evident. For example, a notable finding 
arising out of the interviews with the audit partners was the apparent influence of 
commercial interests or client service on the meaning of audit quality and that the 
wider societal obligation had more limited influence on the meaning of audit quality. 
The issue of economic interdependence and imbalance of power between the 
management and external auditor have put pressures for the external auditor to 
deliver ‗quality‘ that is expected by the audit client. This potentially opens up the 
issue of vulnerability to, and economic dependence on the demands of company 
management. Therefore, it resurrects the issue of expectation gaps that have long 
been associated with auditing.  
In the case of AC members, their conception of the meaning of audit quality is 
greatly influenced by auditors‘ presentations and communication during 
interactions. The external auditors seem to play an important role in AC members‘ 
understanding and constructing meaning and perceptions of audit quality. Further 
reflection on this issue shows that the limits of the knowledge and expertise of the 
AC members and their need to demonstrate a credible image for the legitimacy on 
their role may shape and influence the meaning and perceptions of audit quality for 
this group.  
The review of the research literature and also other policy documents that relate to 
audit quality points out that the concept of audit quality has a dynamic and context 
based aspect; different interpretations of audit quality may be held by different 
people and drivers or factors that influence audit quality may change over time 
(see, for example, Sutton, 1993; Rasmussen and Jensen, 1998; FRC, 2007). This 
perspective is consistent with the findings of this study which show in greater depth 
not just the existence of diversity but also the variety of constructs used to give 
meaning to audit quality. For example, the key construct for quality as understood 
by the audit partners is related to what is expected by the audit client and 
potentially is influenced by the commercial interests of the audit firm. At the same 
time, auditors are also expected to deliver audit quality that is expected by the AIU 
on behalf of the society or what the practitioners themselves believe concerning 
suitable technical audit quality that should be delivered in practice. This study 
suggests the variety of constructs of audit quality may potentially reflect subjective 
construction of the term resulting from interplay between various internal and 
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external factors prevalent in the auditing environment. Nevertheless, the manner in 
which these factors lead to real differences in specific audit practices remains an 
open question. One potential conflict identified by this study is that between client 
services and other constructs of audit quality.  
Audit quality is connected to the value of audit services, yet there is no accepted 
authoritative definition of what it is and what constitutes a quality audit is not 
simple to answer. In the absence of such objective evaluation of what it is, it 
appears that all audit practitioners have to create and rely on various 
representations to signify or convey quality in their work: presentation, professional 
qualification, training, audit working papers or guidelines and standards in planning 
and executing audits. The identification of reliance on various representations to 
signify audit quality is well established in the literature (see section 2.1.5) and is 
consistent with observations made during the course of conducting this study. 
Further both extant literature and the evidence from this research suggest that 
representations are not only important to symbolise quality but are also important 
tools in practice to legitimise auditors‘ actions and knowledge base, mobilise 
commercial interests and maintain the ‗social order‘ of the financial and auditing 
systems (see, for example, Richardson, 1987; Richardson, 1988; Power, 1996; 
Power, 2003; Carrington, 2010). This study suggests that the notion of audit 
quality can be seen as a ‗language‘ without ‗technicity‘ that has been called upon by 
various audit constituents to give meaningful debate that there high quality 
auditing is being delivered. This is not meant to say that there is no high quality 
auditing but rather that the way in which the debate about audit quality is driven is 
partly to maintain legitimacy and convey certain impressions of what is done by 
various constituents in the auditing setting in the name of audit quality. Audit 
practitioners‘ use of the term of audit quality and associated symbols can be 
understood as providing a socially integrative function for the auditing profession 
and also maintaining the legitimate authority of the profession with respect to 
auditing and financial accounting. For AC members, their understanding of the term 
of audit quality, and their function and operation in relation to external audit are 
very much influenced by the external auditors themselves. This highlights the 
potential ceremonial role rather than the substantive purpose of the AC. In a sense, 
the whole debate about audit quality has symbolic representations that help to 
maintain confidence that auditing is worth doing and that each of the significant 
parties in the system is aiming for high audit quality. 
One concern of this research was to investigate the influence of ACs on audit 
quality and it is worth noting that all the groups in this study provided only limited 
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evidence on the impact of ACs on audit practice and the external audit function. 
This finding is consistent with studies such as Cohen at al. (2002) and Turley and 
Zaman (2007) which report a minimal impact of the ACs on audit process and 
external auditor activity. In comparison, the three groups provided mixed views 
concerning the impact of the AIU on auditor‘s work performance.  
8.2 Contributions and Implications of the Study  
By adopting symbolic interactionism as a theoretical approach and employing a 
qualitative research design, this study attempts to contribute to the understanding 
and knowledge on audit quality by researching this issue within the organisational 
and social context of audit practices. This approach is relatively unrepresented in 
existing research but provides insight into the complex and dynamic interactions of 
factors such as economic interests, role expectations and regulations that impact on 
the meaning of audit quality and the practices of various constituents in the 
auditing setting. This perhaps has added a new dimension to the research in this 
field.  
With regard to the audit quality literature, this study enhances the understanding of 
the nature of audit quality from the practical perspective of those who provide the 
audit services and those who are responsible for monitoring them. This perspective 
is also drawn from the context of auditing within the UK, whereas much of the prior 
research has been dominated by studies conducted with reference to the US 
environment (as evidenced in, for example, the surveys of Watkins et al., 2004 and 
Francis, 2004). In addition, much of the audit quality literature that attempts to 
investigate the association between some ‗input‘ and ‗output‘ measures of audit 
quality adopts a large-scale market-based approach or survey-based approach 
(Humphrey, 2008). These studies have tended to use competence and 
independence as a framework of analysis without seeking greater in-depth 
understanding concerning people‘s thought processes and consciousness of what 
constitutes an audit of high or sufficient quality. The research reported in this thesis 
therefore complements existing research through opening up the rationales and 
potential behaviours which lie behind commitments to quality by those involved in 
commissioning, delivering and assessing actual audit engagements. 
The current study has shown that the meaning of audit quality is situated within the 
context in which it applies, how it is influenced and shaped through the interaction 
between internal and external factors in the auditing setting, and what the meaning 
symbolically represents within audit firms and to the outside world. The study 
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suggests that to some extent audit quality means different things and serves 
different purposes in different places and different times, and that context is critical 
to an understanding of practice. Thus, this research highlights the importance of 
studying the meaning and construction of audit quality in its context and provides 
some insights into the meaning of the concept and some of the constructs 
employed to give it meaning. This finding has theoretical relevance, suggesting that 
the meaning of audit quality and its impact on audit practice and oversight process 
can be better understood by analysing it in relation to different interests, 
expectations and the sources of legitimacy of those involved.  
In addition to insights into the meaning of audit quality and some of its concepts, 
this study advances the existing knowledge about the influence of interactions of 
internal and external factors in the auditing environment to the construction and 
representation of the meaning of audit quality in practice. The used of symbolic 
interactionism allows greater insights into the complex interrelationship of factors 
impacting meaning and perceptions of audit quality based on respondents own 
experiences. For example, this study explains how economic and regulatory factors 
influence the notion of audit quality, and, in consequence, the operation and 
activities of audit practitioners. This study also reveals how acts (e.g., external 
auditors‘ presentations and asking challenging questions) and objects (e.g., written 
reports, training and consultations) are used to signify and communicate audit 
quality in practice. In like manner, AC members‘ meaning and perceptions of audit 
quality are very much influenced and shaped by their interactions and 
communications with the external auditors. This study shows the important role of 
the external auditors (in terms of auditors‘ presentations and reports) in 
constructing and representing a meaning of audit quality for the AC members.  
Audit quality is a complex thing and attempts to investigate its meaning as an 
influence on practice in the conduct of audit engagements and audit evaluations 
with reference to the broader societal and organisational context enhance our 
understanding of the process through which auditors, AC members and quality 
inspectors believe that appropriate audit quality has been achieved. It is hoped that 
the findings of this study will be of value to the regulators, audit practitioners, AC 
members, audit clients and other interested parties. A number of implications are 
identified from the findings in this study.  
The concept of audit quality in practice highlights the inherent tensions between, 
and sometimes within, the elements of audit quality. From a practical point of view, 
it can be concluded that the auditors are searching for a difficult balance between 
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related and competing dimensions of audit quality. From the point of view of the 
audit profession and regulator, how to address the inherent tensions in auditing is 
particularly important. The study also shows the unintended consequences of the 
inspection process for audit quality. The implications relate to how policy-makers 
should be able to identify these tensions and position actions related to the 
promotion of audit quality accordingly. The role of the regulator should give 
appropriate consideration to the positioning of audit quality issues at the 
intersection of competing forces. The issue of regulatory policy in relation to audit 
quality remains a matter of active debate currently, as reflected in the European 
Commission Green Paper published in the autumn of 2010 (EC, 2010), and the 
discussion in this study shows how care is needed in using ‗quality‘ as a means to 
justify or encourage acceptance of regulatory action. 
For practitioners and firms there are issues concerning how choices are made when 
conflicts arise between, for example, meeting quality as required by their audit 
client and meeting their professional obligations and roles to the public at large. 
The research has shown potential tensions and conflicts in relation to audit quality 
because of various role expectations on external auditors by different parties with 
whom the audit practitioners interact, whether in terms of satisfying business 
demand for profits or their professional obligations. Considerable potential conflicts 
between the different meanings to audit quality were alluded to by both audit 
partners and quality inspectors. The drive for audit quality may, therefore, simply 
reinforce rather than resolve the issues about expectations and roles that have long 
been associated with auditing. 
This study shows that the operations and processes of ACs in relation to audit 
quality include a ceremonial function and highlights the limited impact of the AC on 
audit quality and the external audit function. This may imply that AC members 
require greater understanding of their roles and need to acquire the appropriate 
type and level of skills and expertise to make them function more effectively. The 
significant efforts by regulators and legislative bodies in recent years towards 
greater codification of AC characteristics and operations may not necessarily 
enhance their governance contribution. Further issues can also be raised with 
regards to how to assess the quality of the governance contribution of the AC itself. 
One approach is to make AC processes more visible through more disclosures about 
the work performed by the AC with the introduction of public reporting by ACs. 
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This study identifies that the role for a technical specification of the concept of audit 
quality may be limited and suggests the rhetorical meaning and exploitation of the 
term ‗audit quality‘ potentially limits what can be achieved for enhancing audit 
quality in practice. Inconsistent language is employed in claims or discussions of 
audit quality by key participants in the audit process. Therefore, calls from different 
parties to ‗standardise‘ or enhance audit quality may potentially obscure or hide 
differences in perspective between participants in the audit process.  
8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
Whilst this study may have provided theoretical and empirical contributions in 
several respects, like any research, it is subject to certain limitations. Principally 
these relate to the scope of groups included in the research, the extent of coverage 
of these groups, the degree to which the evidence collected provides a picture of 
actual practice on real engagements and the limitations of the methods of data 
collection. 
This study is exploratory in nature and only covers perceptions concerning audit 
quality from the perspective of audit partners, AC members and quality inspectors. 
Thus, one limitation of the study is that it excludes some key participants in the 
auditing system such as financial directors of companies, others in executive 
management, information intermediaries and institutional shareholders. Future 
research could focus on the perceptions of these participants to establish if they 
share a common understanding of the concept of audit quality with the groups 
covered in this research or use additional constructs to give meaning to the term. 
Such groups have been included in previous research in the general area of audit 
expectations, where differences between the views of auditors and others have 
illustrated the presence of an ‗expectations gap‘, and it may therefore be productive 
to research further whether there is also a gap regarding understanding of audit 
quality. In addition, perceptions about audit quality from those who are directly 
involved in the detailed audit work such audit managers, audit seniors and junior 
staff might add further insights about the practical operationalisation of audit 
quality.  
A second limitation of the study is that the coverage of the groups included was 
constrained by practical issues concerning access to individuals and the time 
available and future research could attempt to expand the number of individual 
participants, possibly through wider survey methods. Interviews were chosen as the 
primary method of data collection to enhance the ability of the study to identify 
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constructs and symbols that individuals use to represent the general concept of 
audit quality. Further research could then take these constructs and develop 
research instruments to reinforce their significance by surveying their relevance to 
much larger groups of participants.  As noted above, surveys have frequently been 
used to investigate expectation of auditor roles and responsibilities and similar 
methods could be employed in respect of audit quality based on the results of this 
project. Another possible fruitful line for future research would be to consider using 
laboratory type experimental of research to examine the influence of the different 
constructs of audit quality by different people to audit performance or assessment 
of audit quality. Again there is a well-established literature looking at the 
psychology of auditors‘ judgement and decision-making and the findings of the 
current study could be developed into experimental tasks with auditors and other 
groups. 
An important motivation for this study was a concern to go beyond existing 
approaches to audit quality which focus on testing the association between certain 
available indirect signals of possible input and output quality and to ask questions 
about how the concept of audit quality is given real practical meaning by those 
involved in audit engagements; in other words to understand more about the 
process through which significant parties in the audit system determine that 
adequate audit quality is produced. However, it must be acknowledged that, 
although the study has involved direct contact with participants in the audit quality 
process, it still only offers indirect evidence of actual practice. The main data from 
the three groups were gathered through interviews and survey rather than direct 
examination of the content of audit work and its evaluation in actual audit 
engagements. Is felt that these methods of enquiry are still appropriate because 
the study is investigating perceptions of quality held by key groups and an 
objective scale by which to measure quality on specific assignments does not exist, 
but observation of auditors‘ actual work assignments or quality inspectors‘ work 
documents or the proceedings of AC meetings would also be relevant methods of 
study. It should be recognised, however, that such research would have to 
overcome significant obstacles regarding being allowed access to review the 
documents or attend the meetings. Although a study of audit quality in practice 
using interviews is restricted regarding what conclusions can be drawn from a small 
number of people, the objective of an interpretive approach is not wide 
generalisation, but to provide an enhanced understanding of the particular issues 
being researched. Another possible line of research to explore may be to use the 
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findings from this study to develop a framework which could be used to analyse 
behaviour in specific case studies of audit engagements. 
Finally, another aspect of the research for which limitations must be recognised is 
the possible existence of various forms of bias, subjectivity and interpretation that 
are inherent in qualitative research (for example, personal bias and self-serving 
responses by interviewees). Careful attention was paid to the pursuit of a rigorous 
and comprehensive approach concerning the collection and analysis of data, as 
highlighted in Chapter 3, but such limitations are still possible. Limitations of 
research method affect all forms of research enquiry. In this study as in many 
others these do not necessarily undermine the validity of the research and its 
contribution to understanding of the subject of the enquiry but are characteristics 
which must be borne in mind when placing the study alongside the wider body of 
research to which it contributes. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Discussion Paper and Questions posed to the 
respondents by the FRC 
 
The culture within an audit firm 
In ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ the FRC identified the following indicators of audit firm 
cultures that enhance audit quality :  
 
o Leadership of firms emphasising the importance of auditors discharging their 
professional responsibilities.  
o Respect for the principles underlying auditing and ethical standards.  
o Partner and staff development systems that promote personal 
characteristics essential to quality auditing.  
o Not letting financial considerations drive decisions with a negative effect.  
o Promotion of consultation on difficult issues and providing sufficient 
resources to deal with issues as they arise.  
o Development of an information infrastructure to support the audit function.  
 
Possible threats to an audit firm‘s culture: 
o Audit leadership having insufficient input to the firm‘s management 
decisions 
o Over-emphasis on winning and retaining audits. 
o Excessive cost cutting in times of economic downturn. 
o Insufficient importance placed on technical training. 
 
and asked the following questions:  
 
1. Are there other important factors of an audit firm‘s culture that are not referred 
to above?  
2. Are there pressures that could compromise the culture of audit firms that have 
not been identified above?  
3. Are there any further steps that should be taken to build confidence in the 
culture of audit firms and, if so, what might they be and why are they needed? 
The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff 
In ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ the FRC identified the following key drivers of audit 
quality:  
 
o The skills base of partners and staff. 
o The training given to audit personnel.  
o The approach to appraisal of partners and staff.  
 
Possible threats to the skills of an audit team 
o Failure to develop the necessary personal characteristics through effective 
mentoring. 
o Failure to retain staff with the necessary experience and expertise. 
o Allocating more capable staff on the basis of client prestige rather than audit 
risk. 
o Insufficient or ineffective training. 
 
and asked the following questions:  
 
4. Do you agree that technical skills, personal qualities and practical experience are 
key drivers of audit quality?  
5. Has this paper identified the issues that could result in an inadequately trained or 
skilled workforce for audit – if not, what other issues are there and why are they 
issues?  
6. Should there be a fundamental review of the qualification and training 
requirements for auditors? 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Discussion Paper and Questions posed to the 
respondents by the FRC, continued 
 
The effectiveness of the audit process 
In ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ the FRC identified the following features of an effective 
audit process:  
 
o The structure, experience and knowledge of the audit team is appropriate 
for the engagement and resources are sufficient to enable a considered 
response to issues that may arise;  
o High quality technical support is available when the audit team encounters a 
situation it is not familiar with;  
o The audit methodology is well structured and:  
 Provides a framework and procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence effectively and efficiently.  
 Provides for compliance with auditing standards without inhibiting 
exercise of judgement.  
 Requires appropriate audit documentation.  
 Ensures there is effective review of audit work.  
o The objectives of ethical standards are achieved, providing confidence in the 
integrity, objectivity and independence of the auditor; and  
o Audit quality control procedures are effective, understood, applied and 
monitored within firms and across international networks.  
 
Possible threats to effective audit process 
 
o Increased use of computerised audit methodologies may distance auditors 
from the company being audited, reduce flexibility and result in time spent 
coping with the technology at the expense of evidence gathering. 
o Over prescriptive auditing standards, regulation and audit methodologies 
can have adverse impacts such as: 
 Insufficient emphasis on tailoring audit procedures to specific  
          circumstances 
 Inhibiting the exercise of judgement 
 A focus on producing documentation at the expense of performing 
audit procedures properly. 
o ‗client capture‘ where the relationship with the client is so close that 
objectivity is impaired 
 
and asked the following questions:  
 
7. Are there other factors that determine whether an audit process is effective?  
8. Are there threats to the effectiveness of the audit process that have not been 
identified before?  
9. Are there further steps that could be taken to counter the threats to the 
effectiveness of the audit process? 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Discussion Paper and Questions posed to the 
respondents by the FRC, continued 
 
The reliability and usefulness of audit reporting 
In ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ the FRC identified the following characteristics of 
reliable and useful audit reporting:  
 
o The form of the auditor‘s report is highly codified and standardised. 
 Key elements are specified by law and auditing standards 
 A clean auditor‘s report operates as a signal rather than a source of 
 New information 
 Confidence in the auditor‘s report is inextricably linked to confidence 
in the presumed quality of the audit process. 
o Good communication with audit committees. Benefits include: 
 Encouraging a dialogue about the scope of the audit. 
 Providing a forum to discuss the key risks identified and judgements 
made in reaching the audit process. 
 Discussing qualitative aspects of the entity‘s accounting and reporting 
and potential ways of improving financial reporting. 
 
Threats to confidence in audit reporting  
 
o The FRC is conscious that some users and commentators have concerns 
about: 
 Whether the scope of the meaning of ―true and fair view‖ was 
restricted following the introduction of IFRS. This is being addressed 
by the Companies Act 2006. 
 Whether auditors are properly fulfilling their legal responsibilities to 
consider the adequacy of a company‘s accounting records. 
 Whether auditor‘s reports should be more informative about key 
 audit issues and  
 
asked the following questions:  
 
10. Are there factors that determine whether audit opinions command confidence?  
11. Are there other reasons why users may not have confidence in the audit 
opinion?  
12. Are there further steps that could be taken to reinforce the confidence in an 
audit opinion? 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Discussion Paper and Questions posed to the 
respondents by the FRC, continued 
 
Factors outside the control of auditors affecting audit quality 
In ‗Promoting Audit Quality‘ the FRC identified the following influences on audit 
quality that are outside the control of auditors:  
 
The approach taken by management;  
o Good corporate governance plays a major role in ensuring companies attach 
appropriate importance to corporate and financial reporting and to the audit 
process. 
o Nevertheless, there will always be a risk that management may be 
motivated in some circumstances to obstruct the audit process. 
 
The contribution made by audit committees;  
o Although the auditor is responsible for the planning and scope of the audit, 
the audit committee can be of considerable significance in areas such as: 
 Considering the scope of the audit and major risk areas 
 Being satisfied as to the appropriateness of the audit plan and audit 
          resources. 
 
The role of shareholders and commentators;  
o Support of auditors, where appropriate, by shareholders increases the 
likelihood that directors and management will comply with their obligations 
in relation to the preparation of reliable financial statements. 
 
The role of litigation;  
o The liability regime in the UK is being reformed in a way that is designed to 
ensure that exposure to litigation remains a stimulus to audit quality. 
 
The approach of regulators;  
o Regulators need high quality staff, able to assess whether audit firms have 
undertaken high quality audits in compliance with the principles of 
professional standards. for this to work, audit firm must also adhere to the 
principles. 
 
The pressures caused by the accelerating reporting regime.  
o Tight reporting deadlines limit the opportunity for detailed work by auditors 
after the reporting period and results in increased reliance on work 
performed before the end of the reporting period. 
 
and asked the following questions:  
 
13. Are there other external factors that have the potential to affect adversely audit 
quality?  
14. Are audit committees discharging their responsibilities in relation to audit 
adequately, and if not, what further steps might be taken to make their role more 
effective?  
15. Should the FRC develop more detailed guidance for audit committees in relation 
to the evaluation of audit effectiveness?  
16. Should annual reports include a summary of the work undertaken by the audit 
committee to evaluate audit effectiveness?  
17. Are there further steps that should be taken to reduce the risk that these 
external factors may adversely affect the audit process? 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality 
 
This section presents analysis of responses submitted to the FRC on the discussion 
paper for promoting audit quality. All of the respondents are listed in the 
accompanying table, together with an analysis of the responses on seventeen 
specific questions and others issues. Responses of the each respondent in respect 
of each of these issues are tabulated. Columns 1-17 provide and analysis of 
responses to the specific questions posed by the FRC, thus the major of 
respondents addressed these questions and a variety of opinions were expressed. 
An explanation of all columns is provided below. 
 
The Culture within an Audit Firm 
 
Column 1 Q1  
Are there other important indicators of an audit firm‘s culture that are not referred 
to above?  
A. Level of partner involvement with audit client 
B. Greater transparency on governance and control of the audit firm 
C. Review from the inspection bodies 
D. Ownership and control of the audit firm 
E. Professionalism 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 2 Q2  
Are there pressures that could compromise the culture of audit firms that have not 
been identified above?  
A. Effect of regulation and regulators  
B. Commercialisation of the audit firm 
C. Staffing - hiring and retaining of auditor 
D. Audit fees set at level that is not adequately rewards the service 
provided/practice of low balling 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 3 Q3  
Are there any further steps that should be taken to build confidence in the culture 
of audit firms and, if so, what might they be and why are they needed?  
A. Greater transparency of the audit firm governance and control  
B. Create dialogue or communication among audit market participants 
(auditors, regulators and investors) 
C. Greater involvement of audit committees to support role of auditor  
D. Role of inspection bodies to recognise and emphasis positive aspects of the 
audit firm 
E. Auditor legal liability 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 4 Q4 
Do you agree that technical skills, personal qualities and practical experience are 
key drivers to audit quality?  
A. Respondents indicate agreement 
NC No significant comment 
NA not available 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
The Skills and Personal Qualities of Audit Partners and Staff  
 
Column 5 Q5  
Has this paper identified the issues that could result in an inadequately trained or 
skilled workforce for audit – if not, what other issues are there and why are they 
issues?  
A. Respondents indicate yes 
B. Not - rapid changing, excessive and/or overly complex standards and 
regulations 
C. Not – hiring and retaining audit staff 
D. Not – inadequate wider business knowledge  
E Not – increasing internationalisation of companies  
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 6 Q6  
Should there be a fundamental review of the qualification and training requirements 
for auditors?  
A. Respondents indicate yes 
B. Respondents indicate no 
C. Should be left to the UK professional bodies 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
The Effectiveness of the Audit Process  
 
Column 7 Q7  
Are there other factors that determine whether an audit process is effective?  
A. Auditor relationship with audit client  
B. Auditor relationship with audit committees 
C. Attractiveness of the audit profession – hiring and retaining staff  
D. Effect of regulation and regulators 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 8 Q8  
Are there threats to the effectiveness of the audit process that have not been 
identified above?  
A. Rapid changing, excessive and/or overly complex standards and regulations 
B. Inadequate involvement of specialist  
C. Lack of co-operation and support from audit client 
D. Lack of co-operation and support from audit committees 
E. Changes of partner rotation  
F. Inadequate use of computer-aided techniques 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
Column 9 Q9  
Are there further steps that could be taken to counter the threats to the 
effectiveness of the audit process?  
A. Respondents indicate no 
B. Increase period of partner rotation from 5 to 7 years 
C. Introduce joint audit for large listed companies 
D. Promote and support principle based audit approach  
E. Emphasising risk based audit approach 
F. Introduce rotation of audit firm 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
The Reliability and Usefulness of Audit Reporting  
 
Column 10 Q10  
Are there other factors that determine whether audit opinions command 
confidence?  
A. Use principles rather than rules based approach in auditing and financial 
reporting standards 
B. Reputation of audit firm and audit profession 
C. Role of inspection bodies or regulators 
D. Greater information from the audit firm 
E Role of audit committees 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 11 Q11  
Are there other reasons why users may not have confidence in the audit opinion?  
A. Moving away from principle to rules based approach  
B. Lack of information on operation, governance and control of the audit firm 
C. Understand ability - length and legalistic wording  
D. ―Audit expectation gap‖ 
E. Poor communication between auditor and/or audit committees and users 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 12 Q12  
Are there further steps that could be taken to reinforce confidence in an audit 
opinion? In particular, what changes to the form and content of the audit report 
should be considered?  
A. Gives consideration to suggestions made by the Audit Quality Forum 
B. Report should be simplified 
C. Review formats and style of report 
D. Deserve separate and detail discussion  
E. Enhance communication between auditors and/or audit committee and 
shareholders 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
Factors outside the Control of Auditors Affecting Audit Quality  
 
Column 13 Q13  
Are there other external factors that have the potential to adversely affect audit 
quality?  
A. Rapid changing, excessive and/or overly complex standards and regulations 
B. Increasing globalisation and internationalisation of business 
C. Culture of audit client 
D. Lack of consensus about definition of audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 14 Q14  
Are audit committees discharging their responsibilities in relation to audit 
adequately, and if not, what further steps might be taken to make their role more 
effective?  
A. Respondents indicate yes 
B. Not – FRC develop a means to apply pressure to company and/or audit 
committees 
C. Varies between companies 
D. Not – owner representation on the audit committees 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 15 Q15 
Q15 Should the FRC develops more detailed guidance for audit committees in 
relation to the evaluation of audit effectiveness?  
A. Respondents indicate yes 
B. respondents indicate no 
C. FRC should discuss with audit committee 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 16 Q16  
Should annual reports include a summary of the work undertaken by the audit 
committee to evaluate audit effectiveness?  
A. Respondents indicate yes 
B. Respondents indicate no 
C. Up to the company 
NC No significant comment 
NA Not available 
 
Column 17 Q17  
Are there further steps that should be taken to reduce the risk that these external 
factors may adversely affect the audit process?  
A. Better understanding of roles between the participants in the corporate 
reporting chain 
B. Need to avoid initiative overload 
C. Maximise audit committee‘s talent 
D. Examine regulators and quasi-regulators approach (FRC and other relevant 
parties - timely recommendations and outcomes delivered) 
E. Effective audit planning 
NC No significant comment 
NA not available 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
Other significant issues 
 
Column 18 Discussion paper 
A. Welcomes references to discussion paper 
B. Sought about empirical evidence of the assertions and its impact to audit 
quality 
C. Insufficient attention to other dimension of audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 19 Professional judgement 
A. Respondents stressed out about the importance of professional judgement in 
audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 20 Quality of people 
A. Respondents suggested the imperative of quality of people to deliver audit 
quality 
B. Respondents suggested that the rotation of partner should be increased 
from 5 to 7 years 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 21 Definition of audit quality 
A. Respondents suggested that there should be broad view of definition of audit 
quality  
B. Respondents stressed out about the importance of outset of audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 22 Greater transparency of operation, governance and control of 
audit firms 
A. Respondents required more information about operation, governance and 
control of audit firm 
B. Respondents suggested more information on the audit report 
C. Respondents suggested that audit firm should be free to exercise their 
judgement in how best to make the transparency disclosure 
D. Respondents expressed concern the transparency reporting become 
standardised and become additional regulatory burden  
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 23 Commercialisation of audit firm 
A. Respondents expressed concern about commercialisation of the audit firm 
B. Respondents suggested that the provision of non-audit services would 
enhance audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 24 Changes in auditing/accounting regulation and standards 
A. Respondents expressed concern about the effect of the changes to the audit 
quality 
B. Respondents suggested that the changes have created additional resource 
concerns to them 
NC No significant comment 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
Column 25 Principles versus rules 
A. Respondents expressed concern that the changes in regulation and 
standards is moving away from principles to rules based audit approach 
B. Respondents opined that the migration from the principles approach is not 
necessarily a threat to audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 26 Role and support from audit client 
A. Respondents stressed out about the important role and support from audit 
client to audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 27 Role and support from audit committees 
A. Respondents stressed out about the important role and support from audit 
committees to audit quality 
NC No significant comment 
 
Column 28 Value of audit report 
A. Informative report 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 29 Professionalism 
A. Auditor should exercise professionalism (scepticism, integrity, ethical and 
serve the shareholders‘ and other users of account) 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 30 Independence 
A. Independence as another driver of audit quality 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 31 Effects of current initiatives and projects 
A. Enhance confidence to the audit quality 
B. Concern about imbalance review by the regulators 
C. Regulators should promote principles audit approach 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 32 Effects to the audit process 
A. Express concern about prescriptive audit approach 
B. Express concern about global audit standards initiative 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 33 Documentation 
A. Express concern about requirement on documentation 
B. Respondents express positive effects of high quality of documentation 
NC. No significant comment 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper 
Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
Column 34 Resource concern 
A. Express concern about inadequate time, costs and pressure created by the 
current initiatives and projects 
NC. No significant comment 
 
Column 35 True and fair view 
A. Respondents suggested that audit quality should support auditor true and 
fair view 
B. Respondents questioned whether true and fair view add value on the audit 
C. Respondents suggested that the principle approach is important to 
professional judgement to give true and fair view of the financial statement 
NC No significant comment 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
  Column:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
  Questions:  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 
                   
  Audit Firms:                                   
  Big Four:                                   
1 PWC NC A/C B A C B A/B NC A B/E A A A A B A A 
2 Ernst & Young NC A/C NC A B C NC C NC NC A/D D C B B B NC 
3 KPMG B C D A C B D NC B B C B A/B A C A NC 
4 Deloitte A A NC A B B B B/F A NC NC A A A B A B 
  Non-big four                  
5 BDO Stoy Hayward A C NC A A A NC B/E A NC E E NC C B A C 
6 Mazars D A/C NC A C A NC NC C D B A A C A A D 
7 Grant Thornton NC C/D A/D A B/C C D A/E NC D B A NC A A A D 
8 RSM Robson Rhodes NC A/D A/D A C B NC A D B/E NC A NC NC A A D 
  Investors:                  
9 ABI C/E B B A NC NC NC A NC C C NC NC NC NC NC C 
10 EPS NC NC NC A A B NC NC NC B NC NC NC A A C NC 
11 Hermes  E C D A C A NC A D D A/C A A NC A B D 
12 IMA E B/D A 
A 
E B D A NC D C A A A B B NC 
13 3i Group Plc NC NC A/D A NC B A/B A/F D B/E NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
14 NAPF E B/C A 
 
A 
D NC NC NC NC D B/C A B NC B B NC 
15 SLI B NC A/B A NC A D NC NC D C C NC A B A D 
16.  Governance for Owners NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA D NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
17.  CPT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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Appendix 2: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
  Column:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
  Questions:  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 
  Professional bodies:                                   
18.  ACCA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
19. CIMA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
20. CIPFA NC NC NC A A B NC A NC D NC NC B NC A A A 
21. CCAB NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
22.  ICAEW NC A NC A A B C/D C B B C A A/B C C A A 
23.  ICAS NC A NC A NC B NC E D B NC NC NC A A B D 
24. ICAI NC A A/D A B/C B NC A D C/E D C A NC A A D 
25. IFAC  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
26. Centre for Audit Quality NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
27. ICAEW, London Society D A/C/D C/D A D B D A/C B/E B C B A/C NC B A NC 
 Corporate:                  
28. CBI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
29. 
The 100 Group of Fin. 
Dir NC A/C D A A NC NC A/E D B D A A/D A A B NC 
 Others:                  
30. Clifford Moggs NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
31. IRBA (South Africa) C D/C A A C NC B A NC C A NC NC B A A NC 
32. Mr D Alexander NC NC E A A A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC D A A B 
33. Mrs M Downes NC NC E NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC D NC NC NC 
34. Mr I Wright NC NC NC A A A NC E F B C C NC NC A A NC 
35. NAO (Malta) NC A/B E A NC NC NC A NC D B C NC A A A E 
36. ORC  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
37 ODCE NC NC NC A NC NC NC A NC NC NC C NC NC A A NC 
38. Prof JP Percy NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
39. Wales Audit Office NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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Appendix 2 continued: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
  Column:  18 19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
 
30 31 32 
 
33 
 
34 
 
35 
  Issues:  DP PJ QP D&C TRA COM R&S PvR ACL ACO VAL PRO IND EFF APR DOC RES T&f 
  
Audit Firms: 
                        
 
    
   
  Big Four:                                 
1 PWC A/B/C A A NC NC NC A/B A A A NC A 
 
NC B/C A/B 
 
A 
 
NC C 
2 Ernst & Young A/C A A NC NC B A/B A A A NC A NC B/C A/B A A C 
3 KPMG A/B/C A A/B NC NC B A/B A A A NC NC 
 
NC B/C A/B 
 
NC 
 
A C 
4 Deloitte A/C A A NC NC NC A/B A A A NC NC NC A/C A/B NC A C 
  Non-big four                   
5 BDO Stoy Hayward A NC A/B NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A/B NC NC NC 
6 Mazars A/C NC A NC NC NC A/B NC A A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
7 Grant Thornton A/B/C A A/B NC C NC A/B A A A NC NC 
 
NC C A/B 
 
A 
 
A NC 
8 RSM Robson Rhodes A/C A A NC D NC A/B A A A NC NC NC B A/B A A NC 
  
Investors: 
            
 
  
  
 
9 ABI A/C NC A NC A/B A NC NC A A A A A A C NC NC A 
10 EPS A/B NC A NC NC B NC B A A NC NC NC NC NC B NC NC 
11 Hermes  A A A B A/B NC A A A A NC A A A/C C NC NC NC 
12 IMA A/B NC A NC A/B A NC A A A A A 
 
NC 
A/C B/C 
 
B 
 
A 
NC 
13 3i Group Plc A/B NC NC NC A NC NC NC A A NC NC A A B B NC NC 
14 NAPF A/B NC NC NC A/B NC NC NC A A NC A 
 
NC 
NC B/C 
NC NC 
NC 
15 SLI A/B NC NC NC A/B NC NC NC NC A A NC NC A NC NC NC NC 
16.  Governance for Owners NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
17.  CPT A NC NC NC A A NC NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC 
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Appendix 2 continued: Analysis of comments submitted to FRC on Discussion Paper Promoting Audit Quality, continued 
 
  Column:  18 19  20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
 
29 30 31 32 
 
33 
 
34 
 
35 
  Issues:  DP PJ QP D&C TRA COM R&S PvR ACL ACO VAL PRO IND EFF APR DOC RES T&f 
  Professional bodies:                                 
18.  ACCA A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
19. CIMA A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
20. CIPFA A NC A NC A NC A NC A NC NC NC A NC NC NC A NC 
21. CCAB A/C A NC NC NC NC A/B A NC A NC NC NC C A NC NC NC 
22.  ICAEW A/B/C A A A NC NC A/B A A A NC NC NC B/C A A A C 
23.  ICAS A/B/C A A/B NC NC NC A/B A A A NC NC NC C A A A C 
24. ICAI A/C A A NC A NC A/B A A A NC NC A A/C A NC A NC 
25. IFAC  A/B NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A A NC NC A/C NC NC NC NC 
26. Centre for Audit Quality A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
27. ICAEW, London Society A A A NC NC NC A/B A A A NC NC A A/C A NC A NC 
 Corporate:                   
28. CBI A/C NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC A NC NC NC A/C A NC NC NC 
29. The 100 Group of Fin. Dir. A A NC A NC NC A A NC NC NC A NC C A NC A NC 
 Others:                   
30. Clifford Moggs NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
31. IRBA (South Africa) A NC A NC A NC A A NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC 
32. Mr D Alexander NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC 
33. Mrs M Downes A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
34. Mr I Wright A NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
35. NAO  (Malta) NC NC A NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC A A NC NC NC A NC 
36. ORC  A NC NC NC B NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
37 ODCE A NC A NC NC NC A NC NC NC A NC A NC A NC NC NC 
38. Prof JP Percy NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
39. Wales Audit Office A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC A NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC NC 
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Appendix 3: Letter to Interviewees 
 
 
Manchester Business School 
The University of Manchester 
Booth Street West 
Manchester 
M15 6PB 
 
www.mbs.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Dear 
 
Research on Audit Quality 
 
We are currently undertaking research to investigate the perceptions of key 
participants in the audit process concerning the factors that influence audit quality. 
This has been a subject of considerable debate over recent years and one that has 
attracted interest from the Financial Reporting Council, reflected in their 2007 
publication Promoting Audit Quality. It is hoped that our research will both improve 
understanding of what steps have been taken to enhance audit quality and 
contribute to future policy making in this area. 
 
The attention given to audit quality in recent years may have had a particular 
impact within audit firms where the quality of service provided to clients is clearly 
of great importance. In order properly to understand how this subject has been 
addressed within firms in the recent past, we are conducting interviews with a 
number of audit partners from the larger accounting firms and would like to ask if 
you would be willing to provide an interview to assist with this study. The interview 
would require one hour of your time and would take place at a venue that is 
convenient to you. More details concerning the intended topics for discussion will be 
provided if you are able to participate but the intended subjects will include the 
impact of regulation and how audit quality is promoted and evaluated within 
professional firms. The interview will be undertaken by Noor Adwa Sulaiman, a PhD 
student at Manchester Business School who is pursuing doctoral studies on this 
subject together, where the schedule permits, with me or another co-researcher. 
For those participants who are would like to receive information about the research 
findings we will also provide a summary of the findings of the study. 
 
We recognise that giving up time to participate in a project like this is not easy but 
the subject of this research is an important topic in the modern business 
environment and we do hope you will be willing to contribute to the study. If you 
are not able to offer a face to face interview but would be willing to participate in a 
telephone interview then we would also be interested to hear from you. If you feel 
that another of your partners is closer to audit practice and may be better placed to 
contribute then please suggest this. Please respond to Ms Sulaiman 
(nooradwa.sulaiman@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk), to whom any queries may also be 
directed. Thank you for your consideration of this approach and your co-operation 
will be very much appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Stuart Turley 
Professor of Accounting 
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Appendix 3: Letter to Interviewees, continued 
 
 
Manchester Business School 
The University of Manchester 
Booth Street West 
Manchester 
M15 6PB 
 
www.mbs.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research on Audit Quality 
 
We are currently undertaking research to investigate the perceptions of key 
participants in the audit process concerning the factors that influence audit quality. 
This has been a subject of considerable debate over recent years and one that has 
attracted interest from the Financial Reporting Council, reflected in their 2007 
publication Promoting Audit Quality. It is hoped that our research will both improve 
understanding of what steps have been taken to enhance audit quality and 
contribute to future policy making in this area. 
 
Their relationship, interaction and communication with a company‘s auditors place 
audit committee members in an important position to judge audit quality and form 
views about the factors that influence quality. Consequently, in order properly to 
understand this subject, we are conducting interviews with a number of audit 
committee members from UK listed companies and would like to ask if you would 
be willing to provide an interview to assist with this study. The interview would 
require one hour of your time and would take place at a venue that is convenient to 
you. More details concerning the topics for discussion will be provided if you are 
able to participate but the intended subjects will include the impact of regulation, 
the manner in which audit committees can assess audit quality and the extent to 
which they are able to  influence that quality in practice. The interview will be 
undertaken by Noor Adwa Sulaiman, a PhD student at Manchester Business School 
who is pursuing doctoral studies on this subject together, where the schedule 
permits, with me or another co-researcher. For those participants who would like to 
receive information about the research findings we will also provide a summary of 
the findings of the study. 
 
We recognise that giving up time to participate in a project like this is not easy but 
the subject of this research is an important topic in the modern business 
environment and we do hope you will be willing to contribute to the study. If you 
are not able to offer a face to face interview but would be willing to participate in a 
telephone interview then we would also be interested to hear from you. Please 
respond to Ms Sulaiman (nooradwa.sulaiman@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk), to whom any 
queries may also be directed. Thank you for your consideration of this approach 
and your co-operation will be very much appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Stuart Turley 
Professor of Accounting 
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Appendix 3: Letter to Interviewees, continued 
 
 
 
Manchester Business School 
The University of Manchester 
Booth Street West 
Manchester 
M15 6PB 
 
www.mbs.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Research on Audit Quality 
 
Recently I wrote to you to invite you to participate in a research project currently 
being undertaken on audit quality. This topic has been the subject of considerable 
debate and the project is concerned specifically with how quality factors influence 
practice in the conduct of actual audits.  
I am writing again simply to emphasise the significant contribution that your 
participation can make to the research. It is of particular interest to us to be able to 
collect the views and insights of practicing auditors/members of audit committees 
We would be especially grateful for your help because it is only by speaking to 
people with direct experience of audits currently that we can get an accurate 
understanding of audit quality in practice.  
If you have not yet made a whether or not to assist with the research and 
participate in an interview, then I hope you will be able to respond positively to the 
request. (A copy of the text of my original letter is attached.) However, if you have 
already replied to the invitation then please accept my apologies for this follow-up 
letter which may have crossed in the post with your response.  
Finally can I also just restate that protecting the confidentiality of participants‘ 
views is important to us, and also to the University, and no information will be 
referred to in a format which could identify the respondent or firm without 
permission. 
I appreciate your willingness to consider our request.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Stuart Turley 
Professor of Accounting 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide 
 
Auditors:  
 
Meaning and construction of audit quality: 
1. What sort of attributes do you think people look for in an audit? 
2. How do these reflect audit quality? 
3. Do you think it is possible for people outside the process to assess audit 
quality? 
4. How do you evaluate quality on the jobs you control? 
5. What are the key characteristics or qualities you look for in the work done? 
Factors constitute audit quality in practice: 
 
Judgement and methods 
1. How do staff deal with making audit judgement (like fraud risk assessment 
or determining nature, timing and extent of testing)? 
2. How does the firm‘s audit methodology help to support audit decisions or 
audit judgement?  
3. What are the important aspects that could support good judgement? 
Quality of people 
1. How does the firm ensure the audit staff possess the required skills and 
experience? 
2. What can be monitored? 
3. How far does the firm rely on supervision of staff to promote quality? 
4. How are varying skills and experiences of staff accommodated without 
affecting audit quality? 
Governance and control  
1. Where does quality fit into the structure of governance and control of the 
firm? 
2. How does governance and control of the firm ensure high audit quality? 
3. Is quality (review) the responsibility of particular individuals? 
4. Is quality ‗measured‘? If so, how? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide, continued 
 
Culture 
1. Can you describe how quality fits into the organizational values of the firm? 
2. Are specific things done to promote those values and to encourage 
adherence? 
3. Can you describe how the values are communicated to the employees of the 
firm? 
4. What are the impacts of the values to the performance of the staff?  
5. How could you monitor the values? 
Non-audit services and ethics 
1. How are safeguards applied to maintain quality if the firm is also providing 
non-audit services? 
2. How the audit firm satisfy itself that any safeguards required are 
implemented? 
Auditors are recognised as professional members that uphold ethics and 
professionalism. 
 
1. What policies does the firm have? 
2. How are these implemented? 
3. How do ensure people don‘t simply give lip service to these values and 
standards? 
Regulation  
1. How have the changes in audit regulation and corporate governance 
influence the way you carry out the audit? 
2. In general, do you think the changes and reforms have affected the quality 
of work of the auditors? (Improved? Deteriorated? How? – can you give 
specific example?) 
3. How the changes and reforms improve the quality of audit in your firm? 
4. Do you think the impact of regulation on quality is different in your firm from 
others? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide, continued 
 
In my analysis of responses to the Discussion Paper: Promoting Audit Quality 
issued by the FRC, several respondents highlighted some resource concerns in the 
audit firm created by the changes and reforms. 
 
1. How the audit regulation creates such problem? 
2. Can you describe how the firm handle this? 
3. Is there any conflict between cost and quality? 
4. How is this handled in the firm? 
Auditor and audit committee relationship: 
1. Can you tell me about the way you manage the relationship of your firm 
with its audit committee? 
2. What has changed in time with regards to your relationship with the 
company‘s audit committees? 
3. How the communication and interaction influences the way you conduct the 
audit? 
4. Does the audit committee ever have any influence on audit work? 
5. Is that impact beneficial to audit quality? 
6. Can you give specific examples? 
7. How important is a good relationship with the ACs to doing a good audit? 
Wrap up questions: 
1. How as a partner you are comfortable that there is adequate quality to allow 
you to sign the audit report? 
Audit committees:  
 
Meaning and construction of audit quality: 
1. What sort of attributes do you think people look for in an audit? 
2. How do these reflect audit quality? 
3. Do you think it is possible for people outside the process to assess audit 
quality? 
4. How do you evaluate quality on the jobs performed by the auditors? 
5. What are the key characteristics or qualities you look for in the work done? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide, continued 
 
Factors constitute audit quality in practice: 
 
Judgement and methods 
1. How do you satisfied that the auditors have performed good audit 
judgement? 
2. In your opinion, how do the audit firm‘s audit methodologies support 
auditors in handling the key accounting and auditing judgement? 
3. What are the important aspects of the audit methodology that could support 
good judgement of the auditors? 
Quality of people 
1. In your opinion, how do skills and experiences of the auditors contribute to 
quality audits? 
2. How do ‗quality people‘ have any bearing in the selection process of the 
auditor? 
3. How do ‗quality people‘ have any influence when you assess the 
effectiveness of the audit performed by the auditor? 
Governance and control  
1. Where does quality fit into the structure of governance and control of the 
audit firm? 
2. How does governance and control of the firm ensure high audit quality? 
3. How information about governance and control of audit firm does influences 
the audit tender process (appointment, re-appointment or removal) of the 
auditor? 
4. How does information about governance and control assist you in assessing 
the effectiveness of the audit process? 
5. How would you comfortable that the audit firm‘s governance and control will 
deliver quality audit? 
Culture 
1. How is organizational value important in the conduct of the audit? 
2. How do the values of the audit firm influence your quality assessments of 
the audit firm? 
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide, continued 
 
Non-audit services and ethics 
Issue about the provision of non-audit services appears to be significant concerns 
than before  
1. Can you describe about mechanisms available in safeguarding the auditor‘s 
independence? 
2. How does the audit committee satisfy itself that any safeguards required are 
implemented? 
3. In your opinion, how do the provisions of non-audit services influence the 
audit firm‘s performance? 
Auditors are recognised as professional members that uphold ethics and 
professionalism.  
1. In your opinion, how do ethics and professionalism influences the auditor‘s 
performance? 
Regulation  
1. How have the changes in audit regulation and corporate governance 
changed your work with the company‘s auditor? 
2. In general, do you think the changes and reforms have affected the quality 
of work of the auditors? (Improved? Deteriorated? How? – can you give 
specific example?)? 
3. How have changes and reforms improved the quality of audit performed by 
the company‘s auditor? 
4. Do you think the impact of regulation on quality is different in your firm from 
others? 
Auditor and audit committee relationship: 
1. Can you tell me about the way you manage the relationship of your firm 
with its auditor? 
2. What has changed in time with regards to your relationship with the 
company‘s auditor? 
3. How does communication and interaction influence the way auditor conduct 
the audit? 
4. Does the audit committee ever have any influence on audit work? 
5. Is that impact beneficial to audit quality? 
6. Can you give specific examples? 
7. How important is a good relationship with the auditor to promote audit 
quality? 
Wrap up questions: 
1. How comfortable are you that there is adequate quality of work performed 
by the company‘s auditors? 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire 
A STUDY ON AUDIT QUALITY IN PRACTICE 
 
 
Dear Mr/Ms 
 
We are currently undertaking research to investigate the perceptions of key 
participants in the audit process concerning the factors that influence audit quality. 
This has been a subject of considerable debate over recent years and one that has 
attracted interest from the Financial Reporting Council, reflected in their 2007 
publication Promoting Audit Quality. It is hoped that our research will both improve 
understanding of what steps have been taken to enhance audit quality and 
contribute to future policy making in this area. 
 
The attention given to audit quality in recent years may have had a particular 
impact within audit firms where the quality of service provided to clients is clearly 
of great importance. In order properly to understand how this subject has been 
addressed within firms in the recent past, we are conducting a survey with a 
number of individuals (auditors and non-auditors) and would like to ask if you 
would be willing to assist with this study. The survey would require approximately 
30 minutes of your time. The information you provide will be treated with strict 
confidentiality, and will not be used for any purpose apart from the research. In the 
case of publication, only aggregate information will be used without any specific 
reference to individual participants.  
 
The questionnaire is structured in several parts covering possible attributes of audit 
quality, the impact of various factors on the conduct of the audit, how audit quality 
is achieved in practice and also some background information about yourself.  
 
We recognise that giving up time to participate in a project like this is not easy but 
the subject of this research is an important topic in the modern business 
environment and we do hope you will be willing to contribute to the study 
 
Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation. 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 1: Please provide some background information about yourself by ticking the most 
appropriate box in each of the following questions 
 
1. Are you:  Male     Female       ?   
 
2. Which age group are you in?   
 28 – 37              48 – 57 
 38 – 47             Over 57 
 
 
3.  What is your highest level of educational qualification? 
  Bachelor degree    Master degree   
  Doctoral degree    Other (please specify) 
……………………………… 
 
4. What professional qualifications do you hold? 
  ICAEW      ACCA   
  ICAS      Others (please specify) 
………………………………  
5. What is your principal role in audit inspection? 
  
 Leader of inspection team      
 Member of inspection team 
 Both leader and member of inspection teams 
 
 
6.  What is your overall experience in auditing practice? 
 
 Less than 5 years 11 to 15 years More than 20 years
  
 5 to 10 years 16 to 20 years  None 
  
7.  What is your experience in audit inspection? 
 Less than 3 years 3 to 5 years   More than 5 years
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
 
8.  In the last year, what proportion of your time has been spent in different types of 
audit firms in inspection of? 
 More than fifty percent Less than fifty percent 
Big four firms    
Other firms   
 
9. In the last year, what proportion of your time has been spent on inspections of 
different types of audit engagement: 
 More than fifty percent Less than fifty percent 
FTSE 100 companies   
Other listed entities   
Other public interest 
entities 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 2: The following statements refer to possible attributes of an audit which could 
reflect audit quality. Please indicate your personal view of the importance of each statement 
for audit quality by circling one number on the scale. If you feel the attribute is of little or no 
importance for high audit quality, please circle the number 1. If you feel the attribute is very 
important for high audit quality, circle 5. If your feelings are less strong, please circle one of 
the numbers in the middle. (Please circle only one response per statement):  
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1. The audit is carried out in accordance with 
auditing standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The audit is carried out in accordance with 
ethical standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The audit is carried out in accordance with 
quality control standards (ISQC1) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The auditor satisfies the audit client‘s 
expectations 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The audit is valued by the audit client 1 2 3 4 5 
6. The auditor provides good value for money to 
the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The audit work undertaken is based primarily 
on an assessment of the risks associated with 
the client‘s financial statements  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The audit work is determined by a proper 
planning process 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The auditor does sufficient work to obtain 
sufficient evidence to support an audit opinion  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The role of the audit partner is at the centre of 
the audit process 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. The work done in carrying out the audit is 
subject to review before the audit is completed  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The auditor reports the correct audit opinion on 
the financial statements  
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The auditor demonstrates an appropriate level 
of challenge to the management of the audit 
client 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The auditor is technically competent 1 2 3 4 5 
15. The auditor is independent 1 2 3 4 5 
16. The audit meets the quality standards applied 
internally by the audit firm  
1 2 3 4 5 
17. The audit is completed in a timely manner  1 2 3 4 5 
18. The auditor maintains a high level of 
documentation in the completed audit files 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. The auditor maintains a good relationship with 
the management of the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. The auditor maintains effective communication 
and interaction with the audit committee  
1 2 3 4 5 
21. The audit firm provides additional services in 
association with the audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. The audit firm is free from negative findings in 
inspection reports  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 3: The following statements refer to aspects of the business, accounting and auditing 
environment which could have an impact on audit quality. Based on your own experience in 
auditing, please indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement by circling one 
number on the scale from 1 where you strongly disagree to 5 where you strongly agree with 
the statement. (Please circle only one response per statement): 
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1. Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
a  greater focus on meeting client‘s 
expectations 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on delivering 
good value for money to the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater attention being given to delivering 
value added services to the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Competition in the audit market has resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on the auditor‘s 
relationship with the audit client‘s management  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. The framework of audit regulation has led to 
increased focus on conducting an audit beyond 
the minimum requirements of auditing 
standards  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Changes in the framework of audit regulation 
have led to increased emphasis on maintaining 
adequate audit documentation  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Factors in the auditing environment have 
resulted in extensive internal review of the 
audit engagements  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Factors in the auditing environment have 
resulted in greater reliance on consultation 
within the firm as part of the audit process 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The current business environment has resulted 
in greater reliance on risk based audit 
approaches  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The current business environment has resulted 
in greater attention to audit planning 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Changes in the framework of audit regulation 
have created a greater need for the auditor to 
demonstrate a challenge to client management 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Accounting standards requiring more 
estimation and judgements have resulted in 
greater need for technical expertise 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The framework of audit regulation has led to 
greater attention to factors related to the 
auditor‘s independence from the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The framework of audit regulation has led to 
increased focus on conducting an audit beyond 
the minimum requirements of auditing 
standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The framework of audit regulation has resulted 
in less reliance on the auditor‘s professional 
judgement 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 4: The following statements refer to the manner in which audit quality is achieved on 
individual audit engagements in practice. Based on your experience in inspecting audit 
engagements, please indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement by 
circling one number on the scale from 1 where you strongly disagree to 5 where you strongly 
agree with the statement. (Please circle only one response per statement): 
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1. Audit software facilitates compliance with 
the technical requirements of auditing 
standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Audit software promotes compliance with 
documentation requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Performance appraisal systems within audit 
firms increase compliance with the technical 
requirements of auditing standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Performance appraisal systems within audit 
firms improve compliance with 
documentation requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Internal reviews within the audit firm 
enhance compliance with the technical 
requirements of auditing standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Internal reviews within the audit firm 
improve compliance with documentation 
requirements 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Risk based audit approaches help the 
auditor to provide  value for money to the 
client  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Risk based audit approaches help the 
auditor to provide  value added services to 
the audit client 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Effective communication from the auditor to 
client management helps to satisfy the 
client‘s expectations 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Interaction between the auditor and client 
management enhances the degree to which 
audit services are valued 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Risk based audit approaches facilitate the 
achievement of an effective and efficient 
audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The degree of involvement of the audit 
engagement partner during audit planning 
influences the quality of the resulting audit 
process 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Technical and other consultations within the 
firm during planning influence the quality of 
the resulting audit process 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Training within the audit firm enhances the 
delivery of an effective and  efficient audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Internal reviews within the audit firm ensure 
the delivery of an effective and efficient 
audit  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 4: The following statements refer to the manner in which audit quality is achieved on 
individual audit engagements in practice. Based on your experience in inspecting audit 
engagements, please indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement by 
circling one number on the scale from 1 where you strongly disagree to 5 where you strongly 
agree with the statement. (Please circle only one response per statement): 
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16. Audit software facilitates the achievement of 
an effective and efficient audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Training within the audit firm enhances 
auditors‘ technical expertise 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Training within the audit firm improves 
auditors‘ ability to challenge the 
management of audit clients 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Technical and other consultations within the 
audit firm enhance the quality of 
judgements made during the completion of 
the audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Internal reviews within the audit firm 
enhance the quality of audit judgements 
made during the audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Internal reviews within the audit firm 
enhance auditors technical expertise 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Internal reviews within the audit firm ensure 
the auditor‘s independence from the audit 
client 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Audit firm methodologies and manuals 
improve the quality of audit judgement 
applied during the audit 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Audit firm methodologies and manuals 
enhance the auditor‘s ability to challenge 
client management  
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Performance appraisal systems within the 
audit firm improve the auditor‘s 
independence  
1 2 3 4 5 
26. Performance appraisal systems within the 
audit firm enhance the auditor‘s technical 
expertise  
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Interaction between the auditor and the 
audit committee is influential in determining 
the content of audit work undertaken 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Interaction between the auditor and the 
audit committee facilitate the right audit 
opinion being reported 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 5: The following statements refer to possible issues that may arise in the 
process of inspection. Please indicate your personal experience of the occurrence of 
issues by ticking one number on the scale. If you feel issue never or rarely occur 
please tick the number 1. If you feel the issue always occur, tick 5. If your feelings 
are less strong, please tick one of the numbers in the middle. (Please tick only one 
response per statement): 
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1. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning the sufficiency of 
audit work? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning the 
appropriateness of the audit opinion? 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning compliance with 
ethical standards? 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning compliance with 
international accounting standards (IAS)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning the adequacy of 
audit documentation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning the adequacy of 
the auditor's 'challenge' to management? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. How often in the process of inspection do 
issues arise concerning compliance with 
auditing standards? 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. How often in the process of inspection 
are issues that arise resolved by 
discussion with the audit team? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire, continued 
Section 6A: The following statements refer to general propositions about audit 
quality in practice. Please tick one number for each statement to indicate the 
strength of your agreement with that statement, where 1 indicates that you 
strongly disagree and 5 that you strongly agree with the statement. (Please tick 
only one response per statement) 
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1. In general, the quality of auditing in the 
UK is high 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The quality of auditing in the UK has 
increased during the last decade 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The quality of auditing in the UK has 
decreased during the last decade 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. There is a high level of consistency 
between audits in the quality of auditing 
achieved in practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. There is considerable variation between 
audits in the quality of auditing achieved 
in practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. In general market participants perceive 
the standard of audit quality to be 
adequate  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. General concerns about audit quality in 
recent years are based on a proper 
understanding of the conduct of audits in 
practice 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section 6B: Based upon what you have seen, heard, and experienced during audit 
inspections, please rank the following items according to their importance as 
influences on the conduct of audits in practice. Place a "1" next to the item that you 
consider to be most influential, a "2" next to the item that is next most influential, 
and so on. No two items can have the same ranking. 
a. The approach to the conduct of audits in practice reflects the compliance 
obligations placed on the public accounting firm     __________ 
b. The approach to the conduct of audits in practice reflects the commercial values 
of the public accounting firm       __________ 
c. The approach to the conduct of audits in practice reflects the professional values 
of the public accounting firm      __________ 
 
 
Thank you for answering this questionnaire. 
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